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For decades, the Chinese government has been concerned about its ability to meet the 
grain self-sufficiency goal due to the depletion of cultivated land caused by urbanization 
and industrialization.  The Dynamic Balance Policy (DBP) was initiated in 1998 to 
balance China‘s need to protect cultivated land with the need to provide land for urban 
and industrial development.  The DBP is a ―no net loss‖ policy which requires local 
government to keep their good-quality cultivated land at the current level.  If cultivated 
land is converted to other uses, an equal amount of other land, adjusted for the quality, 
must be converted to cultivation to compensate for the loss.   
Empirical evidence suggests that the DBP has had no effects of reducing cultivated 
land loss in China.  Economic incentives, such as the values of urban and cultivated land, 
emerge as the most influential factors for China‘s land use changes.  Moreover, these 
economic incentives may have overridden the effects of the DBP, if any.  Polices can be 
made more effective to address the windfall profits in land acquisition and conveyance, 
and offer economic incentives for not converting cultivated land to urban uses.  
This dissertation conducts a systematic examination of the effects of the DBP of 
curbing the rate of cultivated land conversion.  In particular, it develops a theoretical 
model of land conversion that combines the institutional structure of land use in China 
and the incentive structure of Chinese local officials whose goal is to promote local 
economies and budgetary balances.  This model serves as the theoretical foundation for 
the empirical examination.  The empirical implementation of the land conversion model 
uses the official land use data provided by the Ministry of Land and Resources of China 
and economic data published in various issues of provincial statistical yearbooks.  This 
is a unique set of data which combines China‘s official land use data and economic data 
at the prefecture level and covers a period of rapid economic growth and prominent 
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1.1 Overview  
The loss of agricultural land to urban uses has become a stylized fact of economic 
growth characterized by urbanization and industrialization.  No country, whether 
developed or developing, has been able to avoid it.  Amid the loss of agricultural land to 
urban uses, the loss of prime farmland is a great concern due to its direct impact on the 
national food production and food security.     
While farmland loss to urbanization is an international concern, China‘s problem is 
aggravated in five aspects.  First, China‘s arable land resource is very limited.  
Between China‘s population explosion which is projected to reach 1.5 billion by 2030 
and over 60% of its arable land experiencing water shortages, the potential of developing 
new cultivated land in China is not so great (State Council 2008).  Despite it being the 
fourth largest territory in the world, only 15% of the total land area in China is arable.  
In 2005, with a population of 1.3 billion, China‘s per capita arable land was merely 0.11 
hectares—half of the world‘s average and less than 20% of the United States‘ arable land 
per capita (FAO).   
Second, in addition to limited per capita land resources, China‘s land use reveals 
apparent inefficiencies.  To spur the local economy and to attract private and foreign 
investment, a common practice of local governments is to set aside land for industrial 
development.  This land largely comes from cultivated land, but reportedly less than 14% 
of it is ever actually developed.  In fact, over 1.73 million hectares of set-aside 
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construction land still remain idle after the fervent growth of development zones between 
1987 and 2003 (China Economics Weekly 2004).     
Third, it is not the quantity of land lost, but rather the loss of soil productivity that 
concerns the Chinese government, raising fears about their ability to meet grain 
self-sufficiency goals.  Land development in China does not typically take the physical 
properties of land into consideration, resulting in great losses of fertile cultivated land 
(Yeh and Li 1999).  The loss of such land cannot be offset simply by the development of 
new cultivated land.  The land lost is mostly wetland and irrigated land—prime for 
farming.  However, less than 40% of the newly developed land for cultivation is 
equipped with irrigation and drainage facilities (State Council 2008). 
Fourth, illegal and unapproved land development projects not only encroach upon a 
large quantity of cultivated land and cause millions of farmers lose their way of living, 
but also present a challenge to China‘s legal system.  Collusion between regulators and 
land developers resulting in the incompliance of land use laws is prevalent in China.  
Maintenance of the law and order throughout the country is crucial for China‘s further 
economic prosperity (The 21
st
 Century Economic Report 2003b; China Economics 
Weekly 2004; State Council 2008).   
Fifth, rural land acquisition, a synonym of cultivated land conversion in the literature 
of land use in China, often leads to conflicts between ordinary farmers and government.  
Due to the ownership of land in China, rural land has to be acquired by government 
agencies before it can be used for non-agricultural purposes.  Such conflicts have taken 
place in various forms and scales, ranging from peaceful protests to violent 
demonstrations, serving as a source of social instability in China.   
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1.2 Research Motivation and Questions 
The continuous loss of cultivated land and its associated problems have made the 
protection of cultivated land one of the most pressing land policy challenges faced by the 
Chinese government.  As China juggled the task of cultivated land preservation with the 
need for land for urban and industrial development, a series of measures have been 
adopted, of which the most fundamental one is the revision of the Land Administration 
Law with the provision of the Dynamic Balance Policy (DBP) in 1998.  The DBP is a 
―no net loss‖ policy which requires local government to keep their good-quality, 
cultivated land at the current level.  If cultivated land is used for purposes other than 
cultivation, an equal amount of other land, adjusted for quality, must to be brought into 
cultivation.  In light of this postulation, land use composition is expected to change 
constantly, but the net change in cultivated land area is required to be zero, achieving a 
―dynamic balance‖.   
In keeping with China‘s administrative approach to managing land use, the DBP 
imposes a quota on conversion of cultivated land to urban uses, requiring a zero net 
change in cultivated land areas.  Achieving this quota depends upon the economic 
incentives for land conversion and sales.  If the economic incentives overpower the 
administrative disincentives, the effectiveness of the policy may be jeopardized.  
Motivated by this general conception, this dissertation attempts to answer the following 
questions:   
(1) What are the economic incentives for converting cultivated land to urban 
uses?   
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(2) How does the DBP affect the land use changes?  And how does the DBP 
affects the incentive structure of land conversion? 
(3) Has the DBP had its intended effects?   
1.3 Research Contribution 
China has received a great deal of academic attention due to its rapid economic 
growth and urbanization and its accompanying loss of cultivated land.  Surprisingly 
though, there has been no evaluation of the impacts of China‘s cultivated land protection 
policies, and especially no examination of how the policies impact the area of cultivated 
land.  After more than a decade since the promulgation of the policy, this dissertation 
serves as the first systematic examination of the DBP‘s impacts on China‘s land 
allocation between cultivation and urban.  
In particular, this dissertation formulates the institutional structure of land use in 
China and the incentive structure of Chinese local officials in promoting local economies 
and fiscal balances into a land conversion model, which provides a theoretical backup for 
the empirical evaluation.  The empirical implementation of the land conversion model 
adopts the official land use data provided by the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) 
of China and economic data published in various issues of provincial statistical 
yearbooks.     
This dataset offers the unique opportunity for conducting land use analysis at the 
prefecture level, a level lower than the provinces in China‘s administrative divisions,
1
 
                                                 
1
 There are five de facto administrative divisions at the local level in China.  From the top to bottom, they 
are province, prefecture, county, township, and village (China Statistical Yearbook 2008).  
Prefecture-level divisions include prefectures, autonomous prefectures, prefecture-level cities, and leagues.  
Prefecture-level cities are the largest number of prefecture-level divisions.  They resemble municipals in 
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over a period of rapid economic growth and predominant changes in land use patterns 
from 1996 to 2004.   
1.4 Dissertation Structure 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 explores the 
trends in China‘s cultivated land and urban land from 1996 to 2004.  Chapter 3 
investigates the evolution of the legal system governing the land use in China as a 
problem and solution process.  It discusses four major problems associated with rural 
land acquisition and their respective government responses.  Chapter 4 analyzes the 
incentives for cultivated land conversion that may counteract the effectiveness of the laws 
and the expected costs of violating the laws.  Chapter 5 reviews existing studies on 
China‘s land conversion and land use policies, and sets the benchmark for the theoretical 
and empirical analyses in the following chapters.  Chapter 6 formalizes the incentive 
structure of cultivated land conversion into a theoretical model, and derives the testable 
hypotheses for the empirical endeavor in the later chapters.  Chapter 7 presents the data 
used in the analysis.  Chapter 8 develops the empirical models and estimation methods.  
Chapter 9 discusses the estimation results and explores their policy implications.  
Chapter 10 serves as the concluding remarks. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
that they are generally composed of an urban center and surrounding rural areas much larger than the urban 
core.  Autonomous prefectures are prefectures with one or more ethnic minorities, mostly found in 
Western China.  Leagues are only found in Inner Mongolia.  Prefectures are no longer the dominant 
second-level division.  They have been mostly replaced by prefecture-level cities from 1983 to the 1990s.  
Today, they exist mostly in Western China (The Official Website of the Administrative Division of China.  
www.xzqh.org).  As prefectures, autonomous prefectures, and leagues are a small number of 
prefecture-level divisions, they are all referred to as prefectures in the remainder of dissertation.  
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2 Land Use Trends in China, 1996 – 2004 
This chapter reviews the trends in China‘s land use from 1996 to 2004.  During this 
time, China achieved remarkable economic growth and experienced great changes forced 
by such growth, including changes in its land uses.  In order to explore the transitional 
changes in China‘s land use, it is helpful to familiarize oneself with China‘s land 
classification system and terminology; therefore it will be explained in the first section of 
this chapter.  
It is also important to define the study regions.  When compared to national land use 
trends, areas with more concentrated population and more advanced economies may have 
some features distinguishing them from the national trends.  This will be further 
explained in Section 2.2. 
Following the first two preparatory sections, Sections 2.3 and 2.4 describe the land 
use composition and trends in China from 1996 to 2004 in detail.   
2.1 Land Classification in China 
There are many similar but different terms in literature to refer to land used for 
agricultural production, such as farmland, arable land, cropland, and cultivated land.  
Different countries may have different definitions for each of them, and they are 
sometimes used interchangeably.  To avoid confusion of this kind, this dissertation 
adopts the terminology defined by the MLR of China.   
Table 2.1 lists the official land classification in China based on the uses of land.  
Two types of land central to this dissertation are cultivated land and urban land.  
Cultivated land is defined as the land used for producing major food and feed grains, as 
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well as vegetables (category I).  Urban land is defined as the land classified as cities and 
towns in residential and industrial land (category V).   
When comparing China‘s land classification with that of the United States, one can 
easily find that what is referred to as cropland in the United States is further divided into 
cultivated land and horticultural land in China.
2
  The separation of cultivated land from 
cropland in China stems from the vaunted national grain self-sufficiency policy.  To 
ensure grain self-sufficiency, China imputes a minimum of 1.8 billion mu (120 million 
hectares)
3
 of cultivated land to be maintained at all times (China Daily 2010a).  In order 
monitor the change in cultivated land, the Chinese accounting system keeps cultivated 
land separate from horticultural land.     
2.2 Study Regions 
In addition to land use trends in China as a whole, this chapter examines the land use 
trends in East China and in West and Central China separately (as defined in Figure 2.1).  
Shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, East China and some parts of Central China are where 
population and cultivated land concentrated.  East China is also where the economic 
growth and urbanization the rapidest.  To study land conversions from cultivated land to 
urban land, and to examine the economic incentives for this type of conversions, this 
thesis focuses on the land use changes in East China while using West and Central China 
as a comparison.   
East China refers to the region comprised of eleven provincial administrative 
divisions along China‘s east coast.  Specifically, these provincial administrative 
                                                 
2
 For the land classification in the United States, please refer to ERS/USDA.  
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/majorlanduses/.  
3
 Mu is a Chinese unit for area.  1 mu = 1/15 hectare.   
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divisions are Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan.  Based on the official land use data from the Chinese 
government, this region constitutes 11% of the total country‘s territory and is comprised 
of 10% of the nation‘s farmland, 25% of the nation‘s cultivated land, and 35% of the 
nation‘s construction land.  This region is also the home to 37% of the Chinese 
population, totaling nearly 50 million people (based on the 2000 Census data of 1.3 
billion of population in China).  
East China has long since been the center of China‘s population and economic 
growth and is generally observed to have experienced the greatest and fastest cultivated 
land loss and urban expansion in the country.  Because this region has a very high 
population density and very little unused land, much of the urban land demand must be 
met by converting cultivated land, especially at the fringes of urban metropolitan center 
(Yeh and Li 1999; Seto and Kaufmann 2003; Ho and Lin 2004a; Tan et al. 2005; 
Lichtenberg and Ding 2009).  Between 1988 and 1996, the Pearl River Delta of the 
southern province Guangdong‘s urban area increased more than 300 percent, most of the 
increase was from converted agricultural land, particularly orchards, rice fields, and fish 
ponds (Seto and Kaufmann 2003).  Similarly, in the northern economic center formed 
by Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei, urban land area expanded by 71% between 1990 and 2000, 
and about 74% of the urban land expansion was from arable land (Tan et al. 2005).   
To make matters worse, East China is usually where the most fertile soil located and 
where the climate allows multiple cropping (Ash and Edmonds 1998; Yang and Li 2000).  
The impacts of cultivated land loss in this region can be profound on agricultural 
productivity, urban and industrial growth, and on a large number of people‘s lives.  
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Empirical findings from this region would have important implications for policy design.  
Therefore, this thesis focuses the discussion on this region.   
2.3 Land Composition 
According to the MLR land use data, the share of land of each use has not changed 
much between 1996 and 2004.  Overall, data reveals that East China has a very different 
land composition from West and Central China.  In West and Central China, over 80% 
of the land is occupied by forest, pasture, and unused land, and less than 20% is split 
among cultivated and horticultural land (combined less than 12% of the total), 
construction land composed of industrial, residential, and transportation land (around 2%), 
and inland water areas (nearly 4%).  By contrast, a majority of the land in East China is 
composed of cultivated, horticultural, residential, industrial, and transportation land, and 
inland water areas, accounting for 55% of the total land in this region.  With forestland 
taking up another 35% of the total, just a little over 10% of the land is unused land and 
pastureland.   
Although there is nearly no significant change in China‘s land composition between 
1996 and 2004, prominent changes in China‘s land use have occurred during this period 
of time, particularly in the amount of cultivated land and urban land.  The trends in 
China‘s cultivated land and urban land are examined in the following two sections, 
respectively.   
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2.4 Trends in Cultivated Land 
Figure 2.4 shows that China as a whole lost 7.4 million hectares or 5.7% of cultivated 
land between 1996 and 2004, 1.5 million hectares of which was located in the eastern and 
coastal provinces.  The West and Central parts of China also experienced a loss of 
cultivated land every year during the same period.   
Figure 2.5 shows that the loss of cultivated land was at an accelerated rate 
nationwide, especially after 2001.  It also shows that cultivated land loss in West and 
Central China has been faster than it is in East China every year since the late 1990s.  
This can be explained by the ―Grain for Green‖ (GfG) national policy which was 
launched in 1999 and required the conversion of subpar cultivated land to forests and 
pasturelands.   
The GfG policy aimed to correct China‘s long history of land use management 
problems.  In the planned economy of China from the late 1950s to the late 1970s, the 
mandate for grain self-sufficiency not only applied to the national grain supply, but also 
to the regional grain supply.  In order to achieve the regional grain self-sufficiency, local 
governments had no choice but to convert forests and pastureland into land for planting 
grain crops (Lin and Wen 1995).  Such land use practices were particularly common in 
the arid and semi-arid areas of northwestern China, however, most of the cultivated land 
developed from forests and grasslands was not suitable for cultivation.  The loss of 
forests and grasslands caused a series of environmental problems, such as soil erosion 




While the national grain self-sufficiency is still strongly advocated, the requirement 
for regional grain self-sufficiency has been relaxed since the rural reform launched in 
1979.  Several land conservation projects have been initiated to correct the 
environmental damages caused by converting forests and grasslands to cultivated land.  
The GfG policy is one of them, requiring marginal cultivated land to be reverted back to 
forests and grasslands.  Since the main objective of the GfG program is to prevent soil 
erosion, the program has made the land slope the top criteria for participation.  Land 
with 25 degrees of slope or higher in southwest China, and land with 15 degrees of slope 
or higher in northwest China are classified as marginal cultivated land and are eligible for 
program participation (Uchida, Xu, and Rozelle 2005; The Central People‘s Government 
of China 2007).   
Participating farmers are compensated with grain, cash, and/or free seedlings.  
Compensation in different regions is made different based on the opportunity cost of the 
land.  On average, the total value of three types of compensation—grain, cash, and 
seedlings—is worth RMB 3,150 per hectare in the middle and upper reaches of the 
Yellow River
4
 in the first year of the program participation, and RMB 2,400 per hectare 
per year from the second year.  Due to the higher opportunity cost of land, the total 
compensation package in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River
5
 is valued at RMB 
4,200 per hectare for the first year of the program participation, and RMB 3,450 per 
                                                 
4
 The Yellow River passes through 9 provincial administrative divisions.  From its origin to its end, they 
are Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong (The Official 
Website of the Administrative Division of China. www.xzqh.org).  With the exception of Shandong, they 
are all located in western and central China as shown in the Map of China (Figure 2.1).  Shandong is 
located in eastern China.   
5
 The Yangtze River passes through 11 provincial administrative divisions.  From its origin to its end, 
they are Qinghai, Tibet, Yunnan, Sichuan, Chongqing, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui, Jiangsu, and 
Shanghai.  With the exception of Jiangsu and Shanghai, they are all located in western and central China 
as shown in the Map of China (Figure 2.1).   
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hectare per year from the second year (Uchida, Xu, and Rozelle 2005; The Central 
People‘s Government of China 2007).  Moreover, the compensation is paid for a total of 
8 years if land is converted to ecological forests, 5 years if land is converted to cash 
forests, and 2 years if land is converted to grasslands (The Central People‘s Government 
of China 2007).   
The GfG program started in 1999 as a pilot program in Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu 
provinces.  By the end of 2001, the program was expanded to 20 provinces (Uchida, Xu, 
and Rozelle 2005).  The GfG policy was promulgated almost at the same time as when 
the DBP took in effect, and these two policies seem to have conflicting requirements.  
The conflicts are resolved as follows.  The DBP targets at high-quality and good-quality 
cultivated land, while land lost due to the Grain for Green policy is mostly unproductive 
land, and thus, is not subject to the DBP requirement.   
Evidence from Yang and Li (2000) proved a majority of the cultivated land loss in 
northwestern China was attributed to such reversions advocated by the GfG policy.  The 
transition matrices of land use presented in Section 2.6 will shed some light on the 
impacts of the GfG policy on land use changes in West and Central China.      
2.5 Trends in Urban Land 
Between 1996 and 2004, as the area of cultivated land declines, the area of urban 
land—defined as the sum of cities and towns—has increased both in East China and in 
West and Central China (Figure 2.6).  The rate of urban land expansion in East China 
was significantly higher than it was in West and Central China since 2000 (Figure 2.7).   
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Overall, there has been a decreasing trend in cultivated land and an increasing trend 
in urban land.  Without the assistance of land transition data, we cannot determine 
whether the loss of cultivated land is solely due to urban land expansion.  As Figures 2.5 
and 2.7 together reveal that the rapid annual loss of cultivated land in West and Central 
China after 2000 did not lead to the same rapid annual percentage increase in urban land.  
As mentioned before, the loss of cultivated land in West and Central China may well 
have been induced by the national policy of ecological land conservation.  To better 
understand the whereabouts of the lost cultivated land in different regions, the following 
sections explore the data of land transitions from one type of use to another.  
2.6 Trends in Land Transitions 
Using the MLR land transition data from 1996 to 2001, this section explores the 
transitions between cultivated land and other types of land, with a focus on transitions 
between cultivated land and urban land.  Transition data measures land conversions in 
both directions, and help to pinpoint the culprits of cultivated land loss and the sources of 
newly added cultivated land and urban land.   
2.6.1 Transition Matrix of Cultivated Land 
This section uncovers the major culprits of cultivated land losses and the sources of 
newly added cultivated land.  The top two culprits of cultivated land loss across the 
country are reforestation and expansion of grasslands, accounting for 25.32% and 16.50% 
of the cumulative loss of cultivated land from 1996 to 2001, respectively (Table 2.2A).  
In particular, the 1999 GfG policy of reverting marginal cultivated land to forests and 
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pastureland created a sharp rise in the amount of cultivated land lost to forests and 
pastures from 1999 to 2001.    
Residential, industrial, and transportation land combined is the third largest 
contributor of the cultivated land loss nationwide.  This type of conversion of cultivated 
land has caught special attention from scholars and policy makers because it is typically 
irreversible and a large number of people‘s lives are affected throughout the process.          
As illustrated in the lower panel of Table 2.2A, most of the new cultivated land in 
China is from unused land.  Unused land is also a net contributor to the increase in 
cultivated land every year except 1996.  In addition, while the reversion to forests and 
grasslands has taken over a lot of cultivated land, forests and grasslands are also the 
second and third largest contributors to the cumulative increase in cultivated land from 
1996 to 2001.  By contrast, residential and industrial land or transportation land is rarely 
converted to cultivated land. 
In East China, the trends in land transitions between cultivated land and other lands 
are very different from the national trends as well as the trends in West and Central China.  
Not surprisingly, the loss of cultivated land to residential, industrial, and transportation 
land in this region is more prominent than in other parts of China.  Residential, 
industrial, and transportation land combined accounted for the largest cumulative loss of 
cultivated land in the eastern and coastal region from 1996 to 2001 (Table 2.2B).   
Furthermore, cities and towns of residential and industrial land are urban areas that 
can easily expand into surrounding cultivated land.  In China as a whole, urban land 
expansion contributed less than 4% of the total loss of cultivated land between 1996 and 
2001, lower than any other contributors.  By contrast, in East China, the contribution of 
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urban land expansion to cultivated land loss in the same time period was nearly 9%, 
higher than the percent contribution of pastureland and unused land and only slightly 
lower than the percent contribution of forestland and transportation land. 
The next two largest contributors of cultivated land loss are water areas and 
horticultural land.  Since some water areas and horticultural lands are for agricultural 
production, this implies that considerable structural changes in agriculture have occurred 
in this region.  With higher income levels, people in East China consume increasing 
quantities of fruits and aquatic products and less grain cereals, thus changing food supply 
demands (Heilig 1997).  Farmers also have shifted from growing grain crops to fruit 
trees in hopes of higher compensation should their land be taken by the government since 
the amount of land compensation is determined by the output value of their land in the 
past three years.  Because the value of fruit trees is much higher than that of grains, 
orchard farmers can receive much for compensation for their land then crop farmers (Ma 
2009).   
Moreover, even though East China has also experienced increased losses of 
cultivated land to forests and pasturelands, the GfG policy is not a dominating force for 
the cultivated land loss in this region.  The share of cultivated land loss due to 
reforestation and the expansion of grasslands in this region is far below the national 
average.  The share of cultivated land turned unused is also lower than the national 
average, indicating higher land use efficiency in this region.   
Among the sources of new cultivated land, horticultural land and unused land are two 
net contributors to the increase in cultivated land in East China.  Unused land alone is 
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the most important source of new cultivated land in this region.  From 1996 to 2001, 
nearly 64,000 hectares of the net increase in cultivated land came from unused land.    
To illustrate the differences in the leading causes for cultivated land loss in East 
China and in the rest of the country, Table 2.2C summarizes the transitions between 
cultivated land and other types of land in West and Central China.  Similar to the 
average trend in China as a whole, forests and grasslands are the major culprits for 
cultivated land loss in West and Central China, accounting for over 50% of the total loss 
between 1996 and 2001.  Only 8.8% of the total loss of cultivated land in this region 
during this period of time is due to residential and industrial development, as opposed to 
34% in East China.  Meanwhile, nearly 50% of the increase in cultivated land in West 
and Central China comes from forests and grasslands.  However, forests and grasslands 
are not the net contributors to newly added cultivated land.   
Land transition data also reveals that participating provinces of the GfG programs are 
concentrated in West and Central China.  Some provinces in East China, Zhejiang for 
example, have participated in the reversion of cultivated land to forests, but very few 
have participated in the reversion of cultivated land to grasslands due to the geophysical 
conditions of the region.  Although it would be desirable to explore the intentional 
conversion of cultivated land for ecological conservation purposes, such exploration is 
not central to this thesis.   
2.6.2 Transition Matrix of Urban Land 
Because transition data is only available for land of the first-level classified uses, 
while cities and towns comprising urban land are second-level classifications in 
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residential and industrial land, there is no data on transitions between urban land and 
other residential and industrial land or unused land.  Table 2.3A, 2.3B, and 2.3C 
summarize the transitions between urban land and other types of land implied by 
available data in whole China, East China, and West and Central China, respectively.   
It can be learned from Table 2.3A and 2.3B that the decrease in urban land is trivial 
compared with its increase every year, except 2000.  The significant decrease in urban 
land in 2000 was mainly because Shanghai converted 17,339 hectares of their town areas 
to cultivated land, constituting 99% of the total conversion of this kind in the entire 
country that year.  This dramatic decrease in the urban area of Shanghai is likely due to 
a deliberate policy in 2000, because the conversion from urban land to cultivated land in 
Shanghai in all other years is practically zero.  
It is important to note that the percent contribution of each type of land to the 
changes in urban land in Table 2.3 would be smaller if transitions between urban land and 
other residential and industrial land and unused land were counted.  Nevertheless, the 
percentages calculated based on incomplete transition data indicate that transitions 
between urban land and cultivated land are the most important among all kinds in both 
directions.  Overall, cultivated land is still the largest net source of new urban land in all 
three regions examined.  If taking the conversion from town areas to cultivated land in 
Shanghai 2000 out of the equation, the total area of new urban land converted from 
cultivated land between 1996 and 2001 is nearly 20 times the total area of urban land 
converted to cultivated land in China as a whole, and 13 times in East China.    
The examination of the land transition data leads to the confirmation of the general 
allegation that China‘s urban land expansion has encroached upon a large amount of 
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cultivated land.  Concerned with the ability to meet the nation‘s grain self-sufficiency 
goal, the Chinese government has taken a series of measures to protect cultivated land.  
However, due to the public ownership of land, government agencies in China play a role 
similar to private land developers yet simultaneously act as enforcement agencies of land 
use regulations and laws.  Such conflicting roles have triggered a series of problems in 
land use and management.  The next chapter details these problems and discusses the 




Table 2.1  Land Classification in China 
 
I.  Cultivated Land 
 Irrigated Rice Paddy 
 Rain-fed Paddy 
 Irrigated Cropland 
 Dry Land 
 Vegetable Land 
 
V.  Residential and Industrial Land 
 Cities 
 Towns 
 Rural Settlements 
 Stand-alone Industrial and Mining Sites 
 Saline Fields 
 Land for Special Uses (Military, 
Religious, Prisons, Cemeteries, etc. 
 
 
II.  Horticultural Land 
 Orchards 
 Mulberry Fields 
 Tea Gardens 
 Rubber Plantation 
 Other Perennial Plantation 
 
VI.  Transportation Land 
 Rail Roads 
 Highways 
 Rural Roads 
 Civil Airports 
 Harbors and Docks 
 
 
III.  Forest Land 
 Closed Forest 
 Bushes 
 Sparse Forests 
 Young Afforested Land 
 Forests Stripped of Vegetation after Cut 
or Fire for at Least Five Years 
 Breeding Nurseries 
 





 Reed Area 
 Flooded Area and Tidal Flats 
 Irrigation Infrastructure 
 Flood Control Structures 




IV.  Pastureland 
 Natural Grassland 
 Improved Grassland 
 Sown Grassland 
 
VIII.  Unused Land 
 Unused Grassland 
 Saline-alkali Land 
 Marshes and Swamps 
 Deserts 
 Barren Earth 
 Bare Rocks and Gravels 
 Berms 
 Other Unused Land 
 





Table 2.2  Transitions between Cultivated Land and Other Types of Land 
(Hectares), 1996-2001 
 
A. Whole China 
Cities and
Towns
1996 1,416,543      214,306         277,498     111,287  215,249        55,399          86,532      260,018  251,652  
1997 850,732         153,647         146,066     86,053    170,141        38,261          59,263      145,001  90,561    
1998 570,405         57,469           73,014       85,293    103,187        32,895          48,840      137,617  64,986    
1999 841,677         71,971           181,389     106,181  116,793        28,264          64,620      160,714  140,009  
2000 1,206,508      198,458         477,586     283,577  115,061        30,094          38,389      45,888    47,549    
2001 893,268         83,376           308,007     281,243  120,387        37,314          34,978      42,626    22,652    
Cumulative 5,779,134      779,228         1,463,560  953,634  840,818        222,226        332,621    791,863  617,409  
% 100.00 13.48 25.32 16.50 14.55 3.85 5.76 13.70 10.68
Cities and
Towns
1996 683,532         62,113           221,050     141,140  8,975            538               1,491        64,192    184,571  
1997 372,961         55,862           40,234       101,261  17,879          1,803            5,911        45,059    106,754  
1998 309,369         45,674           55,184       58,628    19,764          4,999            5,444        25,170    99,505    
1999 405,075         48,996           36,315       55,435    24,985          1,734            6,631        52,806    179,907  
2000 586,051         57,188           89,788       182,569  41,107          17,908          2,650        62,294    150,454  
2001 265,944         37,356           25,391       25,858    20,600          2,235            2,084        54,756    99,899    
Cumulative 2,622,931      307,189         467,963     564,890  133,310        29,217          24,211      304,279  821,090  















Horticulture Forest Pasture Transport Water Unused
Residential and Industrial
 
B. East China 
Cities and
Towns
1996 305,631         58,526           24,724       2,727      90,725          28,939          33,029      57,256    38,643    
1997 346,043         45,309           29,444       6,279      98,848          18,229          28,154      101,584  36,425    
1998 140,582         24,500           7,704         499         55,869          14,946          22,424      24,988    4,597      
1999 155,479         19,524           17,880       1,297      54,138          10,744          26,203      30,470    5,969      
2000 181,359         32,219           24,260       7,155      68,956          17,438          19,441      23,585    5,743      
2001 190,440         25,387           36,549       8,448      78,552          23,402          12,777      21,294    7,433      
Cumulative 1,319,536      205,465         140,561     26,406    447,088        113,699        142,029    259,177  98,810    
% 100.00 15.57 10.65 2.00 33.88 8.62 10.76 19.64 7.49
Cities and
Towns
1996 107,415         52,777           15,768       2,430      3,871            487               621           16,064    15,884    
1997 119,922         37,355           6,734         1,757      10,017          1,238            5,502        34,680    23,877    
1998 80,309           24,393           6,435         1,661      9,962            4,440            2,360        14,171    21,328    
1999 94,968           24,778           8,399         1,625      8,972            851               844           19,397    30,953    
2000 140,514         42,044           11,496       991         26,338          17,482          952           20,406    38,287    
2001 105,416         24,323           6,667         122         9,421            1,654            1,147        31,415    32,320    
Cumulative 648,544         205,672         55,499       8,584      68,581          26,151          11,425      136,134  162,649  





















C. West and Central China 
Cities and 
Towns
1996 1,110,912      155,781         252,774     108,560  124,524        26,459          53,503      202,762  213,009  
1997 504,688         108,338         116,622     79,774    71,293          20,032          31,109      43,417    54,136    
1998 429,823         32,968           65,309       84,794    47,318          17,949          26,416      112,629  60,388    
1999 686,197         52,448           163,509     104,884  62,655          17,520          38,417      130,244  134,041  
2000 1,025,149      166,240         453,327     276,422  46,105          12,656          18,947      22,303    41,806    
2001 702,828         57,989           271,458     272,795  41,835          13,911          22,201      21,332    15,219    
Cumulative 4,459,598      573,763         1,322,999  927,228  393,729        108,528        190,593    532,687  518,599  
% 100.00 12.87 29.67 20.79 8.83 2.43 4.27 11.94 11.63
Cities and 
Towns
1996 576,117         9,336             205,282     138,710  5,104            52                 871           48,128    168,687  
1997 253,039         18,507           33,500       99,504    7,863            565               410           10,379    82,876    
1998 229,060         21,281           48,749       56,968    9,803            559               3,084        10,999    78,177    
1999 310,106         24,218           27,916       53,810    16,012          883               5,787        33,409    148,954  
2000 445,537         15,144           78,292       181,578  14,769          426               1,698        41,888    112,168  
2001 160,528         13,033           18,724       25,736    11,178          582               937           23,342    67,579    
Cumulative 1,974,388      101,517         412,464     556,306  64,729          3,066            12,786      168,145  658,440  















Residential and Industrial 
Transport Water Unused
 




Table 2.3  Transitions between Urban Land (Cities and Towns) and Other Types of 
Land (Hectares), 1996-2001 
 
A.  Whole China 






1996 1,542            538             23                  28               147               n.a. 415              390            n.a.
1997 5,012            1,803          138                323             1,102            n.a. 707              938            n.a.
1998 7,325            4,999          134                303             23                 n.a. 917              948            n.a.
1999 3,902            1,734          275                852             2                   n.a. 549              492            n.a.
2000 20,968          17,908        419                514             39                 n.a. 1,319           769            n.a.
2001 4,788            2,235          553                325             58                 n.a. 716              900            n.a.
Cumulative 43,538          29,217        1,543             2,345          1,372            n.a. 4,624           4,436         n.a.
% 100.00          67.11          3.54               5.39            3.15              n.a. 10.62           10.19         n.a.






1996 94,235          55,399        3,390             10,135        789               n.a. 980              23,541       n.a.
1997 53,883          38,261        2,404             4,926          448               n.a. 1,563           6,281         n.a.
1998 65,339          32,895        4,631             6,796          10,992          n.a. 1,432           8,593         n.a.
1999 41,083          28,264        2,915             3,745          1,102            n.a. 1,502           3,555         n.a.
2000 41,931          30,094        2,624             2,879          322               n.a. 1,253           4,760         n.a.
2001 54,378          37,314        4,918             2,785          851               n.a. 2,428           6,082         n.a.
Cumulative 350,850        222,226      20,882           31,266        14,505          n.a. 9,158           52,813       n.a.










B.  East China 






1996 834               487               9                   23                 13 n.a. 225               77                 n.a.
1997 2,776            1,238            72                 229               0 n.a. 363               875               n.a.
1998 6,264            4,440            78                 247               2 n.a. 657               839               n.a.
1999 2,500            851               230               703               0 n.a. 311               406               n.a.
2000 19,186          17,482          246               346               0 n.a. 602               510               n.a.
2001 3,591            1,654            522               277               0 n.a. 559               578               n.a.
Cumulative 35,150          26,151          1,157            1,825            15                 n.a. 2,716            3,285            n.a.
% 100.00          74.40            3.29              5.19              0.04              n.a. 7.73              9.35              n.a.






1996 62,114          28,939          2,582            8,069            43                 n.a. 619               21,860          n.a.
1997 25,701          18,229          1,387            1,670            7                   n.a. 913               3,494            n.a.
1998 27,450          14,946          2,732            3,442            52                 n.a. 765               5,513            n.a.
1999 16,699          10,744          1,609            1,885            14                 n.a. 710               1,737            n.a.
2000 25,362          17,438          1,826            1,698            20                 n.a. 636               3,745            n.a.
2001 35,619          23,402          3,898            1,664            31                 n.a. 2,000            4,623            n.a.
Cumulative 192,944        113,699        14,035          18,429          167               n.a. 5,643            40,972          n.a.













C.  West and Central China 






1996 708               52                 15                 4                   134               n.a. 190               313               n.a.
1997 2,236            565               66                 95                 1,102            n.a. 345               63                 n.a.
1998 1,061            559               56                 56                 22                 n.a. 261               108               n.a.
1999 1,403            883               45                 149               2                   n.a. 238               86                 n.a.
2000 1,783            426               173               168               39                 n.a. 718               259               n.a.
2001 1,197            582               32                 48                 58                 n.a. 157               321               n.a.
Cumulative 8,388            3,066            386               520               1,357            n.a. 1,908            1,151            n.a.
% 100.00          36.56            4.60              6.20              16.18            n.a. 22.75            13.72            n.a.






1996 32,121          26,459          808               2,065            746               n.a. 361               1,681            n.a.
1997 28,182          20,032          1,017            3,255            442               n.a. 649               2,787            n.a.
1998 37,889          17,949          1,899            3,354            10,940          n.a. 667               3,080            n.a.
1999 24,385          17,520          1,306            1,860            1,088            n.a. 792               1,818            n.a.
2000 16,569          12,656          798               1,181            302               n.a. 617               1,015            n.a.
2001 18,760          13,911          1,020            1,121            820               n.a. 428               1,460            n.a.
Cumulative 157,906        108,528        6,847            12,837          14,337          n.a. 3,516            11,841          n.a.














Figure 2.1  East, Central and West Divisions of China 
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Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). www.fao.org.  
Note: This figure from the FAO is originally titled as Permanent Crops & Arable Land 
(Percentage Intensity).  By the FAO definition, permanent cropland and arable land 




Figure 2.3  Population Density in China (People per Square Kilometer) 
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Figure 2.4  Decline in Cultivated Land in China, 1996 – 2004   
 
Data Source: The Ministry of Land and Resources of China. 
 
Figure 2.5  Annual Percent Decrease in Cultivated Land, 1996 – 2004  
 
Data Source: The Ministry of Land and Resources of China. 
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Figure 2.6  Increase in Urban Land in China, 1996 – 2004  
 
Data Source: The Ministry of Land and Resources of China. 
 
Figure 2.7  Annual Percent Increase in Urban Land in China, 1996 – 2004  
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3 Evolution of the Legal System Governing 
Land Use in China: Problems and 
Solutions 
China‘s land use governing system is established to address specific problems and 
continues to evolve as new issues arise.  China‘s Constitution states all land in China is 
public.  While urban land is owned by the state, rural land is collectively owned by rural 
residents in a village.  The first Land Administration Law (LAL) in China was created 
in 1986 to respond to the challenge of providing publicly-owned land to private users.  It 
is the legal structure overseeing all land use.  Since its inception in 1986, the LAL has 
been amended in 1988, and revised in 1998 and 2004 in order to better address problems 
and conflicts in land use and management, including setting regulations for rural land 
acquisition and conveyance.  The LAL and its affiliated regulations, such as the 
Implementation Regulations of the Land Administration Law, the National Land Use 
Master Planning Guidelines for 1986 – 2000, 1996 – 2010, and 2006 – 2020,
6
 and other 
regulations issued by the State Council or the MLR, specify the legal procedures of rural 
land acquisition.  Table 3.1 lists the laws and regulations pertaining to this study in the 
chronological order. 
The development of the urban land use right system and urban land market under the 
regulations of the LAL since 1986 has led to an increased demand for land for urban 
development.  Such demand is typically met by converting rural land, which is a 
                                                 
6
 The National Land Use Master Planning Guidelines are made by the Ministry of Land and Resources of 
China.   
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government taking process, causing many of the problems outlined in the introduction 
chapter.   
Section 3.1 is a brief discussion of the development of the urban land use rights and 
leasing in China, which motivates the discussion of rural land acquisition.  Sections 3.2 
– 3.5 investigate four major problems of rural land acquisition: food security, social 
unrest, illicit land acquisition practices, and the relationship between land speculation and 
unused construction land.  These sections analyze the factors that contributed to these 
four conflicts, as well as government responses through new laws and regulations, such 
as the Dynamic Balance Policy.   
3.1 Urban Land Use Right System  
This section outlines the development of the urban land market in China, which 
motivates the discussion of rural land acquisition.  In the early stage of the economic 
reform, China faced the paradox of supplying land to private development while still 
upholding the public ownership of land.  Leasing land to private entities was only 
allowed under local rules in the Special Economic Zones (SEZ)—zones designated by 
China along its east coast in early 1980s to create a more conducive business 
environment in the economic reform.
7
  Private land leasing nationwide was not legalized 
until 1986 with the enactment of the LAL.   
In order to separate the use of land from the ownership of land, China adopted the 
Leasehold System created by Hong Kong in which the government sold the rights to use 
the land but not the land itself (Zhang and Pearlman 2004).  Based on Hong Kong‘s 
                                                 
7
 The first four SEZs are Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou of Guangdong Province, and Xiamen of Fujian 
Province.  They enjoyed more flexible and liberal economic and government measures than the rest of the 
country.      
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System the LAL of 1986 legitimized the granting of land use rights (LUR) to urban 
private land users and the transfer of LUR among them.  The Provisional Regulations of 
the Grant and Transfer of the Use Rights of Urban Land (hereafter referred to as the 
Provisional Regulations) issued in 1990, coupled with the LAL, provided concrete 
procedures and national guidelines for the allocation and leasing of state-owned urban 
land.   
According to the Provisional Regulations, the grant of the LUR by the state to public 
and private land users is executed in two ways.  The grant of the LUR to public users is 
called the state allocation.  It retains the characteristics of the plan system of the 
pre-reform China, in that the state assigns the LUR to state units and nonprofit 
organizations (such as public schools, military facilities, and temples) virtually free of 
charge and without a time limit.  The grant of the LUR to urban private users is called 
public land leasing or conveyance.  Public land leasing has significant market 
characteristics and, thus, is referred to as the market system, as opposed to the traditional 
plan system (Ho and Lin 2003; Ding and Knaap 2005). 
In the public land leasing system, while land ownership remains public, private land 
users can purchase the use rights of urban land for a fixed time period—40 years for 
commercial uses, 50 years for industrial and educational uses, and 70 years for residential 
uses (State Council 1986, 1988, 1998, and 2004).  In addition to the transaction fee 
which applies to both public and private land users, private land users also pay a 
substantial amount for the LUR.  The payment for the LUR, also known as the 
conveyance fee, is determined by negotiation, bidding (zhaobiao), auction (paimai), or 
listing (guapai).  Factors influencing the conveyance fee include location, land grade, 
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intended use type, floor-area ratio, infrastructure cost, demolition cost, land acquisition 
cost, and urban land use taxes, similar to the factors in western land markets.   
Negotiation was the preferred method for determining land users and conveyance 
fees for a long time until the passage of the Regulations on Bidding, Auction and Listing 
in Land Conveyance in 2003, which required that public land leasing be done only 
through bidding, auction, and listing (Lin and Ho 2005; Cai, Henderson, and Zhang 2009).  
The land market in the early stage of China‘s economic reform was very informal.  Due 
to the lack of transparency and auditing system in China in general, it was no surprise that 
governments granted land use rights to their favored developers at a negotiated price.     
Bidding, auction, and listing are more competitive and transparent methods than 
negotiation for deciding on the land users and conveyance fees and are designed to 
develop a competitive land market in China.  The basic difference is that bidding is a 
one-time game while auction and listing are repeated games.  More specifically, in 
bidding, local land bureaus invite public bids and select the bid best suitable for their 
community and development needs.   
Auctions resemble English auctions in that bids are organized in an ascending order, 
and the highest bidder with a bid higher than the reservation price wins the auction.  
Land conveyances through English auctions are quite transparent and often videotaped 
with the press present (Cai, Henderson, and Zhang 2009).   
By comparison, listing is an unusual kind of auction that involves two stages (Cai, 
Henderson, and Zhang 2009).  In the first stage, bidding is open for ten working days.  
Bids are posted on the trading board of the land bureau and on the internet immediately 
after they are submitted (this is why it is called listing (guapai) in Chinese terms).  
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During these 10 working days, bidders can withdraw or resubmit their bids based on the 
posted bids.  At the end of the first stage, if there is only one bidder left, this bidder gets 
the property at his/her bid price, as long as it is not lower than the reservation price.  If 
there are more than one standing bidders, the auction enters the second stage which is a 
standard ascending English auction among the remaining bidders.   
Apart from negotiation, auction and listing are the two prevailing methods for 
determining land users and conveyance fees in China at large, while only Beijing and 
Shanghai offer bidding (Cai, Henderson, and Zhang 2009).  Cai, Henderson, and Zhang 
(2009) have also found if negotiation is not an option, local land bureaus tend to choose 
listing because it gives local officials more control over the preferred auction winners 
than English auctions and, thus, provide a platform for corruption.   
The dual-track system of granting LUR, i.e., the coexistence of the traditional plan 
system with a new market system, forms the urban primary land market.  In the urban 
primary land market, the state, represented by governments at the county level and 
above,
8
 is the sole supplier of land for urban development.  The increasing demand for 
land for urban development has been mainly met through rural land conversion, which is 
a government taking process in China.  The next four sections investigate four major 
problems arising from rural land acquisition and government responses to them.  
                                                 
8
 County-level divisions are the third local administrative division.  They include urban districts, counties, 
county-level cities, autonomous counties, qi (a name inherited from Mongolia), autonomous qi, forestry 
areas, and special districts at the county level in Guizhou province.  Counties are the most common 
county-level divisions.  County-level cities are similar to prefecture-level cities, covering both urban and 
rural areas.  Urban districts are the urban areas of prefecture-level cities, consisting of built-up areas only.  
They do not exist in prefectures.  All other county-level divisions are small in numbers, and they are all 
referred to as counties in this dissertation.    
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3.2 Concerns over Food Security and Policies of Cultivated 
Land Protection   
Presented in Chapter 2, trends in China‘s cultivated land and urban land, as well as 
the transitions between them, indicate that urban land expansion in China has encroached 
upon a large amount of cultivated land.  The continuous loss of cultivated land in the 
last two decades coupled with continuous population growth has given rise to the Chinese 
government‘s concerns about its ability to meet their goal of maintaining grain 
self-sufficiency.  Such concerns were heightened when Lester R. Brown, a Washington 
DC based environmentalist, asserted in 1995 that China would soon need to rely on 
massive grain imports which could cause unprecedented rises in the world‘s food prices.  
Since then, China has identified cultivated land loss as the central threat to the nation‘s 
food security and made cultivated land protection a pressing issue.   
The Dynamic Balance Policy (DBP) was initiated in 1998 to balance China‘s need to 
protect cultivated land with their need to reserve land for urban and industrial 
development.  ―Dynamic Balance‖ was a term first introduced in the Basic Farmland 
Protection Regulation in 1994.  This Regulation defined basic farmland as cultivated 
land planted with food grains, cotton, oilseeds and vegetables, cultivated land with good 
irrigation, drainage, and erosion control systems, or with development potentials for these 
facilities, experimental fields for agricultural research and development, and other 
cultivated land determined by the State Council.  It required county and township 
governments to designate basic farmland protection zones which contain two grades of 
cultivated land—high-quality with high productivity and good-quality with moderate 
productivity.  By law, high-quality cultivated land can never be converted to 
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nonagricultural use.  Good-quality cultivated land can be converted to nonagricultural 
use upon approval and after the planned period which usually takes between five to ten 
years (Ding 2003; Lichtenberg and Ding 2008).  If good-quality cultivated land is 
converted to nonagricultural uses, an equal amount of same quality land must be 
reclaimed to compensate the loss.  Thus, the amount of good-quality cultivated land will 
always be balanced. 
Though the concept was first introduced in 1994, the DBP was not written into law 
until the revision of the LAL in 1998 and, thus, it was not emphasized and enforced until 
1998.  The DBP, provisioned in the 1998 LAL, required each province to designate at 
least 80% of its cultivated land as the basic farmland, as specified in the 1994 Basic 
Farmland Protection Regulation, and maintain such levels.  Although the DBP is 
stipulated to be implemented at the provincial level, in practice the exchange of new 
cultivated land for the converted cultivated land has been confined within counties and 
county-level cities by the Ministry of Land and Resources (Lichtenberg and Ding 2008).   
Besides the dynamic balance requirement, the 1998 LAL tightened the approval 
procedures for rural land acquisition and reinforced the supervision of the central 
government in an effort to protect diminishing cultivated land.  All construction projects 
that intend to use cultivated land must get project approval through provincial-level 
governments and land use approval through the central government.  In addition, 
conversions of the following three types of land were required to have the approval 
directly from the central government: basic farmland, cultivated land not classified as 




Although the 1998 LAL was written to take effect on January 1, 1999, local 
governments were allowed some time to create their own acts for implementation 
accommodating for local land use management, or revise their Land Administration 
Regulations based on the new LAL.  Table 3.2 lists the effective dates of the 
implementing acts of the 1998 LAL of each provincial-level administrative division.
9
  
For provinces that do not have an implementing act for the national LAL, the effective 
dates of their revised Provincial Land Administration Regulations are listed.   
The various effective dates of the 1998 LAL at the local level imply that the DBP 
was phased in gradually throughout the country.  As shown in Table 3.2, 27 out of the 
31 provincial-level divisions started implementing the new LAL within two years since 
January 1, 1999, and another three provinces started in 2001 and 2002.  Only Qinghai 
province did not start until October 1, 2006.   
The provincial implementing acts of the 1998 LAL and the Provincial Land 
Administration Regulations, revised after the 1998 LAL, commonly require cities and 
counties to maintain their basic farmland at a fixed level.  If a land acquisition agent 
fails to reclaim the appropriate amount and type of land, they must pay a cultivated land 
reclamation fee which is determined by the provincial government.  Governments at 
county level or above (usually the city and county governments) are required to use the 
cultivated land reclamation fees they collect to develop new land for cultivation so that 
the total amount of cultivated land in their administrative regions remain the same.  If 
the city or county government is not able to reclaim land in their administrative regions 
due to the scarcity of arable land, they must request approval from a higher level 
                                                 
9
 The provincial-level administrative divisions in mainland China include twenty-one provinces, five 
autonomous regions, and four municipalities governed directly by the State Council. 
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government to reclaim land in another city or county.  The quantity and quality of the 
reclaimed land must meet the standard set by the provincial land bureau and agricultural 
bureau. 
Various studies conducted after Brown‘s have determined his prediction is unlikely 
to come to fruition for three main reasons.  First, part of the cultivated land loss in China 
can be explained by the structural adjustment within the agricultural sector (Lichtenberg 
and Ding 2008).  As indicated by the MLR data, a considerable amount of cultivated 
land is converted to orchards, grazing grassland, and fish ponds which should not be 
counted as a loss in agricultural productivity (see Chapter 2).  Second, technology 
advancement and agricultural industrialization has improved the productivity of land and 
other inputs in agricultural production (Deng et al. 2006; Lichtenberg and Ding 2008).  
Third, because the average income has risen, Chinese people are consuming more fruits, 
aquatic products, oils, eggs, dairy products, meat, and poultry, and less staple cereals 
(Heilig 1997).   
Nevertheless, a combination of factors, namely meager arable land resources, a large 
population base, ongoing urbanization, and the national policy calling for 95% of grain 
self-sufficiency, contribute to China‘s unwavering determination to maintain certain 
levels of cultivated land.  The Chinese population is projected to reach 1.36 billion by 
2010 and 1.45 billion by 2020.  Simultaneously, the urbanization rate is projected to 
reach 58% by 2020.  Therefore, tensions between population growth and land scarcity 
will not ease in the future.  Since concerns linger, cultivated land preservation remains a 
top priority in the National Land Use Master Planning Guidelines for 2006 – 2020, 
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disseminated on October 23, 2008.  The Guidelines stipulate that to ensure grain 
self-sufficiency, the nation‘s cultivated land be maintained at 121 million hectares by 
2010 and 120 million hectares by 2020 (State Council 2008).     
3.3 Social Unrest and Policies of Rural Land Rights and 
Compensation  
The loss of cultivated land concerns the Chinese government not only because of 
food security, but also because of social stability.  Conflicts from compulsory land 
acquisition and unsatisfactory compensation have sparked protests and sometimes violent 
clashes.  According to official statistics from the complaint reception bureau of the 
National People‘s Congress Standing Committee, 2,938 letters complaining of 
government compulsory land acquisitions and unsatisfactory compensation were received 
in 2003 and 5,407 such complaint letters were received in 2004 (Asia Pulse, October 27, 
2005).  Besides writing complaint letters, some farmers have sued, held demonstrations, 
or squatted on the disputed land.  BBC News described this situation as ―a wave of 
protests sweeping the mainland.‖  The government admitted there were 74,000 ―mass 
incidents‖ related to land issues in 2004, up from just 10,000 a decade ago (Sunday 
Morning Post 2005).  Overall, about 65% of the mass incidents in rural areas nationwide 
are triggered by land disputes (China Daily 2010b).   
In some dramatic cases, disputes over land acquisition and compensation can take 
deadly forms and lead to violent riots and the death of ordinary villagers.  Many of such 
deadly incidents are not disclosed in public and it is difficult to estimate the total injuries 
and deaths of farmers caused by land disputes.  In one reported incident, ten to twenty 
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villagers in the southern province, Guangdong, were killed by security force gunfire as 
part of a conflict over land acquisition (Washington Post 2005).  In a more recent 
incident, four farmers were arrested in Guangdong when taking their grievances about 
land seizures to government officials.  A peaceful protest calling for their release turned 
violent and at least one villager was severely injured (Washington Post 2009).   
Grassroots protests and turmoil triggered by rural land acquisition pose a danger to 
the social stability of China.  As its economy growing into one of the largest in the 
world, China is gravely concerned with its social stability and its image in the world. 
This section explores the following five main causes for the tension between 
government and farmers in land acquisition: (1) compulsory land acquisition, (2) 
inadequate land compensation, (3) unfair distribution of land compensation, (4) wide 
variations in the land compensation determined by arbitrary compensation schemes, and 
(5) the misuse of land compensation retained by village collectives.   
3.3.1 Compulsory Land Acquisition 
Prior to the passage of the first Property Rights Law in 2007, farmers‘ ownership 
rights over the land they cultivated are deemed as contractual rights, and thus very week 
in nature.  The periodical reallocation of land within the village and the government 
compulsory acquisition of land for development purposes are just two examples of how 
weak the rights farmers had over their land (Ho 2001; Ding 2003; Zhang and Pearlman 
2004; Lin and Ho 2005; Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting 2008).   
The contractual system of China‘s rural land use right was introduced in the rural 
reform incepted in 1979.  First, rural land in China was, and still is, collectively owned 
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by rural residents in a village.  Chinese farmers in a village used to produce as a group 
and split the profit.  Once China realized private land would yield higher productivity, 
they started the rural land reform in 1979 (Zhang and Pearlman 2004).  Similar to the 
urban land reform, the rural land reform tried to privatize the land use right while keeping 
the collective nature of its ownership.    
An important regulation in the rural land reform was the Household Responsibility 
System (HRS), implemented in the early 1980s.  In the HRS, village collectives were in 
charge of the land allocation among rural households based on the demographic 
characteristics of the households, such as the number of household members and the 
number of adult male labors.  Then, land was leased to individual households for 
farming.  Originally, farmers were required to pay a land contract fee but that 
requirement was lifted in 2001.  To encourage farmers to maintain soil quality and 
improve land productivity, the HRS required the lease not to be less than 15 years, and it 
was renewable and tradable among villagers as long as the land was used for agricultural 
production.  In practice, however, land was reallocated among villagers by village 
leaders fairly frequently and very few transfers of rural land use rights had occurred (Ho 
2001; Ding 2003; Zhang and Pearlman 2004; Lin and Ho 2005; Clarke, Murrell, and 
Whiting 2008). 
To improve tenure security and to further promote incentives for farmers to maintain 
the land quality and productivity, the revision of the LAL in 1998 extended the lease of 
rural land to 30 years.  And in 2002, the Rural Land Contracting Law (RLCL) was 
passed to emphasize the legal protection of contracting farmers.  The 1998 LAL and the 
RLCL made major progress in prohibiting the arbitrary adjustment in the land allocation 
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in a village.  They required that any adjustment in the land allocation in a village be 
made with the consent of at least two-thirds of the village member‘s assembly.  In 
addition, each adjustment must be approved by the township government or above.   
The LAL and RLCL allow farmers to transfer their land use rights for agricultural 
uses, but prohibit them from selling their land use rights to private developers for urban 
construction purposes, or using their land use rights as collaterals.  If certain land lots 
are designated for development, the transaction of land from farmers to developers must 
go through local governments, involving village collectives, township, county, and higher 
governments.  This transaction is referred to as government land acquisition.  
Government land acquisition transfers the rural land ownership from village collectives to 
the state.  Once rural land becomes state-owned, government is responsible for 
providing basic infrastructures, such as roads, electricity, and pipe water.  Then its use 
right can be placed on the urban primary land market for public land allocation or leasing 
(Tan et al. 2009). 
Despite all of the legal efforts to protect farmers‘ land rights, in practice, arbitrary 
readjustment of land allocation within a village and compulsory land acquisition without 
farmers‘ participation in the decision-making process still have their frequent occurrence 
(Li and Xu 2004; Su and Shen 2008; Ma 2009).  Moreover, research has found 
knowledge of farmers about their rights underscored by the LAL and the RLCL is rather 
limited.  There is also no easy process by which farmers could bring violations to light 
or challenge the actions of village collectives and land acquisition agencies (Development 
Research Center of the State Council of China and World Bank 2005). 
In their field research, Li and Xu (2004) found farmers were not consulted at all 
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during the decision-making process of land acquisition.  Decisions were made 
one-sidedly by governments at various levels involved in the acquisition, including 
village leaders.  Farmers were simply notified when their land would be acquired, for 
what purpose, and how much compensation they would receive.  And many times, such 
notices to farmers were orally delivered by village leaders without any official documents.  
Among 17 villages surveyed by Li and Xu (2004), only two had official government 
notices posted in the offices of the village committees.   
In most cases, farmers have no choice but to comply, surrender their land, and accept 
the compensation offered.  Some farmers take actions to dispute the government 
acquisition of their land, however, evidence shows such disputes will not delay the land 
acquisition projects, regardless of how the dissension is resolved ultimately (Tan et al. 
2009).   
As noted by Ding and Knaap 2005, Ding 2007, and Tan et al. 2009, communist 
China is not the only country where the government is able to seize land.  Eminent 
domain in western countries allows governments to acquire private land as long as the 
acquisition serves public interests.  While different countries may execute different 
levels of eminent domain powers, China‘s land acquisition is the easiest, least 
time-consuming, and least costly because collectively-owned rural land is essentially 
already public.   
3.3.2 Inadequate Land Compensation 
Conflicts between farmers and governments in land acquisition are not necessarily 
caused by the compulsory nature of the acquisition process.  When individual farmers 
43 
 
have no choice but to give up their land, they are most concerned about the level of 
compensation.  The LAL requires that government and/or potential land users of the 
acquired land compensate farmers affected by land acquisition.  However, the amount of 
compensation is set artificially low by law.   
Unlike in the western market system where land owners are compensated according 
to the market value of their land, the driving principle behind the land compensation in 
China is to not leave farmers worse-off than before.  According to this principle, the 
amounts of the land compensation and resettlement subsidies are based on the output 
value of the acquired cultivated land in the past three years, but not the current value of 
the land in the urban land market or the discounted future value of the land (Zou 2009).   
The 1988 LAL specified three components of the compensation package: 
compensation for the land, resettlement subsidies for the displaced farmers, and 
compensation for the loss of unharvested crops and land attachments.  The 1988 LAL 
required that the land compensation be between three and six times, and resettlement 
subsidies be two to three times, the land‘s average annual output value over the past three 
years.  Additionally, the 1988 LAL required that resettlement subsidies not exceed ten 
times, and the total of land compensation and resettlement subsidies not exceed twenty 
times, the average annual output value of the land in the past three years. 
The 1998 LAL reinforced the 1988 LAL requirement for compensation in rural land 
acquisition and raised corresponding multipliers for land compensation to six to ten times 
the land‘s average annual output value over the past three years with a maximum of 
fifteen times the value, and resettlement subsidies to four to six times the same value with 
a maximum of thirty times the value. 
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The formulas specified by the LAL result in far lower compensation than what 
farmers would get if they were allowed to sell their land to private developers freely, 
especially when taking into account the potential benefits from urbanization (Ding 2007).  
Statistics from the Unirule Institute of Economics (UIE 2007), a non-governmental think 
tank in Beijing, shed some light on the difference between the land compensation and 
resettlement subsidies paid to the farmers and the value of their land on the urban land 
market.  In practice, land compensation ranges from RMB 75,000 to 120,000 per 
hectares for public transportation projects, and from RMB 300,000 to 450,000 per hectare 
for industrial and commercial development projects.  By contrast, the price of public 
land leasing in the urban areas is normally 7 to 10 times the compensation paid to the 
farmers.  In the Yangtze River Delta, for example, the price of public land leasing 
ranges from RMB 2,100,000 to 5,250,000 per hectare.  Examples of the land 
compensation and conveyance fees given by Ding and Lichtenberg (2011) indicate 
conveyance fees can be 10 to 20 times the compensation paid to farmers in some specific 
land acquisition projects.   
Perhaps, what worries the farmers the most is their long-term livelihood after losing 
their land.  Given Chinese farmers on average own 0.07 hectares of land per person, 
based on the above compensation scheme, they will each receive RMB 5,000 – 9,000 
(about US$640 – 1,154)
10
 in land acquisition due to public transportation projects, and 
RMB 20,000 – 30,000 (about US$2,564 – 3,846) in land acquisition due to industrial and 
commercial development projects (UIE 2007).  Such small lump-sum compensation 
does not provide farmers with the equivalent lifetime security that land does.  Without 
                                                 
10
 Calculated as 1US$ = 7.8 RMB. 
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skills for investment, lump-sum compensation will be exhausted several years after the 
land acquisition.  Besides, without cultivating products themselves, farmers will have to 
spend more money on food, resulting in a higher living cost than before.   
Because monetary compensation alone cannot provide a new, sustainable lifestyle for 
landless farmers, non-monetary compensation, such as job training and job opportunities 
in the village and township owned enterprises, is included in many land compensation 
packages.  Due to the socialist nature of many policies in China‘s early years of 
economic reform, the 1988 LAL made it mandatory for local governments to assign jobs 
to farmers in land acquisition.  With the marketization of the economy in every respect, 
including the job market, governments were no longer required to arrange employment 
for farmers involved in land acquisition.  The 1998 LAL only suggested local 
governments develop local job opportunities for urbanized farmers.  As allowed by law, 
a portion of the land compensation and resettlement subsidies could be used to develop 
village and township enterprises and/or to subsidize the businesses on the acquired land 
to hire local farmers—but in either case, a job was not guaranteed.   
The weak language and lack of requirements of the 1998 LAL has left millions of 
farmers without land and without jobs.  The survey of 58 villages conducted by the 
Rural Research Center of the Ministry of Agriculture between 1999 and 2000 found that 
approximately 34% of the urbanized farmers were jobless, and many of them had 
difficulty adapting to their new life after their villages were urbanized (Ma 2009).  
Statistics also show after 30 years of economic reform and opening up, more than 50 
million farmers have lost their land and nearly half of them have no jobs or social 
insurance (China Daily 2010b). 
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It is important to realize even if farmers are guaranteed a job by their compensation 
packages, they may still face a serious risk of losing the job.  The Rural Survey Team of 
Zhejiang Province found in their 2003 survey most companies were reluctant to hire 
farmers who lacked qualifications required by profit-seeking firms.  A case study of the 
employment and social security situation of farmers after land acquisition in Beijing‘s 
Fengtai District found farmers were more likely to be laid off due to their inadequate 
education and skills than their urban counterparts when the business was not doing well 
(Tang and Zhang 2004).   
Facing limited job opportunities in their new ―urbanized‖ villages, many farmers, 
especially the younger ones, choose to leave their villages and search for jobs in big and 
mega cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.  Rural migrant workers in China 
earn a lower salary than their urban counterparts and are generally discriminated and 
denied many public services, such as public schools for their children, job training, and 
urban social security programs (Guo 2001; Henderson 2009).     
To address these problems, the State Council issued the Resolution to Deepen 
Reform and Tighten Land Management in October 2004 (hereafter referred to as the 2004 
Resolution).  It is important to note the 2004 Resolution was disseminated after the LAL 
had been revised in August 2004.  The 2004 LAL did not make particular changes in the 
compensation requirement specified in its 1998 version, whereas the 2004 Resolution 
further stressed the requirement for proper compensation and resettlement for farmers in 
land acquisition, and called for special provisions to ensure long-term solvency.  The 
2004 Resolution required local governments to develop a job market for farmers and 
assist them in finding employment after the land acquisition.  This requirement was an 
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improvement upon the compensation scheme specified in the LAL, since both the 1998 
and 2004 versions of the LAL only suggested, but not required, local governments to 
facilitate farmers‘ job searches after land acquisition.  The 2004 Resolution made the 
provision of job training and job opportunities to farmers affected by land acquisition a 
mandatory requirement.  In addition, it required the provision of social security to 
farmers affected by land acquisition.  Despite these requirements, the 2004 Resolution 
did not spell out the details on how to develop a job market for landless farmers or how to 
finance their social security.  It asked the labor department and the social security 
department to search for solutions (Zou 2009). 
 In response, the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Social Security proposed the 
Ideas for Vocational Training and Social Security Provision for Farmers Affected by 
Land Acquisition in 2006 (hereafter referred to as the 2006 Ideas).  The 2006 Ideas 
asserted farmers whose land had been incorporated into urban areas should be granted the 
urban resident‘s status, and consequently have the right to enjoy the urban social security 
system.  For farmers who had lost the land but still resided in rural areas, local 
governments were required to provide necessary social security programs, such as 
minimum living standard assurance (dibao), health insurance, unemployment insurance, 
and pensions.  Such provisions should be funded by land compensation and resettlement 
subsidies, but if this funding fell short, additional money should be taken from local 
revenues collected from state-owned land use fees.  The 2006 Ideas also called for 
vocational training for landless farmers financed by local revenues.   
Both the 2004 Resolution and the 2006 Ideas required establishing the social security 
system for farmers.  Such requirement became a legal sanction and was integrated in the 
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Property Rights Law of China in 2007.  The 2007 Property Rights Law required that 
long-term life security for farmers be included in land compensation packages, in 
addition to the compensation required by the LAL.   
Despite the increased effort to protect and improve the well-being of farmers 
involved in land acquisitions, none of these national laws and regulations has outlined 
how to establish such a social security system.  In fact, the implementation at local 
levels may oppose the intention of the law, altogether.  Scholars are concerned that with 
the new requirement to provide farmers with life-long security after land acquisition, 
there will be more delayed payments of land compensation fees to farmers because local 
governments will now be inclined to retain a larger portion of the land compensation and 
resettlement subsidies to distribute over a longer period of time (Zou 2009).  Without a 
transparent auditing system, farmers will be displeased by public officials managing their 
money. 
In addition, many of the rural social security programs are not based on voluntary 
participation.  Instead, farmers are required to enroll in such programs in order to 
receive the compensation they deserve.  Some farmers simply prefer to receive the full 
compensation in the current value over making monthly payments to their retirement 
funds, for example, and waiting to receive their pensions after certain age (Cao, Feng and 
Tao 2008).    
3.3.3 Unfair Distribution of Land Compensation 
Besides the inappropriate compensation formulas, the hierarchical distribution of the 
compensation is another cause for the low compensation.  Land compensation starts at 
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the highest level of involved government and trickles down, through the other levels of 
involved governments, to eventually reach the deserving farmers.  Since individual 
farmers are at the bottom of this hierarchical order, the share left to them is often 
unacceptably low, even if the original amount provided by the land acquisition agencies 
satisfies the LAL requirements (Ding and Knaap 2005).   
In his dissertation on China‘s land conversion process, Ma (2009) conducted a field 
study in a representative county in China, the Dragon County (a fictitious name).  By 
interviewing local officials and farmers, Ma (2009) obtained first-hand information on 
the problems associated with cultivated land conversion, such as unsatisfactory land 
compensation as well as illegal land conversion and development projects.  One 
example in Ma (2009) illustrates how compensation could be expropriated during the 
delivery from the upper level government to individual farmers.  In a county-level 
public road project, compensation was determined by the county government and then 
delivered to farmers via township and village governments.  Each level of the 
government would take slice of the pie before passing the remaining fee onto the next 
government or, eventually, the farmer.  A local official interviewed by Ma (2009) said:  
When the Coastal Road was under construction, the county 
government paid 18,000 RMB/mu (as compensation for 
land) to the affected villages.  It was a uniform standard 
set by the county government, but some townships took a 
share of it.  For example, one township gave only 15,000 
RMB/mu to its villages.  Some township governments 
delayed paying the villages, and some even used up all the 
compensation themselves for proclaimed financial 
difficulty.  
 
Implied in Ma‘s (2009) interview, the insufficiency of land compensation also 
appears in the form of delayed compensation as village collectives often do not pay 
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farmers in full, upfront.  Instead, the money is doled out in monthly or yearly 
installments; in some cases, farmers never receive the full compensation they deserve.  
The general lack of transparency and public participation in China makes farmers very 
vulnerable to this type of financial arrangement (Shen 2007).  In some cases, the 
intended users of the acquired land are responsible for providing the land compensation, 
but they do not have the cash available.  Instead, as negotiated through local 
governments and village heads, the new land users opt for giving farmers the initial 
public offerings of their new enterprises occupying the converted land.  For farmers 
with very little knowledge of financial market and financial instruments, this form of 
compensation means nothing and many of them refuse the offer.  When farmers have no 
choice but to accept such an arrangement, they live off the dividends of the stocks which 
often are not sufficient for living (Sina News 2009).  
3.3.4 Wide Variations in Land Compensation 
In addition to insufficient amount and unfair distribution of land compensation, a 
third source of farmers‘ dissatisfaction with land compensation is its wide variations 
within the same locality.  Compensation levels can vary from project to project and, 
even in some cases, from household to household within the same project.  Although the 
LAL specifies a national standard for land compensation, the amount of compensation, in 
practice, often depends on the location and potential developers (Ding 2007).  All things 
being equal, compensation for private projects, such as commercial housing and office 
buildings, is typically much higher than for public infrastructure projects, such as 
highways and airports, as revealed by the UIE (2007) statistics.  Likewise, compensation 
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in villages closer to cities is usually higher than in the remote villages.  The perception 
of such inequities cause tension and distrust between villagers and the government. 
3.3.5 Misuse of Land Compensation by Village Collectives 
Other than the dissatisfaction of farmers with the amount, distribution, and fairness 
of land compensation, conflicts between farmers and government can also arise from how 
village collectives spend the retained portion of the compensation.  Village collectives 
are the economic units in rural areas and own the rural land collectively with individual 
farmers.  Therefore, both village collectives and farmers are entitled to the 
compensation.   
According to the LAL, compensation for unharvested crops and land attachments 
must be given to farmers, upfront, while land compensation and resettlement subsidies 
can be retained partially or fully by village collectives.  The LAL requires that any 
retained compensation be used for financing projects serving public interests, such as 
building irrigation infrastructures, and resettling and training unemployed farmers.  
Such fund should not be kept as personal wealth.  However, the retained portion of 
compensation is often misused and becomes a source of corruption due to the lack of 
appropriate accounting and auditing systems (Ding and Knaap 2005). 
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3.4 Legal Procedures of Rural Land Acquisition and Illegal 
Practice 
This section first reviews the legal procedures of rural land acquisition specified by 
the 1986 LAL and reformed by the 1998 LAL, and then explores the unapproved and 
illegal land conversion in detail.   
The 1986 LAL (amended in 1988) granted local governments at the county level and 
above the authority to acquire rural land.  Local governments were required to establish 
specific procedures for implementing the national law and each level of government was 
required to obey the regulations set by the government of one level higher.  The 1986 
LAL required that local governments create an overall land use plan based on the 
National Land Use Master Planning Guidelines created by the MLR, and decisions on 
rural land acquisition and urban land development conform to this overall land use plan.  
Any proposed rural land acquisition is required to be approved by local government at a 
higher level than the government that intends to acquire land, and the amount of land 
authorized for conversion is required to be within the annual quota set in the local overall 
land use plan.  
With the promulgation of the first LAL in 1986, newly founded land management 
bureaus at different levels of government were required to make an overall land use plan 
in their localities.  The goals of making an overall land use plan were to coordinate the 
land use among different economic sectors, therefore, increase land use efficiency and 
preserve cultivated land.  In 1993, the State Council published the National Land Use 
Master Planning Guidelines (hereafter referred to as the National Guidelines) 1986 – 
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2000.  By the end of 1996, most of the provincial-level governments completed writing 
the overall land use plans for their provinces.  However, the National Guidelines 1986 – 
2000 did not establish procedures for the creation and implementation of the master plan 
at local levels, nor did it clarify which agencies should be involved.  As a result, neither 
the National Guidelines nor the local overall land use plans were ever followed (Cai 
2004).   
The 1988 LAL failed to induce disciplined land use and proved unsuccessful with 
respect to farmland protection and urban land use efficiency (Valletta 2005).  The 
inefficacy of the 1988 LAL coupled with the accelerated cultivated land loss urged China 
to revise the law.  In 1997, the State Council issued a Notice on Further Enforcing Land 
Management and Protecting Cultivated Land, also known as the No. 11 Document.  The 
No. 11 Document called for investigations into all construction since 1991 to determine 
how much cultivated land was converted to new construction, and how well the land had 
been used.  The No. 11 Document‘s findings directly led to the substantial revision of 
the LAL in 1998, specifically in regard to cultivated land preservation (Tang 2008).  
Learning from the failures of the 1988 version, the 1998 LAL included principles and 
procedures for local governments to create and implement overall land use plans.  All 
land quotas in these local master plans are required to conform to the quotas in the 
National Guidelines and they still must follow a hierarchical system in which local 
governments are required to submit their overall land use plans to a higher level 
government for approval.  Local land use plans must stay within the overall land use 
plan quotas of the government above them and the amount of cultivated land cannot dip 
below the quota of the higher government.     
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The 1998 LAL also introduced the zoning concept which required the overall land 
use plans at the county and township levels to designate zones for each land use purpose.  
Local governments are required to utilize existing construction land for redevelopment, 
limit unnecessary conversion of cultivated land, and control the total amount of 
construction land within the quota.  The 1998 LAL stressed the importance of land use 
master plans and set the basis for the assembly of the National Guidelines 1996 – 2010.    
The legal procedures of rural land acquisition specified by the LAL are arguably 
difficult to enforce in practice.  For example, the revision of the LAL in 1998 requires 
the acquisition of basic farmland, other farmland exceeding 35 hectares, and any land 
exceeding 70 hectares to be approved by the central government agencies.  However, 
the central government approval procedures are reportedly lengthy and rigid, and cause 
local officials to bypass them by all means (China Economics Weekly 2004; Ma 2009).  
A common trick they play is dividing large land use projects into several small ones for 
easier and faster approval since the acquisition of farmland of 35 hectares or fewer can be 
approved by provincial governments (Xinhua News Agency 2006; Ma 2009). 
Moreover, the planning tools based on the LAL and the National Guidelines have not 
proved to be very realistic.  Examining the land use laws and policies in China, one can 
easily conclude the quota system is government‘s main vehicle for constraining 
accelerated cultivated land conversion.  Specifically, central and local level land use 
master plans must specified a minimum amount of cultivated land and a maximum 
amount of construction land in their corresponding regions in each planning horizon.  
The annual conversion of cultivated land to urban construction uses is required to be 
within the quotas defined in the local land use master plans as well as in the National 
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Guidelines.  The DBP, in nature, is also a stipulated quota.  Since quotas are usually 
made 10 to 15 years ahead of time, it is unrealistic to expect them to remain relevant and 
achievable for long periods of time due to the changes in economic environments, 
especially for a fast growing country such as China.  For example, more than 20 
provinces reached the 2010 quota for minimum amount of cultivated land allowed by 
2002 (Cai 2004). 
Unapproved and illegal land transactions were prevalent in China‘s land 
development.  Reported by the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), 70% of the 
6,866 so-called high-tech and industrial development zones across the country were built 
on illegally acquired land and abandoned altogether by 2004 (China Daily 2004).  
Between 1999 and 2008, nearly1.4 million unapproved and illegal land use cases have 
been uncovered by MLR land inspections, involving more than 569,972 hectares of land, 
of which 259,148 hectares are cultivated land (MLR 2000 – 2009).   
Ironically, one of the motivations for illegal land development has been the 
correction measures in land use management.  As land developers and local officials 
anticipate changes in laws would make land acquisition and conveyance more difficult, 
they would engage in land transactions more actively right before the new law or 
regulation.  For example, the number of illegal land use cases surged about six months 
before the effective date of the Regulations on Bidding, Auction and Listing in Land 
Conveyance.  Once the Regulations became effective on July 1, 2003, the conveyance 
of land for profit-seeking construction projects had to be carried out through bidding, 
auction, and listing, instead of negotiation (The 21
st
 Century Economic Report 2003b).   
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The prevalence of unplanned, unapproved, and illegal land use activities is indicative 
of the difficulties the central government has in overseeing local land activities.  Besides 
passing laws and decrees, the central government generally lacks a functioning 
supervision system for local compliance.  The most common supervision instrument is 
periodic inspections which are effective in the short-term, but do not induce constant, 
long-term compliance of the law (China Economics Weekly 2004).   
In the most recent land inspection campaign carried out between September 15, 2007 
and January 15, 2008 (a.k.a. the 100-day land inspection campaign), the MLR identified 
three common violations of land use laws.  First, farmland is provided to 
non-agricultural land users through rental contracts instead of going through the 
acquisition approval procedure and, therefore, avoiding conveyance fees.  Most rental 
contracts are signed by townships, villages, and individual farmers.  Among 32,000 
illegal land use cases uncovered during the 100-day campaign, 19,000 cases are in this 
form of violation, involving 25,000 hectares of land.  The second type of common 
violation is industrial land expansion that does not conform to the national master 
planning guidelines.  Although only 420 such cases out of 32,000, they take over 58,000 
hectares of land.  A third type of common violation is to begin the land acquisition and 
resettlement process long before the proposed project is approved.  This violation was 
found in nearly 12,000 cases, involving 151,000 hectares of land (MLR 2008).
11
   
                                                 
11
 It is not clear over what time period these illegal land use cases have occurred.  
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3.5 Land Speculation and Idle Construction Land  
Many aforementioned illegal and unapproved land development projects are 
motivated by speculative land conversion and development.  Because of the nature of 
speculation, the land acquisition procedures specified by the LAL are not likely to be 
followed.  This section investigates a particular type of land use inefficiency in 
China—idle construction land— caused by such speculative behaviors.   
Land conversion and sales for speculation purposes normally take place before 
development funds are fully established, which leaves a tremendous amount of land idle 
or underdeveloped.  Because it is quick and easy for land speculators to acquire land in 
the rural areas, much of this idle land was cultivated land before it became idle (Cai 2003, 
Ho and Lin 2004a; Su 2005).  Speculative land conversion and conveyance reached 
three climaxes between 1987 and 2003, commonly referred to as three ―Land Enclosure 
Movements.‖  The salient feature of Land Enclosure Movements is that land is acquired 
by local governments for anticipated development opportunities, but not for immediate 
use.   
The first Land Enclosure Movement started in 1987, just after the first Land 
Administration Law was enacted in 1986.  The law gave legal sanction to the granting 
and subsequent transfer of long-term leases of publicly owned land.  Some developers 
sensed the profitability of land transactions brought by the new law and started enclosing 
land.     
Since development zones were exempt from many political and economic regulations 
and could be managed with preferential land use policies, they grew rapidly during 1992 
and 1993, serving as the peak of the first Land Enclosure Movement.  Many local 
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governments set aside large parcels of previously cultivated land as industrial 
development zones or parks to attract capital investment from foreign investors.  
According to the Ministry of Construction‘s statistics, there were over 6,000 development 
zones at and above the county level by March 1993, spanning 1.5 million 
hectares—bigger than the total urban areas in Chinese cities and towns at the time (1.34 
million hectares) (China Economics Weekly 2004).   
Unfortunately, many of these development zones remained idle because the 
anticipated investment was never realized.  By 1996, 116,000 hectares of land in 
designated economic development zones remained undeveloped, over half of which was 
previously farmland that could not be converted back (Cai 2003, Ho and Lin 2004a; Su 
2005).  In some cases, the size of the idle industrial land exceeds the size of adjacent 
villages (The United State Embassy 2007). 
The second Land Enclosure Movement was spurred by the real estate boom in the 
early 2000s.  Employment in Chinese cities previously came bundled with housing, but 
in 1998, employer allocated housing was terminated.  As a result, residential housing 
became a profitable commodity on the market and residential development became a 
large user of land.   
The boom of the real estate market presents developers with another profitable 
opportunity besides selling housing units.  Because industrial development land is 
exempt from many taxes and fees, some developers use their connections with local 
officials to obtain land classified as industrial development land at reduced rates.  They 
then wait for opportunities to create more profitable housing projects or sell the land use 
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right to real-estate developers.  While developers wait for such opportunities, the land 
remains idle (Cai 2009).     
The third Land Enclosure Movement started in 2002, sparked by another wave of 
building development zones.  The MLR found 70% of the 6,866 so-called high-tech and 
industrial development zones across the country had not been developed in 2004 (China 
Daily 2004).  After three Land Enclosure Movements, over 1.73 million hectares of 
designated construction land became idle (China Economics Weekly 2004).  More than 
13 million hectares of land in the planned development zones were ordered to be returned 
to agricultural use, accounting for almost 65% of the total land planned for these 
development zones (Lin 2007). 
Government attempts to eliminate idle construction land dates back to April 26, 1999, 
when the MLR issued the Methods of Dealing with Idle Construction Land (hereafter 
referred to as the Methods).  The Methods require local governments to impose fees on 
construction land left idle for one year; such fees are to not exceed 20% of the 
conveyance fee.  If land sits idle for more than two years, the government reserves the 
right to reclaim the land back and return it to its original use (The State Council 1999).  
According to Cai (2009), the supremacy of this regulation is under the LAL and the 
Constitution which presents big problems for implementation at local levels.  If the land 
allocation or conveyance contract, which is protected by the LAL and the Constitution, 
does not specify the deadline for any deferred development of the land, local 
governments are not empowered to take the land back from developers.  In many cases, 
since developers have used their connections with local officials to obtain the land, the 
same connections will prevent their land from being revoked.  In practice, this 
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regulation is strictly enforced at local levels when inspections are carried out by central 
government agencies, but as soon as the central government loosens the supervision 
strength, the regulation is completely ignored.  Thus far, the two-year limit of idle 
development land has not been firmly enforced nationwide (Cai 2009).  
As mentioned earlier, unapproved and illegal land transactions were prevalent in the 
three Land Enclosure Movements.  Local officials have been widely blamed for 
colluding with land developers and taking advantage of the loopholes in laws.  Once 
caught, they are severely punished via fines, confiscation and/or demolition of the 
buildings on the illegally developed land, returning land to its original uses, 
administrative penalties, and/or criminal charges.   
According to the MLR news release on their 100-day land inspection campaign, 
3,857 local officials were turned in to the central government investigation agencies and 
2,864 of them received administrative penalties.  An additional 2,797 officials were sent 
to criminal courts, 535 of them receiving criminal charges.  The central government 
agencies collected a total of US$500 million worth of fines and confiscated and/or 
demolished over 26 million square meters of illegally built buildings (Ministry of Land 
and Resources 2008). 
While land grabbing officials face administrative penalties, land developers normally 
pay fines and incur the cost of demolishing the buildings and returning land to its original 
use.  For example, in 2003, a chemistry equipment manufacturing company acquired 
some basic farmland illegally in Shanghai.  The punishment, finalized in 2007, included 
a fine of nearly $40,000 per hectare, removal of the already-completed construction on 
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the land, and returning the land to cultivation (Shanghai Baoshan Planning and Land 
Management Bureau 2008).   
With the threat of such harsh punishments, why would local officials risk 
jeopardizing their political careers and collude with land developers engaging in illegal 
land uses?  The next chapter analyzes the motivation of local government for cultivated 




Table 3.1  Development of China’s Land Use Laws and Policies, 1978–2008 
 
Date/Period Event Descriptions and/or Comments 
1978 
Adoption of the 
Household 
Responsibility System 
-Abandoned village collective production team 
-Leased the rural land for agricultural production 




-The first Land Administration Law in China 
legalizing the grant and transfer of the use rights 
of publicly owned land   
-Set forth a hierarchical approval procedure for 
converting collectively owned rural land to 
state-owned urban land 
-Required government agencies acquiring rural 
land to arrange employment for landless farmers     
-Required local governments to make overall land 
use plans conforming to the National Land Use 
Master Planning Guidelines 
1988 





Regulations on the 
Grant and Transfer of 
Use Rights of Urban 
Land 
-Provided more concrete procedures for the 
leasing of urban land 
1993 
National Land Use 
Master Planning 
Guidelines, 1986 – 
2000 
-By the end of 1996, most of the provincial-level 
governments finished making the overall land use 




-Defined the basic farmland and required counties 
and townships to designate basic farmland 
protection zones 
-Coined the concept of the Dynamic Balance, 
requiring the amount of good-quality cultivated 
land to be kept at a fixed level in the dynamic 
process of land conversions   
Exact Time 
Unknown 









Land (a.k.a. No. 11 
Document) 
-Served as the launch of the national inspection of 
the sources of new construction land to gain 
knowledge of the legality of land conversions and 
conveyances and land use efficiency 
-Directly led to the revision of the Land 
Administration Law in 1998 with regard to 
cultivated land preservation 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Date/Period Event Descriptions and/or Comments 
1998 
Revision of the Land 
Administration Law 
-Extended the rural land use lease from 15 years 
to 30 years  
- Removed the hierarchical approval procedures 
for converting cultivated land to urban uses and 
transferred the approval authority back to the 
central government 
-Raised the amount of land compensation and 
resettlement subsidies in rural land acquisition   
-Abandoned the requirement for arranged 
employment and puts landless farmers on the 
competitive job market   
-Made the Dynamic Balance Policy introduced in 




Methods of Dealing 
with Idle Construction 
Land 
-Required local governments to impose idle 
construction land fees not to exceed 20% of the 
conveyance fee if the land was not used one year 
after the conveyance, and to reclaim the land and 
return it to its original use if it remained idle for 
more than two years 
2002 Rural Land 
Contracting Law 
-Gave emphasis to the legal protection of the 30- 
year rural land contracts 
-Stated the rural land use leases were tradable 
among agricultural users, but not between 
agricultural and urban users.  Rural land use 
leases were not allowed to be used as collateral 
for loans.   
-Stated the rural land use lease would be 
renewable as long as it continued to be used for 
agricultural production 
-Required that any adjustment in the land 
allocation in a village be made with the consent 
of at least two-thirds of the village member‘s 
assembly, and with the approval by the township 
government or above 
July 1, 2003 Regulations on 
Bidding, Auction and 
Listing in Land 
Conveyance 
-Required the conveyance of land for 
profit-seeking construction projects be carried out 






Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Date/Period Event Descriptions and/or Comments 
August 
2004 
Revision of the Land 
Administration Law 
-Reiterated the requirement of compensation in 
rural land acquisition, but did not change the 




Resolution to Deepen 
Reform and Tighten 
Land Management 
-Gave greater emphasis to the requirement of 
proper compensation and resettlement of farmers 
in land acquisition, especially in the long-term 
sense   
-Required local governments to facilitate the job 
search of farmers and to include urbanized 
farmers in the urban social security system   
2006 Ideas for Vocational 
Training and Social 
Security Provision for 
Farmers Affected by 
Land Acquisition  
-A follow-up of the 2004 Resolution to Deepen 
Reform and Tighten Land Management 
-Suggested a few methods of building social 
security for farmers   
October 1, 
2007 
Property Rights Law -Strengthened the urban land tenure security by 
guaranteeing automatic renewal of the urban land 
use rights upon expiration 
-Although not automatic, rural land use leases 
could be renewed under certain laws 
-Recognized farmers‘ land use rights as property 
rights, as opposed to contractual rights as defined 
by previous laws 
-Highlighted and reinforced the legal restrictions 
on readjustments of land allocation by village 
collectives 
-Called for a land registration system 
-Did not make any changes in the formula for the 
compensation in land acquisition 
-Still silent on whether farmers is allowed to 
trade their land use rights freely or use them as 
collateral for loans 
October 23, 
2008 









Table 3.2  Effective Dates of the Implementing Acts* of the 1998 Land 
Administration Law of Each Municipality and Province in the Chorological Order 
 





























































































Last Update: 01/01/1993 
Sources: 1. Real Estate Law Service Net, http://www.law110.com 
2. Law Library, http://www.law-lib.com  
3. China Agricultural Information Net, http://www.agri.gov.cn 
Note: *Some provinces call their implementing acts of the 1998 LAL the Provincial   
Land Administration Regulations. 





4 Counter-Incentives for Cultivated Land 
Protection Policies 
As analyzed in the previous chapter, the hierarchical approval system specified in the 
1988 LAL failed in practice, because local governments who are responsible for 
managing the land use and enforcing the law have stand to profit more from skirting the 
law.  Even after the 1998 LAL tried to correct this problem by putting the central 
government in charge of approving cultivated land conversion, local governments still 
managed to circumvent the law and engage in unapproved or illegal land development.   
This chapter analyzes the economic incentives driving local governments‘ 
questionable actions surrounding land acquisition and conveyance, and their expected 
costs of getting caught out of compliance.  The economic incentives for land conversion 
are believed to stem from the cadre evaluation system of China.  When the job 
performance of government officials is evaluated, local fiscal management and economic 
growth are the most important factors.  Performance evaluations based on these two 
criteria determine officials‘ opportunities for advancement as well as their remuneration 
(Huang 1990; Rozelle 1994; Whiting, 2001; He and Wu 2005; Clarke, Murrell, and 
Whiting 2008; Lichtenberg and Ding 2008).  Personal goals and career ambitions of 
higher office may incline local officials disregard regulations on cultivated land 
conversion in order to bolster their own district‘s economic growth and success (Clarke, 
Murrell, and Whiting 2008; Lichtenberg and Ding 2008).      
These incentives are analyzed in Section 4.1 on how arbitrage in land transactions 
has raised local revenues and eased local budget pressure, and in Section 4.2 on how 
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competition among local economies has led to the encroachment onto cultivated land.  
Section 4.3 evaluates whether new laws and regulations have been designed to downplay 
these known incentives, and whether existing punishments and penalties for 
noncompliance of laws are a deterrent to questionable land projects.  Section 4.4 
explores the challenges of the implementation of national regulations at local levels due 
to the strong incentives for land conversion.   
4.1 Decentralization of the Fiscal System and Local Budgetary 
Pressure  
The decentralization of China‘s fiscal system in 1993 reduced intergovernmental 
transfers from the central to local governments by shifting responsibilities for the 
provision of public infrastructure from the central government to local governments.  
Consequently, many local governments have faced increasing budget deficits (Eckaus 
2003; Ding 2005b; Cao, Feng, and Tao 2008; Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting 2008).   
Land acquisition and conveyance is an effective way for local governments to raise 
revenues.  Due to the land ownership and legal system as previously discussed, 
government land acquisition in China is relatively easy, inexpensive, and not as time 
consuming when compared with western countries (Tan et al. 2009).  As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the land compensation fees and resettlement fees are very low due to the 
prevailing compensation formula.  Further, the cost for governments to provide basic 
public infrastructures on the acquired land, such as roads, electricity, and tap water, is 
minimal, accounting for only 20-50% of the total acquisition cost (Tan et al. 2009).   
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While the cost of land acquisition is low, the conveyance fee paid by private land 
users is very high.  In practice, the conveyance fee is determined by calculating the 
present value of the land rent for the next 50 to 70 years, depending on the intended land 
use and leasing period (Wang 2005).  The UIE (2007) statistics in Chapter 3 reveal the 
unit land conveyance fee is normally 7 to 10 times the unit land compensation.  For the 
total of 14.7 million hectares of land seized by government in the past two decades, the 
government has gained 2 trillion RMB (about US$294 billion) from the differential 
between the total conveyance fee and the land compensation paid to farmers (China Daily 
2010).  Without a doubt, the local government‘s ability to buy low and sell high makes 
land acquisition and conveyance a very profitable government business with no 
investment risk (Ding 2007; Tan et al. 2009).   
In addition to being fast and risk-free, another advantage of revenues generated from 
land conversions and conveyances is they are recorded as off-budget, and thus, can be 
easily used to offset local budgetary deficits.  Further, land revenues include not only 
the one-time conveyance fee and the cultivated land occupation tax, but also various 
types of land taxes and fees, like urban land use taxes, land management fees, land value 
increment taxes, and taxes on newly added construction land.  The stream of revenues 
provided by these monthly and yearly taxes and fees add a further incentive for local 
governments to allocate land to urban uses. 
It is difficult to estimate how much of a local government‘s total revenue is 
comprised of land revenues.  It has been argued the legal status of some of the land 
revenues is obscure and the occasional reports of their amounts are murky (Eckaus 2003).  
Limited statistics suggest land conveyance fees accounted for 35% of total local 
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government revenue nationwide from 2001 to 2003, and in 2004, this share reached 47% 
(Ping 2006).  In Shenzhen and Xiamen,
12
 profits generated from rural land acquisition 
accounted for 70% of the municipal revenues (Lin and Ho 2005).  Cai, Henderson, and 
Zhang (2009) documented that revenues from land sales in Chengdu, Chongqing, and 
Suzhou
13
 made up 2.6 to 5% of local GDP in 2004 and 2005.  Based on the official 
statistics published in the Land and Resources Statistical Yearbooks of China, Ding and 
Lichtenberg (2011) found in China as a whole, land-related revenues grew from less than 
10% of the total budgetary revenue (i.e., taxes) in 1999 to 55% in 2003 and 2004.   
4.2 Pressure for Local Economic Growth  
Local government officials are evaluated and promoted based upon their competency 
of maintaining local fiscal balance and the performance of the economy in their locality.  
The decentralization of China‘s political system has led to rigorous economic 
performance competitions among localities (Skinner, Kuhn, and Joseph 2001; Cao, Feng, 
and Tao 2008).  Performance measures of local economies include local Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), employment rate, and the amount of private and foreign direct 
investment (FDI).  During the reform era in China, industrial development funded by 
private and FDI proved more successful in generating GDP and employment 
opportunities than agricultural sectors or state-owned enterprises (Clarke, Murrell, and 
Whiting 2008).  As a result, more cultivated land is converted to industrial and urban 
uses.  Likewise, to attract investment from private and foreign sources, many local 
                                                 
12
 Shenzhen and Xiamen are two of the first four Special Economic Zones designated by China in the early 
1980s (See Footnote 7).   
13
 Chengdu is the capital city of the southwestern province Sichuan.  Chongqing is the fourth provincial 
municipality, parallel to Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai.  Suzhou is a prefecture-level city in Jiangsu 
Province, situated in Yangtze River Delta.   
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governments set aside large parcels of previously cultivated land and declare them 
industrial development zones (Cao, Feng, and Tao 2008; Lichtenberg and Ding 2008).   
Furthermore, government policies encouraging real estate development have resulted 
in more cultivated land loss.  The demand for housing in expanding urban areas is 
growing rapidly.  Urban development sprawls beyond the city core, expanding into rural 
areas since acquiring cultivated land is far cheaper than acquiring existing urban land 
(Ding 2005a).  In Beijing, for instance, the cost of converting cultivated land accounts 
for 30 to 40% of the total development cost.  By comparison, the cost of acquiring 
existing urban land can be 60% of the total development cost (Ding and Knaap 2005).   
In summary, the pressures and benefits faced by local officials to raise local revenues 
and to promote local economies have motivated fervent engagement in land acquisitions, 
even if it means unlawful conducts.  The next section investigates whether government 
policies aiming to control land use have addressed the local governments‘ self-serving 
motivations for land conversion and conveyance. 
4.3 Lack of Disincentives for Land Conversion and Weak 
Punishment for Noncompliance of Laws 
Chapter 3 points out regulations and policies regarding cultivated land protection in 
China are all based on a quota system.  No landmark measures have been taken to 
reduce or eradicate the fundamental incentives driving cultivated land conversion, i.e., 
address the substantial differences between the conveyance fee and the acquisition cost.  
The 1998 LAL raised the land compensation fees and resettlement subsidies, but the 
increase in land acquisition cost is negligible and does not significantly shrink the profit 
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margin.  Also, the 1998 LAL does not require land compensation to be formulated in 
accordance with the market value of the land, nor contain any specific regulations on 
calculating the conveyance fees in the urban primary land market, both, if defined, would 
aid in closing the gap between the cost and profit.   
Conveyance fees can still be substantially higher than acquisition costs even after 
accounting for costs accrued in replacing the lost cultivated land with new land under the 
new LAL, because local officials have a series of low-cost approaches to meeting the 
―dynamic balance‖ requirement.  By interviewing local people in Qingzhou City of 
Shandong Province in 2001, Lin and Ho (2005) found local officials could select barren 
land in remote areas and designate it as basic farmland, but classify fertile land adjacent 
to urban areas as uncultivable land.  Similarly, Zhang, Huang, and Ni (2001) found local 
governments in the east coastal areas redefined fishing ponds as cultivated land in order 
to meet the quota for cultivated land in their jurisdiction.  Such gimmicks are much 
cheaper than acquiescing to the central government‘s suggestions of transferring the top 
soil of fertile land to barren land, creating new farmland through ocean fill, developing 
irrigation systems on dry land, and/or improving land quality through agricultural 
research and development.   
Additionally, China‘s system of discovering and punishing unapproved and illegal 
land transactions does not help effectively close the profit margin in land transactions 
either.   Although the administrative penalties on local officials conducting unapproved 
and illegal land transactions for profits-reaping purposes are harsh, and often include 
expelling of the political power and criminal charges, the chance of such local officials 
being caught is fairly small (Xinhua News Agency 2006, 2007).  The central 
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government currently relies on periodic land inspections to discover illegal land 
behaviors.  In some cases, those once-illegal land projects could have obtained the 
required approvals several years after the development, and thus sporadic land 
inspections would not be able to discover this type of illegal projects.  In other cases, the 
land grabbing officials could hide or destroy any records of their murky behaviors right 
before the upcoming land inspection.  As previously mentioned, there is also no easy 
process for farmers to bring violations to light.  Hence, local land grabbing officials face 
a relatively low risk of being caught and jeopardizing their careers (Ma 2009).   
4.4 Challenges of Implementing National Policies at Local 
Levels  
The inefficacy of China‘s current legal system in curbing cultivated land conversion 
is also a result of weak implementation of national policies at local levels.  The 
decentralization in the Chinese political system allows local governments to play an 
active and direct role in the development process.  Local governments are responsible 
for the implementation and enforcement of the laws and policies issued by the central 
government.  Local governments are encouraged to make accommodations for their 
specific, local circumstances when it comes to enforcing and implementing national 
policies.  This allowed local discretion provides tremendous opportunities for local 
officials to interpret central government policies in favor of their own development goals.  
A case study of the articulation and implementation of the farmland protection policies at 
the local level in Huzhou City of Zhejiang Province by Skinner, Kuhn and Joseph (2001) 
sheds some light on the ineffectiveness of the DBP at the local level.   
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Huzhou is one of the prefectural-level cities in the Yangtze River Delta and a perfect 
example of how local governments negotiate around DBP requirements.  Amid the rural 
industrialization through developing township and village enterprises (primarily based on 
food processing and garment manufacturing) in Zhejiang Province, Huzhou has lost more 
than 9% of its cultivated land since 1978.  Between 1992 and 1997, per capita cultivated 
land decreased by 8.9%, from 0.056 to 0.051 hectares.  The DBP‘s mandate in Huzhou 
is based on the Provincial Implementing Act issued by the Zhejiang Land Management 
Bureau.  The Huzhou prefecture government and its lower-level county and township 
governments are required to maintain cultivated land in their respective administrative 
regions equal to that of the level in 1996, both quantity and quality.  However, local 
governments have been able to seek significant flexibility in meeting this requirement.  
In Huzhou, two initiatives are fundamental to agricultural land protection: land 
reclamation and land use reorganization.  Reclaimed agricultural land typically comes 
from inferior land not suitable for cultivation, such as barren land, ponds, beds of small 
rivers, obsolete irrigation channels, and land situated with illegal residential houses.  
Land reclamation fees are collected if provincial quantity and quality standards are not 
met.  However, many township governments and enterprises simply consider the land 
reclamation fees as a fixed cost and a necessary expense for their industrial and 
residential development priorities.   
The local governments‘ ability to interpret and implement the DBP in favor of their 
local development interests is further revealed through the reorganization of land use.  
As available sources for land reclamation decline, local officials in Huzhou seek to 
relocate and merge dispersed rural settlements to make land available for industrial 
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development, even though it is often good farmland.   
Some townships in Huzhou can also take advantage of the development land that has 
been set-aside.  Their local land regulations state that all land, including agricultural 
land, falling within the development land area is considered construction land if the land 
use plans were developed prior to the formalization of the provincial agricultural land 
protection regulations in 1999.  This practice facilitates the encroachment of industrial 
and residential activities onto agricultural land without violating the LAL.  
 Thus far, the analysis of the incentives for local governments involved in cultivated 
land conversion to not comply with the central government requirements has been based 
on anecdotal evidence.  This thesis attempts formulate this incentive structure into a 
theoretical land conversion model.  Based on the theoretical analysis, this thesis will 
examine empirically the strength of the economic incentives in land acquisition and the 
effectiveness of the Dynamic Balance Policy under such influences.  Given this attempt, 
it is necessary to review existing literature on the driving forces of China‘s cultivated 
land conversion, setting the benchmark for the theoretical and empirical analyses of this 




5 Literature Review 
While urbanization and industrialization is commonly believed to have fostered the 
rapid loss of cultivated land in China, there has been a lack of economic and econometric 
analyses of this relationship.  Geographers, urban planners, as well as policy researchers 
have contributed voluminous studies on China‘s land use changes, in particular from 
agricultural to urban uses, in its economic reform era.  Nevertheless, most of them are 
limited to an anecdotal account of the changes in China‘s land use, and/or a descriptive 
rationale for the driving forces of the observed changes.  Many of the previously 
discussed studies fall into this category, for example, Heilig (1997), Yeh and Li (1999), 
Lin and Ho (2003), Ho and Lin (2004a), Tan et al. (2005), and Long et al. (2007).   
A handful of studies distinguish themselves from others by examining the driving 
forces for China‘s land use changes, using economic modeling and regression-based 
econometric techniques.  They are Seto and Kaufmann (2003), Liu, Zhan and Deng 
(2005), Deng et al. (2008), and Lichtenberg and Ding (2009).  This chapter reviews 
these works and discusses their similarities and differences in the approach to addressing 
similar issues adopted by this thesis.     
First of all, Liu, Zhan and Deng (2005) is the only study that has examined the 
effects of the cultivated land protection policies in China.  They argued that various laws, 
regulations and policies regarding land use and management had been issued during their 
study period of 1990 – 2000.  To examine the policy impacts, they included two year 
dummies indicating the issuance of new policies in their model urban land expansion.  
The 1992 year dummy was included to test the effectiveness of the Implementing Act of 
the Land Administration Law issued in 1991 and the Urgent Notice of Prohibiting 
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Misused and Unapproved Farmland Acquisition issued in 1992.  The 1995 year dummy 
was included to test the effectiveness of the Basic Farmland Protection Regulation issued 
in 1994, which was the groundwork policy of the Dynamic Balance Policy as discussed 
in Chapter 3. 
It is not difficult to see that the definition of the policy indicators in Liu, Zhan and 
Deng (2005) is flawed.  By including the year dummies for 1992 and 1995, Liu, Zhan 
and Deng (2005) assumed the policies were effective only in the year they were issued or 
in the following year.  It is not clear if they have meant to assign the value 1 to the 
policy dummies for the year in which the policy was issued and also for the years after 
the policy issuances.  In addition, Liu, Zhan and Deng (2005) applied the same year 
dummy for different provinces, which may not have reflected when the policy change 
had actually occurred in that province.  As far as this thesis has found, local 
governments of different levels in China are typically allowed some ―grace period‖ for 
the implementation of national policies.  Local governments can take the grace period to 
make the implementing acts suitable for their localities.  Provincial implementing acts of 
the 1998 LAL issued in various years after 1998 are an example of such practice (see 
Table 3.2).  The policy indicator of this thesis will be carefully crafted based on this 
fact.      
One thing that all of the studies reviewed in this chapter have in common is that they 
all use panel data of land use and socioeconomic variables, which allows them to 
examine the demographic and economic driving forces for land use changes, controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity across sections.  While they have all compiled 
socioeconomic data from published statistical yearbooks, they obtained their land use 
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data from two different sources.  Specifically, Seto and Kaufmann (2003), Liu, Zhan 
and Deng (2005), and Deng et al. (2008) used technologies in the geographic information 
systems (GIS) to estimate the changes in land use, whereas Lichtenberg and Ding (2009) 
adopted the official land use data collected by the Ministry of Land and Resources of 
China.   
Given the amount of time and effort required for interpreting the remote-sensing 
images and validating the interpretation in the fields, those studies using GIS data for 
land use changes all have small panels with very few years and/or cross-sectional units, 
limiting the statistical power in their econometric analyses.  Specifically, the dataset of 
Seto and Kauffman (2003) contains only 11 counties in the Pearl River Delta for two 
years, and the dataset of Liu, Zhan and Deng (2005) consists of 13 cities for three years.  
Deng et al. (2008) is a diligent effort to compile the data for all 2,348 counties in China.  
Their dataset includes over 2000 cross-sectional units, but the time component has only 
three years.  Because the land area in the base year is used as an exogenous variable in 
the model, their study is for the land use changes between two years only.     
Data used by these studies not only casts doubt on the statistical power of their 
econometric analysis due to its small sample size, it also fails to transmit the dynamics of 
land use changes.  Due to the time and effort required, all of the aforementioned studies 
based on the GIS data only managed to assemble the data for two or three data points 
with five to eight years apart, and then calculated the land use changes between the two 
end dates of the study period.  Such data omits any important land use changes in years 
between the beginning and ending years.  Seto and Kauffman (2003) attempted to 
overcome this shortcoming of the GIS data and formed a time series of eight years 
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between 1988 and 1996.  They used the Bayesian maximum likelihood method to 
identify the years in which urban land use changes had occurred based on the probability 
density function of each class of land and the land use maps of 1988 and 1996.  With 
this information, they were able to obtain the annual changes in land areas by use.  
However, such data derived based on assumptions and probability density functions 
should be used with caution, as they may not be warranted by the reality check. 
By comparison, Lichtenberg and Ding (2009) and this thesis both adopt the official 
land use data, which is a continuous series of eight years from 1996 to 2004.  
First-differencing the data to study the changes in land areas still leaves the sample with 
seven time units.  The sample of Lichtenberg and Ding (2009) contains 99 
prefecture-level cities in East China, making a total of 792 observations in the data, large 
enough to yield precise estimators.  Similarly, this thesis has compiled data for all 
prefectures in China, along with four provincial-level municipalities, making a total of 
2,640 observations in the whole China sample, and 808 observations in the East China 
sample.   
With panel data, Seto and Kaufmann (2003) adopted the random coefficient 
estimation to account for heterogeneity and unobserved variables among counties.  
Their estimation results showed that the annual rate of land conversion from agricultural 
land to urban uses is positively correlated with the ratio of the agricultural land value to 
urban land value.  This finding seems to be counterintuitive in that common wisdom and 
empirical evidence found by Lichtenberg and Ding (2009) claim that areas with higher 
agricultural land value should have experienced a slower rate of converting agricultural 
land to urban uses.  Seto and Kaufmann (2003) explained that relatively more 
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productive and valuable agricultural land was converted to urban uses, because where 
land was productive was also where population concentrated and increased population 
put an upward pressure on urbanization.  However, they also found that the annual rate 
of land conversion from agricultural land to urban uses is negatively correlated with the 
agricultural labor productivity, contradicting their finding of the positive correlation 
between agricultural land conversion and the agricultural land value.  Seto and 
Kaufmann (2003) did not make any effort to reconcile this conflict.   
Seto and Kaufmann (2003) recognized the potential endogeneity in the relationship 
between land use changes and the productivity of land or labor, and tried to infer the 
direction of the causality using the Granger causality test.  The Granger causality test is 
a test used in time-series analysis.  It determines whether one time series is useful in 
forecasting another.  The sample of Seto and Kaufmann (2003) has too few time-series 
observations for this kind of test.  Based on an unsuitable test, Seto and Kaufmann 
(2003) found little evidence for the ―causal relations in Granger‘s sense‖ between land 
use changes and their explanatory variables in any direction.  They concluded that while 
the change in land use did not Granger cause the changes in the productivity of land or 
labor in each sector, or the total investments in capital construction, these factors did not 
cause the change in land use either.  There must have been unobserved variables outside 
the model that drive the land use changes in China.   
Noting that the econometric models in Seto and Kaufmann (2003) and Liu, Zhan and 
Deng (2005) are based on anecdotal evidence and wide belief, the relations they have 
found between land use changes and the factors they selected in the ad hoc fashion 
cannot be taken as causal relationships.  Thus, their findings do not convey sound policy 
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implications for what can lead to slower agricultural land loss or slower urban land 
expansion.  Careful empirical application of insightful theoretical analysis will offer 
much more interpretive power for policy-making.  Studies by Deng et al. (2008) and 
Lichtenberg and Ding (2009) make significant improvement in this aspect to the literature 
on China‘s land use changes.  
In the examination of the driving forces for the urban land expansion between 1995 
and 2000 in China, Deng et al. (2008) identified their explanatory variables based on the 
monocentric urban expansion model.  Implied directly by this model, urban areas would 
be increasing in population and income and decreasing in transportation costs and 
agricultural land rents.  To test the hypotheses of the monocentric urban model, they 
started their empirical investigation with the basic model including such explanatory 
variables as GDP growth, population growth, agricultural investment as a measure for 
agricultural land rent, and highway density as a measure for the commuting cost.   
The basic model was extended to include factors influencing land use changes in 
developing countries including China, such as the structural changes.  To account for the 
influence of structural changes in China‘s economy, Deng et al. (2008) included the 
growth of industrial GDP and the growth of GDP from the service sector.  To account 
for climatic effects, they included variables for temperature and rainfalls.  To account 
for the geophysical factors, they included the average elevation, slope, and the share of 
flat land in a county.  Finally, they included the distance of the county to the nearest port 
city, the distance of the county to its provincial capital, and the size of the urban core of 
the county in 1988.   
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Their results indicated that local GDP growth was important in explaining the growth 
of the urban core in the late 1990s.  Holding GDP constant, population growth and 
highway density were positively correlated with the urban core growth, and the growth of 
agricultural investment was negatively correlated with the urban core growth.  
Noting that GDP was an explanatory variable in all regressions, the results of Deng 
et al. (2008) may be subject to endogeneity problems.  Recently proved by Ding and 
Lichtenberg (2011), urban land expansion has been an important factor driving China‘s 
economic growth, suggesting that incomes measured by GDP are endogenous and thus 
need to be instrumented for.  Deng et al. (2008) failed to address the endogeneity issues.  
Their regression results may be biased, and the interpretation of their results needs to be 
treated with caution.  
A more recent study by Lichtenberg and Ding (2009) offered a different approach to 
examine the relationship between economic driving forces and urban land expansion in 
China.  Instead of addressing urban land expansion as a result of economic growth or 
population growth, Lichtenberg and Ding (2009) examined the incentive structure of 
Chinese local officials for cultivated land conversion that had ultimately led to urban land 
expansion in China.  They portrayed local officials in charge of land use as private 
individuals whose goal is to maximize the rewards from the central government in 
accordance with their performance in local economic growth, fiscal management, as well 
as maintaining agricultural production.  Based on this framework, Lichtenberg and Ding 
found the rate of urban spatial expansion would be higher in areas where land conversion 
was more profitable, i.e., where urban land value is higher, and lower in areas where 
agricultural land value, and hence compensation for land conversion, was higher.  In 
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addition, the rate of urban spatial expansion would be higher in areas where expected tax 
revenues were larger. 
In the empirical analysis, Lichtenberg and Ding (2009) examined the strength of the 
identified factors affecting urban spatial expansion in Chinese cities using the official 
land use data.  Their dataset consisted of 99 prefecture-level cities in ten coastal 
provinces
14
 in China from 1997 to 2004.  The dependent variable was defined as the 
change in urban land area from year t to year t+1, in both level and percentage terms.  
As clarification, urban land in Lichtenberg and Ding (2009) is defined as the land 
classified as cities in Table 2.1, and the urban land in this thesis is defined as cities and 
towns because many prefectures in western China do not have land classified as cities.   
Socioeconomic data was collected from published provincial statistical yearbooks.  
The dependent variable in estimation is defined as the change in the area of land defined 
as city by the MLR from year t to year t+1.  Although motivated by different rationales, 
Lichtenberg and Ding (2009) defined the value of land in different sectors in the same 
way as Seto and Kaufmann (2003).  Specifically, the average values of urban land 
agricultural land were defined as local nonagricultural GDP divided by urban land areas 
and agricultural GDP divided by cultivated land area, respectively.  An alternative 
measure for average agricultural land was defined as total agricultural output value 
divided by cultivated land area.  Another key explanatory variable was the local 
government budgetary revenue per unit of urban land.    
The change in urban land area from year t to year t+1 was then estimated on the 
urban land value, agricultural land value, and local government budgetary revenue per 
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unit of urban land in the initial time period (year t).  Assume the land use changes in the 
following year (t+1) would not affect the economic factors in current year (t), the model 
set up by Lichtenberg and Ding (2009) did not face the problems associated endogeneity.  
This is also an important assumption adopted by this thesis. 
Using prefecture and year fixed effects estimation, Lichtenberg and Ding (2009) 
found that changes in urban land area were positively correlated with the value of urban 
land and local government budgetary revenue per unit of urban land, and negatively 
correlated with the value of agricultural land.  Based on these findings, Lichtenberg and 
Ding (2009) concluded that empirical evidence from coastal provinces was consistent 
with the theoretical investigation that Chinese local officials responded to land values in a 
manner similar to private land developers in competitive land markets.  In addition, 
government revenues influenced the changes in urban land area as expected by the 
theoretical model.  These results suggested that policies aiming to slow down cultivated 
land conversion and urban land expansion should be made to restrain the incentives of 
local officials for buying low and selling high in the land conversion process.   
As mentioned earlier, Liu, Zhan and Deng (2005) was the only study that attempted 
to evaluate the effectiveness of any cultivated land protection policies in China, but they 
did not execute their evaluation properly.  This thesis is the first economic paper to 
examine one of the most important land use policies in China, with well-grounded 
theoretical and empirical approaches. 
This thesis adopts the theoretical approach of Lichtenberg and Ding (2009) in that 
the goal of this thesis is to examine the impacts of the Dynamic Balance Policy.  As 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Chinese local officials play a dual role in land use 
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management.  They are the policy enforcement and at the same time the agent to carry 
out land conversion.  The incentives for enforcing the policy are likely to be weakened 
by the economic incentives for converting cultivated land to urban uses.  Analyzing 
such an incentive structure at the micro level serves the research goal of this dissertation, 
although the empirical implementation of the theoretical analysis adopts macro data.  
Further, this dissertation extends the model of Lichtenberg and Ding (2009) to include the 
land conversion from unused land to cultivated land, an indispensable element for the 
study of the Dynamic Balance Policy. 
This dissertation exploits the official land use data and economic data from the same 
sources as Lichtenberg and Ding (2009).  The variable definitions, as well as the 
estimation specifications and procedures, have some similarities to those adopted by 
Lichtenberg and Ding (2009).  An improvement in the econometric estimation made by 
this thesis is the testing and correction for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in panel 
data analysis.  Without this adjustment, the estimation technique adopted by this thesis 
would be the same as Lichtenberg and Ding‘s (2009).  If autocorrelation and/or 
heteroskedasticity present, failure to correct them would lead to incorrect variance 
estimators, which would affect the hypothesis testing.  These technical details will be 
spelt out in the empirical chapters.   
The remainder of the dissertation will develop the theoretical and empirical models 
for examining the effects of the DBP as well as the economic driving forces, and detail 




6 Theoretical Models   
This chapter establishes a theoretical model to analyze the incentive structure of 
agricultural land conversion to urban uses, and derives testable hypotheses for the 
empirical analysis.  Specifically, section 6.1 defines the variables and sets up the general 
model.  Sections 6.2 and 6.3 analyze the model in the pre-policy and post-policy cases, 
respectively, and derive the optimal amount of agricultural land converted to urban uses 
and the optimal amount of other land converted to agricultural use in each case.  In 
addition, their comparative statics are developed with respect to the parameters in the 
model.     
The theoretical model is based on the dynamic land transition model formulated by 
Lichtenberg and Ding in their 2009 study on Chinese local officials as land developers in 
urban spatial expansion.  As argued in Chapter 4, local officials in China use land 
acquisition and development to promote economic growth and relieve budgetary pressure 
(Ping 2006; Cao, Feng, and Tao 2008; Lichtenberg and Ding 2009).  Lichtenberg and 
Ding (2009) formulate such incentives of Chinese local officials into a dynamic land 
transition model where only the conversion from agricultural to urban land is examined.  
This dissertation extends their model to include the conversion of other types of land to 
agricultural land as required by the Dynamic Balance Policy (DBP).  For simplicity, the 
continuous process of land conversion formulated by Lichtenberg and Ding (2009) is 
adapted into a static model of changes in land use from one year to another.  This 
modification simplifies the mathematical derivation of a dynamic function of two choice 
variables, but yields a set of results comparable to those from the dynamic model. 
86 
 
6.1 Variable Definitions and the General Model 
Let   ,   , and    denote the initial area of urban, agricultural, and all other land, 
respectively.  Let      denote the area of agricultural land converted to urban uses, 
and      denote the area of all other land converted to agricultural uses.  By 
assumption, agricultural land that is converted to urban land is not always replaced with 
other land.  It is also assumed that no land other than agricultural land is converted to 
urban uses, an assumption supported by observations in Chapter 2 that other land is not a 
primary source for new urban land.  Additionally, assume that agricultural land is not 
converted to any use other than urban construction.   
To account for the quality differential of land, define the relative productivity of 
other land to existing agricultural land as      , and thus the area of other land 
converted to agricultural land, adjusted for quality, is    .  The DBP requires that 
      .     
As discussed earlier, the first objective of local officials in China is to promote local 
economic growth.  Assume the local economy consists of two sectors: agriculture and 
urban.  Local officials face the problem of maximizing the value of agricultural 
production and urban production.  Let functions          and          represent 
the instantaneous revenues from agricultural and urban sectors, respectively.  
Discounting them by factor     yields their present value at time t.  Following the 
specification of Lichtenberg and Ding (2009), assume labor and capital used in 
production are not constrained and that they adjust instantaneously with the land, thus the 
revenue functions,          and         , are functions of land only.  They 
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preserve the common properties of a revenue function: increasing and concave in input, 
i.e.,        , and          . 
The second objective of local officials is to maintain the local budgetary balance.  
Local budgetary revenues come from two sources: first, taxes on the value-added of 
urban production,          , where   denotes the aggregate tax rate; and second, taxes 
and fees collected from urban land users,  
         , where  
  denotes the 
aggregate taxes and fees per unit of land.  Local budgetary expenditure on providing 
urban infrastructure is defined as a function of the size of the urban area,         .  
Assume the expenditure function has the common property of convexity, i.e.,      and 
     .   
Following the analytical mechanism of Lichtenberg and Ding (2009), to facilitate the 
analysis, shifters are included for the value of agricultural production,    , the value 
of urban production,    , and the local budgetary balance,    .  The initial values 
of these shifters are set to be one.  Such shifters can be understood as any external 
shocks that could increase the value of agricultural and urban production, or the weights 
that local officials place on agricultural, urban, and government sectors.  They also 
allow cross-sectional comparison of different locations.   
In addition to maximizing the present value of agricultural and urban production and 
the present value of net budgetary revenues, local officials engage in the profit 
maximization in land conversion and sales at time t.  As discussed earlier, land 
conversion and development further promote urban production, and revenues generated 
from land transactions relieve the local budgetary pressure.  Profits from converting 
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agricultural land and selling it on the primary urban land market are expressed as 
            , where  
  denotes the unit price of agricultural land on the urban 
primary land market (i.e., the conveyance fee per unit of land), and       denotes the 
unit cost of converting agricultural land to urban uses.   
As discussed in Chapter 3, the cost of converting agricultural land to urban uses is 
mainly comprised of land compensation fees and resettlement fees, which are calculated 
based on the average agricultural land productivity in the past three years.  The average 
cost, as well as the marginal cost, of agricultural land conversion,      , is thus 
predetermined on the initial amount of agricultural land,   , and constant in the amount 
of land being converted,   .  Due to diminishing marginal productivity, unit 
compensation is decreasing in the initial amount of agricultural land at a decreasing rate, 
i.e.     , and       (Lichtenberg and Ding 2009).   
Unlike the cost of agricultural land conversion, the cost of converting other land to 
agricultural land,         , has the increasing and convex properties of a standard cost 
function, i.e.,      and      .  To help analyze the effects of different costs of 
converting other land to agricultural land in different locations on the optimal rates of 
conversions from agricultural land to urban land and from other land to agricultural land, 
a shifter     is added to the cost function of other land conversion. 
The final presentation of the profit maximization problem facing local officials is 
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subject to 
         and     .                                  
The DBP adds an additional constraint,       . 
6.2 Optimal Land Conversion without the Dynamic Balance 
Policy 
In the absence of the DBP, the Lagrangian function for this problem is 
                           .         
The Kuhn-Tucker first-order necessary conditions with respect to   ,   , and   are 
        





                               ;      (6.1) 
          
    
 
        ;            (6.2) 
             , with complementary slackness.       (6.3) 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (6.1) – (6.3) define the optimal amount of land conversion 
of each kind in the absence of the DBP.   
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 When   
    and     , it is a case in which local officials voluntarily convert 
other land to agricultural land.  Equations (6.1) and (6.2) together imply 
  





                             .      (6.4) 
Equation (6.4) implies that   
  and   
  are chosen to equate the marginal cost of 
converting other land to agricultural land with the marginal benefit of converting 
agricultural land to urban land.   
 For interior solutions,   
    and   
   , the second-order sufficient conditions 
for a maximum ensure that  
           
 
 
                       ,  
           
      
 
       , 
and         
                     
          
 
 
                                                  . 
 Total differentiating equations (6.1) and (6.2) and applying the Cramer‘s rule, we 
obtain the following comparative statics of   
  and   
  with respect to the model 
parameters.  
Results 6.2.1  Comparative statics with respect to  : 
    
   
 
  
             , where                                     
                 , guaranteed by the second-order sufficient conditions for a 
maximum;          
    
   
 
  
                        .         
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This pair of comparative statics indicates that the optimal amount of agricultural land 
converted to urban land is lower in areas where the value of agricultural production, and 
thus the value of agricultural land, is higher.  Likewise, the optimal amount of other land 
converted to agricultural land is higher in areas where the value of agricultural production, 
and thus the value of agricultural land, is higher.   
Results 6.2.2  Comparative statics with respect to  : 
    
   
 
  
                     ;           
    
   
 
  
             .       
Results 6.2.2 indicate that the optimal amount of agricultural land converted to urban land 
and the optimal amount of other land converted to agricultural land are both higher in 
areas where the value of urban production, and thus the value of urban land, is higher.   
Results 6.2.3  Comparative statics with respect to  : 
    
   
 
  
                            ;               
    
   
 
  
                   .               
Because                and        , the signs of results 6.2.3 are determined 
by the sign of          .  If the marginal expenditure of urban land is greater than 
the marginal revenue, i.e.,            , then 
   
 
  
   and 
   
 
  
  , implying that 
both the conversion of agricultural land to urban land and the conversion of other land to 
agricultural land is slower in areas where maintaining budgetary balance is more 
important.  By the same token, if the marginal expenditure of urban land is less than the 
marginal revenue, i.e.,            , then 
   
 
  
   and 
   
 
  
  , implying more 
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agricultural land will be converted to urban land and more other land will be converted to 
agricultural land in areas where government revenue generation from urban production is 
deemed more important.   
Results 6.2.4  Comparative statics with respect to  : 
    
   
 
  
                      ;     
    
   
 
  
             .      
Results 6.2.4 indicate that the optimal amount of agricultural land conversion and other 
land conversion is both higher in areas where the aggregate tax rate on urban production 
is higher.      
Results 6.2.5  Comparative statics with respect to   : 
    
   
 
   
                    ;             
    
   
 
   
            .           
Similar to results 6.2.4, these results indicate that the optimal amount of agricultural land 
conversion and other land conversion is both higher in areas where the aggregate tax rate 
on urban land is higher.      
Results 6.2.6  Comparative statics with respect to   : 
    
   
 
   
                    ;   
    
   
 
   
            . 
Similar to results 6.2.4 and 6.2.5, these results indicate that the optimal amount of 
agricultural land conversion and other land conversion is both higher in areas where the 
price of converted agricultural land on the urban land market is higher.        
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Results 6.2.7  Comparative statics with respect to   : 
    
   
 
   
                                  ;     
    
   
 
   
                            .         
Result 
   
 
   
   implies that the optimal amount of agricultural land converted to urban 
land is larger in areas where there is initially more agricultural land.  The sign of 
   
 
   
 
cannot be determined because the sign of                    cannot be 
determined, where                      and       by assumption.   
Results 6.2.8  Comparative statics with respect to   : 
 
   
 
   
                                   ;  
 
   
 
   
                          . 
Results 6.2.8 imply that the conversion of agricultural land to urban land and the 
conversion of other land to agricultural land are both slower in areas where there is 
initially more urban land.   
Results 6.2.9  Comparative statics with respect to  : 
    
   
 
  
            ;             
    
   
 
  
                            . 
These results suggest that the optimal amount of both agricultural land conversion and 
other land conversion is lower if the cost of converting other land to agricultural land is 
higher.           
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                    . 
Result 
   
 
  
   suggests that the optimal amount of agricultural land converted to urban 
land is larger in areas where the soil quality of other land is higher.  Also, the effect of 
the soil quality of other land on the optimal amount of agricultural land conversion is 
dependent on the optimal amount of other land converted to agricultural land.  
Furthermore, the relationship between the optimal amount of other land converted to 
agricultural land and the soil quality of other land is unclear, because the sign of 




cannot be determined.   
Results 6.2.11  Comparative statics with respect to   : 
 
   
 
   
   
   
   
          , where 
   
   
   because like in any natural resource 
extraction, the cost is lower if the initial endowment is larger.  Similarly,  
 
   
 
   
   
   
   
                         . 
Results 6.2.11 point out that the optimal amounts of agricultural land converted to urban 
uses and other land converted to agricultural land are both higher in areas where there is 
initially more land other and agricultural and urban land available.   
Implied by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (6.1) – (6.3), another possibility in the 
absence of the DBP is that it is never optimal to convert other land to agricultural land, 
i.e.,   
    and     , because the marginal cost of replacing agricultural land with 
other land is always greater than the marginal benefit of converting agricultural land to 
urban land:  
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                             .       (6.5) 
In this case, the only condition defining   
  is (6.1) with   
   : 
  





                   
                
          .  
(6.6) 
Differentiating equation (6.6) with respect to each parameter gives us the following 
comparative statics: 
   





   
       ;               (6.2.12) 
where                        , implied by the second-order sufficient 
condition for a maximum;   





   
        ;             (6.2.13) 
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  ;   (6.2.14) 
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               ;        (6.2.18) 
    
 
   
 
  
   
                     .       (6.2.19) 
 Results 6.2.12 – 6.2.19 are essentially the same as the comparative statics of   
  
when   
    in the corresponding results 6.2.1 – 6.2.8.  In the absence of the DBP, 
whether there is voluntary conversion of other land to agricultural land or not, the optimal 
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amount of agricultural land converted to urban land is always smaller in areas where the 
value of agricultural land is higher; and larger in areas where the value of urban land is 
higher.  In addition, the optimal amount of agricultural land conversion is always larger 
in areas where the aggregate tax rates on urban production and urban land are higher, and 
where the price of the converted land in the urban land market is higher.  Moreover, the 
optimal amount of agricultural land conversion is higher in areas where there is initially 
more agricultural land or less urban land.  Finally, the relationship between agricultural 
land conversion and local budgetary balance is compounded by the fact that while more 
urban land may increase the tax revenue from the urban sector, it may also increase the 
expenditure for providing urban infrastructure.   
6.3 Optimal Land Conversion with the Dynamic Balance 
Policy 
The previous section analyzes the optimal land conversion rate in the absence of the 
DBP and develops the comparative statics and testable hypotheses.  This section 
performs a similar analysis for the case when the DBP is enforced, and compares the 
results with the corresponding results in the pre-policy case.   
The problem facing local officials in the presence of the DBP is 
         
             
 
 
                       
                   
 




        ,     , and       .                                  
The Lagrangian function for this problem is 
                                 .         
The Kuhn-Tucker first-order necessary conditions with respect to   ,   , and   are 
          





                                 ;   (6.7) 
          
    
 
         ;            (6.8)  
                , with complementary slackness.      (6.9) 
Because of the cost of agricultural land reclamation and development, local officials 
would only want to meet the minimum requirement of the DBP, i.e.,   
      
  .  The 
superscript, d, is used to distinguish the solutions from those to the pre-policy model 
derived in section 6.2.  In this case, the first-order necessary conditions for a maximum 
are 
   





                                 ;    (6.10) 
  
    
 
         ;             (6.11) 
          .              (6.12) 
When   
      
  , equation (6.11) implies    
      
   
 
 
       
 
  .  The 
Lagrangian multiplier at the optimum can be interpreted as the marginal value of relaxing 
the policy constraint.  It is the shadow price local officials would be willing to pay for a 
small relaxation of the constraint.   
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Substituting    into equation (6.10) gives us  
      





               
                 
               .  (6.13) 
Comparing equation (6.13) with (6.4), because   
     
 , a result of the DBP requiring 
more conversion of other land to agricultural land, and         , the following 
inequality is obtained. 
      





               
                 
                
 






               
                
               
Due to the concavity of the revenue function,         , and the convexity of the 
expenditure function,         , the above inequality implies   
     
 .  Thus, the 
DBP will decrease the amount of agricultural land converted to urban uses.    
To yield a set of comparative statics of   
   and   
   as in the pre-policy analysis, 




                              
   
 
  ;     (6.14) 
          .              (6.15) 
Implied by equations (6.14) and (6.15),   
   and   
   are invariant with respect to  , 
i.e., 
  




   
  
  
  .             (6.3.1) 
Total differentiating equations (6.14) and (6.15) with respect to  ,  ,  ,   ,   , 
  ,   ,  , and   yields the following comparative statics.   
    




   
  
  
         ;           (6.3.2) 
99 
 
where                             , implied by the second-order sufficient 
condition for a maximum; 
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        ;           (6.3.5) 
    
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
        ;           (6.3.6) 
    
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
         ;           (6.3.7) 
    
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
                      ;       (6.3.8) 
    




   
  
  
          ;          (6.3.9) 
    




   
  
  
             ;         (6.3.10) 
    
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
   
   
   
      .           (6.3.11) 
Note that results (6.3.2) - (6.3.11) are essentially the same as their corresponding 
results in the pre-policy case.  This finding suggests that the DBP will not change the 
directions of the effects of each factor influencing the optimal amount of land conversion, 
but it may change the magnitude of the effects.  While it is mathematically challenging 
to compare the magnitude of the post-policy results and the pre-policy results, it is easy to 
test empirically whether the DBP has changed the effects of other factors on the changes 
in land use.  The testing techniques will be spelt out in Chapter 7.  
Results derived in this chapter serve as the testable hypotheses in the empirical 
examination.  Not all of the hypotheses can be tested due to data constraint.  The next 
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The empirical examination of the relation between land use changes and their driving 
forces requires two types of data—land use data and economic data.  In China, land use 
data is collected and managed by the MLR and land bureaus at the local levels, while 
economic data is collected and managed by the National Statistical Bureau and statistical 
offices at the local levels.  The effort on data collection and compilation of this thesis 
involves extracting land use and economic data from their respective sources and 
merging them by space and years.  The data thus has the panel data nature.  This 
chapter describes the sources, units, and the spatial and temporal dimensions of the data, 
and provides a summary of descriptive statistics of the data used in this analysis.  
7.1 Sources 
7.1.1 Land Use Data 
As discussed in the literature review, there are two main sources of data for 
measuring land use changes in China.  One is the GIS data estimated from the remote 
sensing images, and the other is the official data collected and maintained by the MLR.  
This dissertation adopts the latter.  This section will first address the accuracy issue of 
China‘s land use data, an issue raised by many researchers, and then introduce the unit of 
the data.    
This thesis covers the period from 1996 to 2004, in which reliable and accurate data 
for China‘s cultivated land have been collected.  Prior to 1996, areas of land by use were 
reported by local governments in the hierarchical order and given to the central 
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government.  It is well-documented that villages and townships tended to underreport 
their cultivated land areas for tax relief.  Estimates obtained from satellite images reveal 
that the actual cultivated land in China was nearly 40% more than what had been reported 
by local land bureaus prior to 1996 (Heilig 1997; Ash and Edmonds 1998; Smil 1999; Lin 
and Ho 2003).  Not only was the total amount underreported, the rate of converting 
cultivated land to nonagricultural uses was also underestimated by the statistics reported 
to the central government (Seto and Kaufmann 2003).  For example, satellite photos 
taken of seventeen large urban areas in China in 1987, 1991, and 1995 estimated the rate 
of land being converted from cultivation to urban uses to be two and half times faster 
than the official statistics (The United State Embassy 1997).   
To obtain accurate and reliable measurement of China‘s land resources, a 
comprehensive national land survey was conducted by the MLR between 1984 and 1996. 
It was the first national land survey in China that adopted a standardized methodology for 
classifying and measuring land across the country (The Central People‘s Government of 
China 2007).  More than 50,000 survey personnel were trained and sent to measure 
every village, town, and city.  Data collected during this period was adjusted to the 
standard time of October 31, 1996, forming the so-called 1996 Land Survey Data.  Since 
1996, changes in land use at the end of each year were reported by local land bureaus at 
the county level and above, and added to the 1996 Land Survey Data (Lin and Ho 2003).   
While official land data rounded to 10,000 mu or sometimes 1,000 hectare can be 
found in published statistical yearbooks, data as accurate as to 0.1 mu is kept confidential 
by the Chinese government.  Thanks to the collaboration of the Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy and the MLR of China, this study was granted access to the official land use data 
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rounded to 0.1 mu at the county, prefecture, and provincial levels from 1996 to 2004.  
To avoid confusion caused by the less commonly used Chinese unit for area (mu), the 
land use data in the analysis is scaled to hectares. 
7.1.2 Economic Data 
The economic data used in this thesis is compiled from published provincial 
statistical yearbooks.  Led by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, each province 
publishes an annual statistical yearbook which contains data at the provincial, prefecture, 
and county levels.   
The economic variables compiled by this thesis include local GDP from the primary, 
secondary, and tertiary industries, and local government revenues and expenditures.  
The primary, secondary, and tertiary industries can be loosely referred to as agricultural, 
industry, and services sectors, respectively.
15
  In the Chinese statistics, GDP and 
government revenues and expenditures are recorded at the end of the year as the 
increment in the year (National Statistic Bureau of China).  Therefore, they are flow 
variables, parallel to the annual changes in land areas.   
Following Lichtenberg and Ding (2009), the value of land is measured by GDP 
divided by land areas.  Specifically, the average value of cultivated land is calculated as 
local GDP from primary industry per unit of cultivated land, which is also a measure for 
the cost of land conversion because land compensation is linear in the agricultural output 
value according to the compensation formula specified in the LAL.  Similarly, the 
                                                 
15
 In China, primary industry refers to agriculture including farming, forestry, animal husbandry and 
fishery.  Secondary industry refers to industry including mining and quarrying, manufacturing, and the 
production and supply of electricity, water and gas.  Tertiary industry refers to all other industries not 
included in primary or secondary industry, such as services.  Source: National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/indicators/currentsurveysindicators/t20020419_17997.htm   
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average value of urban land is defined as local GDP from secondary and tertiary 
industries per unit of urban land.     
Additionally, local government revenue and expenditure per unit of urban land are 
included to capture the relationship between land use changes and local fiscal 
performance.  Local government revenue is a close approximation to the tax revenue 
generated from the urban sectors, because agricultural taxes accounted for only 4% of 
China's fiscal income and they were abolished, altogether, in 2004 (Xinhua News Agency, 
March 6, 2004).  It is important to note that data on local government revenues and 
expenditures published in China‘s statistical yearbooks measures the budgetary revenues 
and expenditures.  They are exogenous of the changes of land use, in that land 
conversions and conveyances only contribute to the off-budgetary revenues, as discussed 
in Chapter 4.   
A final note on the economic data is that all monetary variables in Chinese RMB are 
normalized to the real year 2004 terms, and then converted to US dollars using the 2004 
average annual exchange rate.
16
  GDP deflators for agricultural, industry, and services 
sectors are used to deflate the local GDP from respective sectors.  In addition, the GDP 
deflator for agricultural sector is used to deflate the total output value of farming while 
the overall GDP deflator is used to deflate the local government expenditures and 
revenues.   
                                                 
16
 Chinese GDP deflators and the exchange rate of RMB per US dollar are from the World Development 
Indicators 2010 published by the World Bank. 
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7.2 Spatial and Temporal Dimensions 
The official land use data is available at three local administrative levels—county, 
prefecture, and provincial.  Based on earlier discussions, the DBP requirement is 
postulated at the county level in practice, but economic data at the county level is not 
always available for all counties and all years.  Thus, the empirical analysis is 
implemented at the prefecture level.  In addition to data aggregated at the prefecture 
level, data for four provincial-level municipalities are included for two reasons.  First, 
like in prefectures, the subdivisions of provincial-level municipalities are called urban 
districts and rural counties.  The transitions between urban and rural land within a 
provincial-level municipality resemble the same transitions within a prefecture.  Thus, 
they can be studied together.  Second, the provincial-level municipalities are 
administered directly by the central government and play a central role in the regional 
economy.  The rate of urbanization and cultivated land loss in these municipalities has 
been phenomenal and cannot be left out in the study.  In the remainder of this 
dissertation, data is referred to as prefecture-level data, even though it contains some 
provincial-level observations. 
For many prefectures and counties in China, rapid economic growth has demanded 
some administrative adjustments.  Theoretically, prefecture-level cities are more 
urbanized than prefectures and, likewise, county-level urban districts and cities are more 
urbanized than counties.  When prefectures grow to certain size in their economy and 
population, they seek the approval of upper-level governments to become prefecture-level 
cities.  Counties upgrade to county-level cities and county-level cities upgrade to urban 
districts in the same way.  It is believed that such upgrades will bring more favorable 
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economic regulations, tax policies, and make the upgraded areas more competitive among 
jurisdictions of similar population and economic scales in the country (Chan, Henderson, 
and Tsui 2008).   
There are commonly five types of administrative adjustments: (1) move of counties 
or county-level cities from one prefecture or prefecture-level city to another (hereafter 
referred to as Type 1); (2) upgrade of counties to county-level cities; (3) upgrade of 
county-level cities to urban districts; (4) upgrade of prefectures to prefecture-level cities; 
and (5) name changes.  The main concern over the administrative adjustments is 
regarding the Type 1 adjustment because it causes changes in geographical boundaries 
which lead to significant changes in land areas and economic variables that cannot be 
explained by the land conversion process.  Sometimes there is a lag between the changes 
in land use data due to boundary adjustments and the changes in economic data.  In 
other words, some prefectures may still have reported their economic data for the areas 
under the old administration during the years when such boundary adjustments occurred. 
To smooth out the time-series dimension of the data, some cleaning procedures have 
been applied to make data comparable over time for affected prefectures.  For example, 
if certain counties of prefecture A are merged into prefecture B in 2000, data for these 
counties, when available, are taken out of prefecture A and added to prefecture B for the 
entire study period of 1996 – 2004.  In doing so, prefectures A and B can be treated as 
all other prefectures with unchanged total land areas.  For many provinces, however, 
economic data at the county level is not consistently available.  To cope with the Type 1 
adjustments, data for prefectures A and B are combined for the entire study period, and 
the ―new‖ prefecture named as A-B is then treated as a single analytical unit.  This is 
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also the cleaning procedure adopted by Deng et al. (2008) to cope with the boundary 
shifts among Chinese counties.   
Table 7.1 lists the prefectures that have experienced Type 1 administrative boundary 
changes in the study period along with the provinces to which they belong, years in 
which such changes occurred, brief descriptions of the changes, what cleaning procedures 
applied, and the names of the ―made-up‖ prefectures.  After treatment for administrative 
boundary changes, the data retains 326 prefectural-level divisions as opposed to the 333 
prefecture-level divisions as listed in the official record.
17
  Along with the four 
provincial-level municipalities, the cross-sectional component of the data has a total of 
330 units.  
On the temporal dimension of the data, the study period expands from 1996 to 2004, 
as determined by the availability of the land use data.  First-differencing the land use 
data leads to the drop of the 2004 data and creates eight time periods for study.  
Combined with the cross-sectional dimension, the panel dataset of the entire country 
contains a maximum of 2,640 observations for each variable.   
The whole China sample is split into an East China sample and a West and Central 
China sample in the same manner as in Chapter 2.  The eastern and coastal sample has 
98 prefectural-level divisions and three provincial-level municipalities over eight years.  
The West and Central sample has the remaining 228 prefecture-level divisions and one 
provincial-level municipality.   
Table 7.2 summarizes the land variables and economic variables used in the 
empirical estimation for each of the three samples.  Land variables include the 
contemporary amount of cultivated land, urban land, and unused land, and their annual 
                                                 
17
 The Official Website of the Administrative Division of China.  www.xzqh.org 
108 
 
changes in both absolute and percentage terms.  The annual percentage changes in land 
use is calculated as the difference between the logarithm of land area in year t+1 and the 
logarithm of land area in year t.  Prefectures in China on average have experienced an 
annual loss of cultivated land, an annual increase of urban land, and an annual loss of 
unused land.  Table 7.3 presents the correlation coefficients between each pair of land 
use changes.   
As shown in Table 7.2, the average annual absolute loss of cultivated land at the 
prefecture level in West and Central China is nearly twice of that in East China.  This is 
likely due to the Grain for Green (GfG ) program discussed in Chapter 2, which has 
resulted in the reversion of a large amount of marginal cultivated land to forests and 
grasslands (The Central People‘s Government of China 2007).  However, because 
prefectures in West and Central China tend to be much larger than their counterparts in 
East China, the base amount of cultivated land is larger.  Consequently, the average 
annual percentage loss of cultivated land is actually lower in West and Central 
prefectures than it is in eastern coastal prefectures by 0.1 percentage points.  Moreover, 
the average annual percentage increase in urban land at the prefecture level is faster in 
East China in both level and percentage terms.   
Table 7.2 also shows that the average value of cultivated land, proxied by local GDP 
from primary industry per unit of cultivated land, and the average value of urban land, 
proxied by local GDP from secondary and tertiary industries per unit of urban land, are 
both higher in eastern prefectures than they are in western prefectures.  Average annual 
local budgetary revenue is higher in eastern prefectures, while average annual local 
budgetary expenditure is higher in western prefectures.   
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As mentioned in Chapter 2, most of the loss of marginal cultivated land due to the 
GfG policy is not subject to the DBP.  As a result, the impacts of the DBP on land use 
changes in West and Central China are expected to be different from its impacts in East 
China, where cultivated land lost to urban uses is mostly prime farmland.  Moreover, 
given the disparities in land values in eastern and western regions of China, as revealed 
by the descriptive statistics of the economic variables, it would be necessary to examine 
the economic incentives for cultivated land conversion for these two regions separately.   
For these reasons, same empirical analysis is conducted using the whole China, East 
China, and West and Central China samples separately in the following chapters.  
Results from the whole China sample will provide a general idea of the driving forces for 
land use changes and the policy impacts.  Results from the eastern and coastal sample 
would be the most appropriate for analyzing the economic incentives for land use 
changes between cultivation and urban uses and the impacts of the Dynamic Balance 
Policy.  Results from the West and Central sample will serve as a comparison to 
illustrate the driving forces for cultivated land loss in West and Central China may be 
different than they are in East China.  
 
7.3 Indicator for the Dynamic Balance Policy  
In addition to the land use and economic variables, another important variable is the 
indicator for the Dynamic Balance Policy (DBP), which equals one when the policy is in 
effect and zero otherwise.  Its value is determined by when the provincial implementing 
acts of the 1998 LAL were issued (see Table 3.2).  If the provincial implementing act 
takes effect in the first half of year t, then the policy indicators for year t and thereafter 
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are assigned to be one, meaning that the land conversion in year t, i.e., the change in 
cultivated land area from year t to t+1, has been influenced by the new law.  If the 
provincial implementing act takes effect in the second half of year t, then the policy 
indicators for year t+1 and thereafter are assigned to be one, meaning that the land 
conversion in year t+1, i.e., the change in cultivated land area from year t+1 to t+2 will 
capture the impacts of the new law.  For example, the Shandong and Guangdong 
Provincial Implementing Acts of the 1998 LAL took effect on August 22, 1999 and 
January 8, 2000, respectively.  The policy indicators for the prefectures in both 
provinces are set to be one for the years 2000 - 2003, and zero otherwise.   
The last update of the Implementing Acts of the Land Administration Law in Beijing 
was in 1993.  Shown in Table 3.2, Beijing did not issue an implementing act of the 1998 
LAL and no clear documentation is found when Beijing adopted the DBP.  Regulations 
on the Collection and Use of Cultivated Land Reclamation Fees promulgated by the 
Beijing Land Bureau and Finance Bureau on November 26, 2002
18
 suggest that Beijing 
has been following the DBP at least since 2002.  Because Beijing is the nation‘s capital, 
it is reasonable to assume that Beijing adopted the national law in its land administration 
when the law became effective on January 1, 1999. 
   
                                                 
18
 Source: http://www.bjtd.com/article_view.asp?article_id=298  





Province Year Description of the Boundary Changes Cleaning Procedures 
Names of the 
Prefectures/Prefecture- 







Some boundary adjustments among these 
three adjacent prefectures. 
Data for Tongling, Chaohu, 
and Liu'an are combined 





The prefecture-level city Bozhou was 
created, and the county-level city Bozhou 
that used to be in Fuyang Prefecture became 
the urban district of the new prefecture level 
city. 
Data for Bozhou and 
Fuyang are combined for 





Part of Hefei became under the 
administration of Huainan. 
Data for Hefei and Huainan 
are combined for the entire 
time series. 
Hefei-Huainan 
Bengbu Anhui 2004 
There was a slight increase in the total land 
area of Bengbu since 2004, but no record for 
this change.  Economic data for Bengbu 
seem to have captured this change.   
None. Bengbu 
Shenzhen Guangdong 2000 
There was a slight increase in the total land 
area of Shenzhen since 2000, but no record 
for this change.  Economic data for 












Province Year Description of the Boundary Changes Cleaning Procedures 
Names of the 
Prefectures/Prefecture- 




Chongzuo Prefecture was upgraded to 
Chongzuo City at the prefecture level.  
Five counties of Chongzuo Prefecture 
(Heng, Binyang, Shanglin, Longan, and 
Mashan) became counties of the 
prefecture-level city, Nanning. 
Data for these five counties 
from 1996 to 2002 are 
taken out of Chongzuo, and 
added into Nanning. 





Laibin Prefecture was upgraded to Laibin 
City at the prefecture level.  Four 
counties of Laibin Prefecture (Luzhai,  
Rongan, Sanjiang, and Rongshui) 
became counties of the prefecture-level 
city, Liuzhou. 
Data for these four counties 
from 1996 to 2001 are 
taken out of Laibin, and 
added into Liuzhou. 





Hezhou Prefecture was upgraded to 
Hezhou City at the prefecture level.  
Three counties of Hezhou Prefecture 
(Cenxi, Teng, and Mengshan) became 
counties of the prefecture-level city, 
Wuzhou. 
Data for these four counties 
of 1996 are taken out of 
Hezhou, and added into 
Wuzhou. 





Songhuajiang was incorporated into 
Heilongjiang in 1996, but the economic 
data for the following years have not 
been adjusted for this change. 
Added the data for Harbin 
and Songhuajiang for the 










Province Year Description of the Boundary Changes Cleaning Procedures 
Names of the 
Prefectures/Prefecture- 






Part of Jingzhou became under the 
administration by Jingmen in 1997.  Jingshan 
County and Zhongxiang County that used to 
be administrated by Jingzhou, became 
counties of Jingmen in 2003. 
Added the data for Jingmen 
and Jingzhou for the entire 
time series. 
Jingmen-Jingzhou 
Suizhou Hubei 2000 
The county-level city, Suizhou, became a 
prefecture-level city in 2000.  The 
county-level city, Guangshui, became a 
county-level city of Suizhou.   
The county-level data of 
Suizhou and Guangshui are 
combined to get the 
prefecture data for Suizhou 
1996-2000.  
Prefecture-level data for 






The county-level city, Yangling, was taken out 
of Xianyang Prefecture, and designated as a 
prefecture-level sample district in 1998.   
Data for Xianyang and 
Yangling are combined for 





Five counties-Renshou, Pengshan, Hongya, 
Danling, and Qingshen-were taken out of 
Leshan Prefecture, and formed a new 
prefecture-level city, Meishan. 
Data for Leshan and 
Meishan are combined for 





Two county-level cities, Ziyang and Jianyang, 
and two counties, Lezhi and Anyue, were 
taken out of Neijiang Prefecture, and formed a 
new prefecture-level city, Ziyang.  
Data for Neijiang and 
Ziyang are combined for 









Province Year Description of the Boundary Changes Cleaning Procedures 
Names of the 
Prefectures/Prefecture- 
level Cities in Data 
Ili Kazak     
Ili 
Xinjiang NA 
Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture includes Ili 
Prefecture.  The data reported for Ili Kazak 
sometimes include Ili Prefecture and 
sometimes not.   
Data for Ili Kazak and Ili 
Prefecture are combined for 






The prefecture-level city, Dongchuan, was 
incorporated into the prefecture-level city, 
Kunming.  Xundian County was taken out of 
Qujing City at the prefecture-level, and moved 
Kunming.   
Data for Kunming, 
Dongchuan, and Qujing are 
combined for the entire 
time series. 
Kunming-Dongchuan- 




Table 7.2  Descriptive Statistics of Data Used in Analysis 








Cultivated Land Area in Year t   (Ha) 2,640 385,579 333,361 1,392 2,545,017
Urban Land Area in Year t  (Ha) 2,640 8,893 8,354 77 85,876
Unused Land Area in Year t  (Ha) 2,640 745,094      2,994,557  601             36,700,000  
Absolute Change in Cultivated Land  Area from 
Year t  to Year t +1 (Ha)
2,640 -2,754 9,242 -155,187 95,450
Absolute Change in Urban Land  Area from Year 
t  to Year t +1 (Ha)
2,640 285 952 -15,489 11,174
Absolute Change in Unused Land  Area from 
Year t  to Year t +1 (Ha)
2,640 -177 26,211 -79,217 1,289,941
Log(Cultivated Land in Year t +1) - Log(Cultivated 
Land in Year t )
2,640 -0.00856 0.03307 -0.70990 0.37496
Log(Urban Land in Year t +1) - Log(Urban Land in 
Year t )
2,640 0.03239 0.08309 -0.31085 1.48984
Log(Unused Land in Year t +1) - Log(Unused 
Land in Year t )
2,640 -0.00202 0.07235 -0.85232 1.85253
Local GDP from Primary Industry per Unit of 
Cultivated Land in Year t  (2004US$/Ha)
2,562 2,738          3,243         110             43,075         
Local GDP from Secondary and Teriary Industries 
per Unit of Urban Land in Year t  (2004US$/Ha) 
2,562 340,734      236,140     8,549          2,302,404    
Local Budgetary Revenue per Unit of Urban Land 
in Year t  (2004US$/Ha) 
2,538 21,938        17,494       1,268 186,162       
Local Budgetary Expenditure per Unit of Urban 
Land in Year t (2004US$/Ha) 














Cultivated Land Area in Year t   (Ha) 808 311,088 227,036 5,566 1,132,309
Urban Land Area in Year t  (Ha) 808 12,915 9,960 1,379 85,876
Unused Land Area in Year t  (Ha) 808 99,999        161,842     601             1,115,495    
Absolute Change in Cultivated Land  Area from 
Year t  to Year t +1 (Ha)
808 -1,772 6,304 -97,537 15,423
Absolute Change in Urban Land  Area from Year 
t  to Year t +1 (Ha)
808 453 1,334 -15,489 10,129
Absolute Change in Unused Land  Area from 
Year t  to Year t +1 (Ha)
808 -519 4,095 -73,634 59,920
Log(Cultivated Land in Year t +1) - Log(Cultivated 
Land in Year t )
808 -0.00926 0.04116 -0.70990 0.12109
Log(Urban Land in Year t +1) - Log(Urban Land in 
Year t )
808 0.03534 0.07055 -0.26987 0.81878
Log(Unused Land in Year t +1) - Log(Unused 
Land in Year t )
808 -0.00394 0.09920 -0.85232 1.13107
Local GDP from Primary Industry per Unit of 
Cultivated Land in Year t  (2004US$/Ha)
808 4,722          4,614         358             43,075         
Local GDP from Secondary and Teriary Industries 
per Unit of Urban Land in Year t  (2004US$/Ha) 
808 475,754      279,016     56,454        1,670,239    
Local Budgetary Revenue per Unit of Urban Land 
in Year t  (2004US$/Ha) 
808 27,981        24,225       4,150 186,162       
Local Budgetary Expenditure per Unit of Urban 
Land in Year t (2004US$/Ha) 














Cultivated Land Area in Year t   (Ha) 1,832 418,433 365,955 1,392 2,545,017
Urban Land Area in Year t  (Ha) 1,832 7,119 6,824 77 50,570
Unused Land Area in Year t  (Ha) 1,832 1,029,612 3,556,458 1,709 36,700,000
Absolute Change in Cultivated Land  Area from 
Year t  to Year t +1 (Ha)
1,832 -3,187 10,245 -155,187 95,450
Absolute Change in Urban Land  Area from Year 
t  to Year t +1 (Ha)
1,832 211 710 -1,546 11,174
Absolute Change in Unused Land  Area from 
Year t  to Year t +1 (Ha)
1,832 -26 31,349 -79,217 1,289,941
Log(Cultivated Land in Year t +1) - Log(Cultivated 
Land in Year t )
1,832 -0.00825 0.02879 -0.37598 0.37496
Log(Urban Land in Year t +1) - Log(Urban Land in 
Year t )
1,832 0.03109 0.08805 -0.31085 1.48984
Log(Unused Land in Year t +1) - Log(Unused 
Land in Year t )
1,832 -0.00118 0.05661 -0.32707 1.85253
Local GDP from Primary Industry per Unit of 
Cultivated Land in Year t  (2004US$/Ha)
1,754 1,824 1,707 110 23,704
Local GDP from Secondary and Teriary Industries 
per Unit of Urban Land in Year t  (2004US$/Ha) 
1,754 278,536 182,625 8,549 2,302,404
Local Budgetary Revenue per Unit of Urban Land 
in Year t  (2004US$/Ha) 
1,730 19,115 12,252 1,268 127,117
Local Budgetary Expenditure per Unit of Urban 
Land in Year t (2004US$/Ha) 
1,730 43,143 33,992 2,811 372,127
 
Data Sources: The Ministry of Land and Resources of China, and various provincial statistical yearbooks 
from 1997 to 2005.   
Units of Variables: Land areas are in hectares (Ha).  Local GDP, total output value of farming, and local 
budgetary revenues and expenditures per unit of land are in real year 2004 US$ per hectare 
(2004US$/Ha). 
Table 7.3  Correlation Coefficients of Each Pair of Land Use Changes 
A. Absolute Change 
 Whole China East China West and Central China 
 Cultivated Urban Unused Cultivated Urban Unused Cultivated Urban Unused 
Cultivated 1.0000   1.0000   1.0000   
Urban -0.0900 1.0000  -0.1871 1.0000  -0.0759 1.0000  
Unused -0.0035 -0.0197 1.0000 0.2735 -0.0591 1.0000 -0.0128 -0.0238 1.0000 
 
B. Percentage Change 
 Whole China East China West and Central China 
 Cultivated Urban Unused Cultivated Urban Unused Cultivated Urban Unused 
Cultivated 1.0000   1.0000   1.0000   
Urban -0.1622 1.0000  -0.4460 1.0000  -0.0277 1.0000  





8 Empirical Models and Estimation Methods 
The empirical goal of this thesis is to examine whether the Dynamic Balance Policy 
(DBP) has reduced the conversion of cultivated land to urban land in China, and to 
estimate the strength of the economic incentives for land conversion compared to the 
strength of the DBP.   Based on the theoretical discussion in the previous chapter, this 
chapter presents the econometric models and estimation methods for achieving this goal.  
The first section specifies the linear model of the level changes in land areas.  The 
second section transforms the linear model into a log-log model of the percent changes in 
land areas.  Following the model specifications, the third section discusses the 
estimation methods.   
8.1 Model Specification 
8.1.1 Linear Model—Level Changes  
The theoretical models in Chapter 6 assume that the changes in agricultural land are 
equal to the changes in urban land in their absolute values.  In reality, as shown in the 
land use trends discussed in Chapter 2, this equality does not hold.  Therefore, the 
empirical analysis requires examining the changes in cultivated land as well as the 
changes in urban land.  In other words, there are two alternative dependent variables in 
the estimation of optimal cultivated land conversion:    
  for the annual change in 
cultivated land and    
  for the annual change in urban land.  The dependent variable in 
the estimation of the annual change in unused land is    
 .  The subscript, i, indicates the 
cross-sectional unit, and t indicates the year.   
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According to the theoretical analysis in Chapter 6, there are three types of factors 
influencing the annual changes in cultivated land, urban land, and unused land.  The first 
group includes the economic factors, specifically, the contemporary value of cultivated 
land measured as GDP from primary industry per unit of cultivated land (
      
   
 ), the 
contemporary value of urban land (
           
   
 ) measured as GDP from secondary and 
tertiary industries per unit of urban land, and the contemporary budgetary revenue and 
expenditure per unit of urban land (
        
   
  and 
        
   
  respectively).   
The second type of factors influencing China‘s land use changes is the administrative 
factors.  In particular, the DBP may change the average changes in land areas as well as 
the economic incentives for conversion of cultivated land to urban uses.  The policy 
effects are estimated by a policy indicator,    , which is equal to one if the policy is in 
effect, and zero if not.  The values of     are assigned based on Table 3.2.   
The third type of factors is the initial amounts of cultivated land, urban land, and 
unused land.  Among these factors, the initial amount of unused land,    
 , has the most 
important policy interest, because it can be used to proxy the cost of converting unused 
land to cultivated land, a variable that cannot be directly measured.   
In light of the policy importance of each type of factors, the basic model of land use 
changes is comprised of the economic and administrative factors, and the initial amount 
of unused land is included in the extended model.  The basic model is expressed as 
follows: 
       
       
     
    
    
       
   
    
            
   
    
         
   
    
         
   
  
                                 
              ,         (8.1) 
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where   is an indicator for whether the dependent variable is the annual change in 
cultivated land (   ), urban land (   ), or unused land (   ).  Equation (8.1) is 
essentially an extended version of the model specified in Lichtenberg and Ding (2009).  
It includes additionally the government expenditure and the policy dummy.   
 To control for the cost of converting unused land to cultivated land and to examine 
how the DBP affects the incentive structure, equation (8.1) is extended to include the 
initial amount of unused land and the interaction terms between the policy indicator and 
each explanatory variable: 
       
       
     
    
    
       
   
    
            
   
    
         
   
    
         
   
  
                                
       
    
    
    
      
   
    
    
           
   
    
    
        
   
   
                                 
    
        
   
     
       
           .     (8.2) 
Because both land and economic data are reported at the end of the year, equations (8.1) 
and (8.2) essentially capture the relations between the changes in land areas in year t+1 
and their influencing factors at the end of year t.   
As a common practice in panel data analysis, the error terms in equations (8.1) and 
(8.2) are decomposed into three components.  The cross-section component (  ) 
accounts for the unobserved heterogeneities among prefectures over the entire sample 
period.  Likewise, the time component (  ) accounts for the unobserved heterogeneities 
over time.  The third component (   ) captures the idiosyncratic errors that change 
across i as well as across t.   
The signs of the estimated coefficients in equations (8.1) and (8.2) can be determined 
by the comparative statics derived in Chapter 6.  Specifically, the annual change in 
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urban land is expected to decrease in the value of cultivated land (  
   ), but increase 
in the value of urban land (  
   ) and the average local budgetary revenue (  
   ).  
The sign of   
  cannot be determined because faster conversion of cultivated land to 
urban uses can raise more revenues, but at the same time it also requires more 
expenditure for the provision of public infrastructures on the urban land.  The net effect 
of these two opposite forces is unclear.   
Additionally, the DBP is expected to slow down the increase in urban land, i.e., 
  
   .  Moreover, the annual change in urban land is expected to be larger in areas 
where there is more unused land (  
   ).  Or the annual change in urban land is not 
related to the initial amount of unused land if the conversion of unused land to cultivated 
land is not accompanied by conversion of cultivated land to urban land.  In this case, 
  
   .  Whether   
    or   
    can be tested easily.  Also implied by the 
theoretical results, the DBP will not change the signs of the same comparative statics 
from the pre-policy analysis, but it will change their magnitudes.  If the DBP is effective, 
it should attenuate the economic incentives for land conversion.  Thus, the coefficients, 
  
 ,   
 , …,    
 , are expected to be negative.     
Because the changes in urban land and changes in cultivated land are in opposite 
directions, when the dependent variable in equations (8.1) and (8.2) is the annual change 
in cultivated land (   
 ), a set of opposite signs is expected, i.e.,   
   ,   
   ,   
   , 
  
   , and   
   .  Likewise, the coefficients,   
 ,   
 , …,    
 , are expected to be 
positive.   
Moreover, according to the theoretical results, the annual change in unused land is 
expected to be negatively correlated with both the value of cultivated land (  
   ) and 
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the value of urban land (  
   ), and also negatively correlated with the average local 
budgetary revenue (  
   ).  Again, the sign of   
  cannot be determined due to the 
compounding effects of the budgetary expenditure.  The annual change in unused land 
and its own initial amount are negatively correlated, i.e.,   
   , implying that areas 
with more unused land endowment will experience a faster loss of unused land.  
additionally, the DBP is postulated to increase the conversion of unused land to cultivated 
land, and thus,   
   , and   
 ,   
 , …,    
   .   
In addition to the statistical significance of each individual coefficient, the joint 
significance of the coefficients of the policy dummy and the policy interaction terms will 
be tested to give a sense of the overall effectiveness of the DBP.  Furthermore, the 
theoretical analysis indicates that the relationship between changes in land areas and the 
value of cultivated land vanishes when the DBP is enforced, i.e.,   
    
   .  This 
hypothesis can be tested easily using a t-test. 
8.1.2 Log-Log Model—Percentage Changes 
Following Lichtenberg and Ding (2009), the linear model of level changes in land 
areas is transformed into a log-log model to account for possible nonlinearities in the 
relations between land use changes and their driving forces.  The respective log-log 
forms of equations (8.1) and (8.2) appear as follows:   
           
        
     
     
 
   
  
   
    
    
      
   
    
    
           
   
    
    
        
   
  
                    
    
        
   
    




            
        
     
     
 
   
  
   
    
    
      
   
    
    
           
   
    
    
        
   
  
                  
    
        
   
    
       
       
    
       
      
   
  
                 
       
           
   
    
       
        
   
     
       
        
   
  
                        
          
           .          (8.4) 
Mathematically, first differencing the logarithms of the variable in two time periods 
is approximately the same as the percentage change in the variable if the time horizon is 
short, in this case, one year.  Therefore, the dependent variables in equations (8.3) and 
(8.4) are in essence the same as the dependent variable in Lichtenberg and Ding‘s (2009) 
linear-log model, 
     
     
 
   
 .   
In addition to taking into account the possible nonlinearities in the model, the log-log 
model allows us to examine the change in the rate of land use changes.  Instead of the 
marginal effects in absolute terms indicated by the estimated coefficients from the linear 
model, the estimated coefficients in the log-log model can be interpreted as the elasticity 
of the ratio of land area in t+1 over land area in t with respect to each parameter.  In 
general notations, the elasticity is expresses as 
    
          
       





where   denotes a generic coefficient estimator, x denotes a generic explanatory variable, 
and y in this case denotes the land area in any use.  Because the annual percentage 
change in y can be expressed as 
                     , 
with some mathematical manipulation, the change in r implied by 1% change in x can be 
expressed as 
        
    
  
       .           (8.5) 
With the estimation results generated in the next chapter, equation (8.5) will be used to 
calculate the change in the annual rate of urban land expansion and the change in the 
annual rate of cultivated land loss with a 1% change in the average value of cultivated 
land or urban land, or a 1% change in the average local budgetary revenue or expenditure.   
The log-log model helps us pinpoint important factors influencing land use when 
their marginal effects are small in hectares, but large in percentages.  Such findings are 
especially valuable for small prefectures where the land use changes may not be sizeable 
by absolute measures but could be very significant in percentage terms.   
The error terms in the log-log model is specified in the same fashion as they are in 
the linear model.  The same estimation methods will be adopted for both models, which 
are discussed in the next section.  The functional-form transformation does not change 
the predicted signs of the coefficient estimators.  And the same hypothesis testing will 
be performed on both the linear and the log-log models.   
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8.2 Fixed Effects and Difference-in-Difference Estimations 
Equations (8.1) - (8.4) specify the error terms into three components: the 
cross-section component accounting for the unobserved heterogeneities among 
prefectures over the entire sample period, the time component accounting for the 
unobserved heterogeneities over time, and the idiosyncratic component that changes 
across sections as well time.  In the panel data analysis, the unobserved heterogeneities 
among prefectures and over time can be treated either as fixed effects (FE) or random 
effects (RE).  When they are treated as FE, the estimation is essentially the 
difference-in-difference (DID) estimation in the literature of policy evaluation, and the 
policy estimator,   
  or   
 , can be interpreted as a DID estimator.   
Wooldridge (2002) and Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) argue when there 
are multiple time periods, and groups are exposed to the policy intervention at various 
times, the DID estimation is an application of the two-way FE model.  Specifically, the 
cross-sectional FE control for the unobserved permanent differences between the 
treatment group (group experiencing the policy intervention) and the control group 
(group not experiencing the policy intervention); likewise, the time FE control for the 
trend in the outcome variable that exists in both groups.  
As shown in Table 3.2, the effective date of the DBP varies by province, which 
divides the sample into a control group (prefectures not subject to the DBP) and a 
treatment group (prefectures subject to the DBP).  The prefecture-specific FE control for 
the differences across prefectures (either in the control or treatment group) that are 
constant over time, and the year-specific FE control for the differences over time that are 
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common to all prefectures.  Modeling the error terms as FE removes the bias in the 
estimated policy impact that arises from other influential factors unrelated to the policy.    
Furthermore, Figure 8.1 demonstrates that the timing of the passage of provincial 
implementing acts of the 1998 LAL is uncorrelated with the average annual percentage 
loss of cultivated land before their implementation of the new law, ruling out the 
possibility that provinces with faster cultivated land loss tend to wait for longer to 
implement the national policies of curtailing cultivated land conversion.  This finding 
suggests that provincial implementation of the Dynamic Balance Policy in China is 
purely determined by administrative forces outside the model.  And thus, the policy 
indicator can be treated as exogenous.  
Standard FE estimators are prone to problems of cross-sectional heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation within each cross-section.  The estimators will still be unbiased and 
consistent if heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation present, but they will have 
improper variance matrix estimates, which will affect the hypothesis testing (Wooldridge 
2002).  Moreover, as Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) point out, the DID 
estimator of the policy in this case has a potential problem with clustered error terms as 
the unit of observation (prefectures) is more detailed than the level of variation 
(provinces).  To obtain correct variance estimates, the next section performs a series of 
specification tests to determine the regression models.  
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8.3 Specification Tests 
8.3.1 Heteroskedasticity with Clusters and/or Autocorrelation 
Panel heteroskedasticity is tested using the Stata command xttest3, which performs a 
modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect models.  The xttest3 
command tests the hypothesis that  
sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for i=1,…, N,  
where N is the number of cross-sectional units.  The resulting test statistic is distributed 
Chi-squared (N) under the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity (Stata Manual).  
Table 8.1 lists the modified Wald test results for each regression specified in section 
8.1, using three samples discussed earlier.  The statistics of all tests reject the null 
hypothesis that the model of homoskedastic error terms fits better than the model of 
heteroskedastic error terms, indicating the existence of heteroskedasticity.    
The first-order autocorrelation (AR(1)) within each prefecture is tested for each 
regression using the method developed by Wooldridge.  A brief account of 
Wooldridge‘s method is given in the appendix.  Table 8.2 lists the Wooldridge test 
results for serial correlation for each regression.  The test statistics show that AR(1) 
exists in changes in urban land area in both level and percentage terms, with or without 
policy interaction terms, and whether estimation uses the whole China sample or the East 
China sample.  The test statistics support the existence of AR(1) in changes in cultivated 
land area only in the East China sample, and the existence of AR(1) in changes in unused 
land area only when policy interaction terms are included.  Accordingly, models with 
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AR(1) disturbances should be estimated using the two-way FE regression with the 
autocorrelation correction.  
To illustrate how heteroskedasticity and AR(1) corrections affect the estimates, each 
model is estimated by two-way FE without such corrections.  The standard panel data 
FE estimations without corrections are carried out using the Stata command xtreg, fe.  
Note that this command fits data with group-specific one-way FE models.  Dummy 
variables for years 1997 – 2003 are added manually.   
For the coexistence of panel heteroskedasticity with cross-sectional correlation (or 
so-called clusters) and panel-level AR(1) in error terms, only two commands in Stata 
have the full options to obtain heteroskedastic and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) and 
cluster-robust variance estimates: xtgls and xtpcse.  The xtgls command fits panel-data 
linear models using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), and allows estimation in 
the presence of AR(1) within panels, cross-sectional correlation, and heteroskedasticity 
across panels.  However, to use xtgls, the data needs to have many time series and few 
panels for consistent estimates (Wiggins 1999).  Since our data has 8 time periods and 
330 panels, xtgls would be inappropriate.  Therefore, the estimations opt for the 
command xtpcse, with the option correlation(ar1).  When computing the standard errors 
and the variance-covariance estimates, xtpcse assumes that the disturbances are 
heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels.  With the 
correlation(ar1) option, the model is estimated by Prais-Winsten FGLS assuming an 
AR(1) process in the disturbances (Stata Manual).  Note that estimates produced by 
xtpcse are consistent but inefficient (Wiggins 1999).   
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8.3.2 Omitted Variable Bias 
Limited by data, this thesis by no means would have controlled all factors that 
influence the land use changes in China.  However, the omitted variable bias (OVB) 
should be minimal as the prefecture-specific and year-specific FE adopted in the 
empirical estimation serve to control for the influences of unobserved variables across 
prefectures and over time, respectively.  Nevertheless, if the unobserved variables are 
correlated with one or more of the included explanatory variables, then the coefficient 
estimates would still be biased.  Based on earlier discussions on the GfG policy driving 
the majority of the cultivated land loss in West and Central China, it is necessary to 
examine whether this policy is correlated with any of the included explanatory variables, 
and whether omitting this variable would cause OVB. 
One possible correlation is between the GfG payment and the agricultural GDP, 
which is the main regressor in the specified models above.  The discussion in Chapter 2 
reveals that compensation of the GfG program consists of grain, cash, and/or seedlings.  
Free seedlings are only given to farmers who agree to convert their cultivated land to 
forests, and the value of seedlings is independent of the agricultural productivity on the 
previously cultivated land.  The grain and cash compensation varies slightly by location 
based on agricultural productivity.  Specifically, compensation in the upper reaches of 
Yangtze River is about 30-50% higher than the compensation in the middle and upper 
reaches of Yellow River (Uchida, Xu, and Rozelle 2005; The Central People‘s 
Government of China 2007).  Moreover, disclosed by the policy document in 2007, the 
compensation standard has not changed since its promulgation in 1999 (The Central 
People‘s Government of China 2007).  While data on the average amount of 
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compensation per hectare of land in the GfG program for the study period is not found, 
available data indicates that the average compensation per hectare of participating land 
from 2004 to 2009 is practically the same (Table 8.3).  Because the GfG payment is not 
serially correlated with agricultural GDP, and the cross-sectional variations have been 
controlled by the prefecture-specific FE, the OVB should not be a problem for the 
estimator of the agricultural GDP per unit of cultivated land.      
Another possible correlation is between the GfG payment and the indicator for the 
DBP.  Because cultivated land lost to forests and grasslands due to the GfG policy does 
not need to meet the DBP requirement, the estimated effect of the DBP in the models of 
cultivated land changes may be biased downwards.  Such biases may especially exist in 
the regressions for West and Central China where a vast amount of cultivated land loss is 
due to the GfG policy.     
8.4 Two-Stage Estimations 
The theoretical analysis assumes that the conversion of cultivated land to urban uses 
and the conversion of unused land to cultivated land are simultaneous decisions, and 
solves the equation system simultaneously to get the optimal rate of land conversions of 
each type.  Therefore, the estimation equations of changes in urban land, changes in 
cultivated land, and changes in unused land can be estimated independently.   
Implied by the requirement of the DBP to compensate for the loss of cultivated land 
with unused land, there seems to be a recursive structure in China‘s land conversion.  In 
particular, the amount of unused land converted to cultivated land may depend on the 
amount of cultivated land converted to urban uses.  If the DBP is effective, then faster 
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conversion of cultivated land to urban uses will result in faster conversion of unused land 
to cultivated land.  It would be interesting for policy makers to determine the effects of 
changes in urban land and changes in cultivated land on changes in unused land.   
Under this scenario, the econometric model can be formulated as a two-stage FE 
model.  In the first stage, annual changes in urban land or cultivated land are estimated 
according to the specifications in section 8.1.  Then, in the second stage, annual changes 
in unused land are estimated using the predicted changes in urban land or cultivated land 
from the first-stage estimations.  The two-stage least squares (2SLS) with two-way FE 
model is specified as 
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where     
  and    
     
 
   
  are the predicted value of the first-stage regressions specified as 
models (8.1) - (8.4).   
The predicted signs of the estimated coefficients of the initial level of unused land 
and the policy indicator are the same as before, i.e.,   
     
    and   
     
     
When    , meaning equations (8.6) and (8.7) capture the relationship between the 
change in cultivated land area and the change in unused land area.  Because unused land 
is supposed to be used to make up of the loss of cultivated land, the change in cultivated 
land and the change in unused land are expected to be positively correlated, i.e., 
  
     
   .  When    , if the data supports the assumption that the loss of cultivated 
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land is approximately equal to the increase in urban land, then the change in urban land 
and the change in unused land are expected to be negatively correlated, i.e.,   
     
   .  
In the setup of (8.6) and (8.7), the explanatory variables used in the first-stage 
regressions of changes in cultivated land and urban land are essentially the instrumental 
variables (IV) of the second-stage regressions of changes in unused land.  The two-stage 
FE regressions are executed using the Stata command xtivreg2, fe, which implements IV 
estimation of the FE panel data models with possibly endogenous regressors.  This 
command also performs HAC and cluster-robust variance estimation though options bw(#) 
and cluster(prefecture).  The option bw(#) requests kernel-based 
autocorrelation-consistent variance-covariance estimation.  The default kernel is the 
Bartlett kernel.  The option cluster(prefecture) causes xtivreg2 to report 
variance-covariance estimation that are robust to both arbitrary heteroskedasticity and 
arbitrary cross-sectional correlation (Stata Manual).   
In the IV estimation, a series of tests need to be conducted for the validity of the 
instruments.  The command xtivreg2 performs the over-, under- and weak identification 
tests automatically after the IV estimation.   
The two requirements for an IV are first, it must be correlated with the dependent 
variable in the first stage; second, it must be uncorrelated with the error terms in the 
second-stage regression.  The over-identification test is performed to test whether the 
instruments are valid (which is the null hypothesis), i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, 
and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.  




The under-identification test is an LM test of whether the equation is identified, i.e., 
that the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors.  A rejection 
of the null indicates that the model is identified.  The weak identification test tests 
whether the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogeous regressors, but only 
weakly.  The Stata reports the Cragg-Donald F statistic for the weak identification test, 




Figure 8.1  No Correlation between the Provincial Effective Dates of the Dynamic 
Balance Policy and Cultivated Land Loss before the Policy 
 
Note: 
Qinghai is not included in the graph.  Qinghai had a very high rate of cultivated land 
loss and much delayed implementation of the 1998 LAL.  The inclusion of Qinghai in 
this test would imply a negative correlation between the effective date of the Dynamic 
Balance Policy and the rate of cultivated land loss.  However, the major cause of 
cultivated land loss in Qinghai is the reversion to forests and grasslands, and the reasons 
for Qinghai to delay passing the provincial implementing act of the 1998 LAL may not 
explain the decision-making in other provinces.  Thus, it is appropriate to exclude 
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Table 8.1  Modified Wald Test Results for Panel Heteroskedasticity 
A. Whole China 
Dependent Variable 
Without Policy Interaction Terms With Policy Interaction Terms 
Chi2 (330) P-Value Chi2 (330) P-Value 
Absolute Change in Cultivated 
Land Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
1.5e+06 0.0000 1.2e+06 0.0000 
Absolute Change in Urban Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
8.0e+07 0.0000 1.5e+07 0.0000 
Absolute Change in Unused Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
8.0e+07 0.0000 1.4e+08 0.0000 
Percentage Change in Cultivated 
Land Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
1.3e+06 0.0000 9.8e+05 0.0000 
Percentage Change in Urban Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
4.0e+05 0.0000 5.2e+05 0.0000 
Percentage Change in Unused Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
2.3e+08 0.0000 3.7e+07 0.0000 
 
B. East China 
Dependent Variable 
Without Policy Interaction Terms With Policy Interaction Terms 
Chi2 (101) P-Value Chi2 (101) P-Value 
Absolute Change in Cultivated Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
1.4e+05 0.0000 45829.95 0.0000 
Absolute Change in Urban Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
4.7e+05 0.0000 3.3e+05 0.0000 
Absolute Change in Unused Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
2.5e+06 0.0000 1.5e+06 0.0000 
Percentage Change in Cultivated 
Land Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
2.2e+05 0.0000 2.0e+05 0.0000 
Percentage Change in Urban Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
31048.17 0.0000 34178.11 0.0000 
Percentage Change in Unused Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
3.6e+06 0.0000 3.2e+07 0.0000 
 
C. West and Central China 
Dependent Variable 
Without Policy Interaction Terms With Policy Interaction Terms 
Chi2 (229) P-Value Chi2 (229) P-Value 
Absolute Change in Cultivated Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
5.3e+05 0.0000 5.5e+05 0.0000 
Absolute Change in Urban Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
2.8e+06 0.0000 3.7e+06 0.0000 
Absolute Change in Unused Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
4.5e+07 0.0000 3.9e+07 0.0000 
Percentage Change in Cultivated 
Land Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
1.2e+06 0.0000 9.1e+05 0.0000 
Percentage Change in Urban Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
4.7e+05 0.0000 8.3e+05 0.0000 
Percentage Change in Unused Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
1.9e+07 0.0000 2.2e+07 0.0000 
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Table 8.2  Wooldridge Test Results for Panel-Level Autocorrelation  
A. Whole China 
Dependent Variable 
Without Policy Interaction Terms With Policy Interaction Terms 
Test Statistic P-Value Test Statistic P-Value 
Absolute Change in Cultivated 
Land Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
0.012 0.9115 0.009 0.9253 
Absolute Change in Urban Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
27.645 0.0000 38.185 0.0000 
Absolute Change in Unused Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
1.540 0.2155 1609.867 0.0000 
Percentage Change in Cultivated 
Land Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
0.244 0.6216 0.222 0.6381 
Percentage Change in Urban Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
18.251 0.0000 18.473 0.0000 
Percentage Change in Unused Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
1.690 0.1946 473.656 0.0000 
 
B. East China 
Dependent Variable 
Without Policy Interaction Terms With Policy Interaction Terms 
Test Statistic P-Value Test Statistic P-Value 
Absolute Change in Cultivated Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
5.207 0.0246 4.081 0.0460 
Absolute Change in Urban Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
54.966 0.0000 68.258 0.0000 
Absolute Change in Unused Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
0.116 0.7337 493.329 0.0000 
Percentage Change in Cultivated 
Land Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
4.154 0.0442 4.372 0.0391 
Percentage Change in Urban Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
27.621 0.0000 32.580 0.0000 
Percentage Change in Unused Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
1.784 0.1846 254.589 0.0000 
 
C. West and Central China 
Dependent Variable 
Without Policy Interaction Terms With Policy Interaction Terms 
Test Statistic P-Value Test Statistic P-Value 
Absolute Change in Cultivated Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
0.459 0.4988 0.447 0.5045 
Absolute Change in Urban Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
0.708 0.4010 0.808 0.3696 
Absolute Change in Unused Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
1.497 0.2224 1757.557 0.0000 
Percentage Change in Cultivated 
Land Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
1.776 0.1839 1.823 0.1783 
Percentage Change in Urban Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 
9.577 0.0022 10.237 0.0016 
Percentage Change in Unused Land 
Area from Year t to t+1 (Ha) 





Table 8.3  Average Nominal Payment per Hectare of Land Participating in the 
Grain for Green Program 
 












9 Estimation Results and Policy Implications 
9.1 Estimation Results 
Based on the discussion in the previous chapter, the econometric implementation of 
the empirical models first performs the two-way FE regressions without corrections for 
heteroskedasticity with clusters or AR(1), and then correct the variance-covariance 
estimates for heteroskedasticity with clusters for all regressions and AR(1) for regressions 
in which AR(1) is detected (see Table 8.2).  In Tables 9.1 - 9.4, regressions corrected for 
AR(1) according to Table 8.2 are highlighted in bold.   
This chapter discusses the results with HAC and cluster-robust variance estimates.  
The results from the standard two-way FE regressions without corrections serve as the 
comparison to show how correct variance estimation can affect hypothesis testing.  For 
example, correcting for heteroskedasticity with clusters has made many standard errors 
smaller, and consequently changed many coefficient estimates from statistically 
insignificant to significant.  Such changes will lead to very divergent policy 
implications.   
The discussion of the policy implications of these results is organized as follows.  
Section 9.2 investigates the impacts of the Dynamic Balance Policy on land use changes 
and on economic incentives driving the land use changes.  Section 9.3 discusses the 
strength of the economic incentives for cultivated land conversion.  Section 9.4 
examines whether changes in unused land correspond to changes in cultivated land or 
urban land.  Section 9.5 considers a few policy recommendations.  Section 9.6 
addresses the limitations of the empirical results.   
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9.2 Impacts of the Dynamic Balance Policy  
The Dynamic Balance Policy (DBP) is expected to have positive effects on the 
average change in cultivated land area and negative effects on the average change in 
urban land area.  Estimated coefficients of the policy indicator from regressions without 
policy interaction terms mostly have the expected signs, but they are all statistically 
insignificant except the one from the model of percent change in urban land area in West 
and Central China (Tables 9.1 and 9.2).   
Moreover, the DBP is expected to affect both the average changes in land areas (the 
intercept in the regression equation) and the economic incentives faced by local officials 
(the slope of the regression equation with respect to each economic factor).  The 
empirical results summarized in Tables 9.3 and 9.4 show that regressions with policy 
interaction terms yield some evidence for the policy effects on the average changes in 
cultivated land and urban land areas, as well as the joint effects of the policy on the 
average land use changes and on how other variables affects the average land use 
changes.   
Although some coefficients of the policy indicator from the regressions with 
interaction terms have the expected signs and are statistically significant, whether the 
policy has been effective needs to be evaluated by its overall effects using all of the 
interaction terms.  Accordingly, the coefficient of each interaction term is multiplied by 
the mean of the associated variable over the subsample where the DBP is in effect, and 
then the sum of the products is added to the coefficient of the policy indicator.  The 
result is the difference in the dependent variable between setting the policy indicator 
equal to one and setting it equal to zero, i.e., the incremental effect of the DBP.  A Wald 
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test is performed to determine if this means-weighted sum of coefficients is significantly 
from zero.  For the linear models, the Wald test for linear constraints is used, and for the 
log-log models, the Wald test for nonlinear constraints is used.    
The nonlinearity of the test is introduced because in the log-log functional form, the 
estimated coefficient of the policy indicator needs be transformed according to the 
function below in order to be interpreted as the percentage effect of the policy on the 
dependent variables: 
                      ,         (9.1) 
where s is the percentage impact of the policy, b is the estimated coefficient of the policy 
indicator, and V(b) is the estimated variance of b (Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980; 
Kennedy 1981).  Thus, in the weighted sum of coefficients described above, the 
coefficient of the policy indicator is transformed according to equation (9.1).   
Table 9.7 summarizes the overall effects of the DBP on cultivated land, urban land, 
and unused land areas, along with the Wald test statistics and p-values.  As shown in 
Table 9.7, when the effect of the DBP is evaluated jointly with its interactions with the 
economic factors, the overall policy effect is statistically insignificant in both level and 
percentage terms in most cases.  Specifically, there is no evidence for any effects of the 
DBP on changes in cultivated land or urban land areas.  The only statistically significant 
evidence indicates that the ratio of unused land area in year t+1 over its area in year t 
increases by 0.004% in West and Central China if the DBP is in effect.   
Perhaps, the results from the 2SLS FE estimation render more evidence for the policy 
impacts on unused land.  Table 9.5 and 9.6 report the second-stage regression results 
only because the first-stage regressions in the 2SLS estimations are the same as those 
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presented in Tables 9.1 - 9.4.  Also reported are the results of over-, under- and weak 
identification tests.  All of the over-identification test statistics do not reject the null 
hypothesis of valid instruments, except the model of testing the relationship between the 
level change in unused land area and the level change in urban land area in whole China 
(at the 10% significance level).  More than half of the under-identification test statistics 
(15 out of 24) reject the null hypothesis, meaning the model is indentified.  Some of the 
weak-identification test statistics do not reject the null hypothesis at any significance 
levels, indicating that the excluded variables may be weakly correlated with the error 
terms in some regressions.   
Results in Table 9.5 and 9.6 indicate that when the DBP is in effect, the annual level 
change in unused land areas will increase in East China and in China as a whole, but the 
percentage change will not be affected.  Results consistently suggest that the changes in 
unused land areas, in both level and percentage terms, are strongly correlated with the 
initial amount of unused land in a prefecture.  Prefectures with more unused land to start 
with tend to experience faster losses of unused land.       
Overall, there is no empirical evidence for the effects of the DBP.  The absence of 
the overall effects of the policy may be attributed to the overpowering economic 
incentives for cultivated land conversion.  The next section details the effects of the 
economic incentives on land use changes and compares the strength of the policy impacts 
with that of the economic incentives.         
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9.3 Strength of the Economic Incentives  
 In the estimations of changes in cultivated land and urban land areas, most of the 
estimated coefficients of the average values of cultivated land and urban land, and the 
average values of local budgetary revenue and expenditure have the predicted signs, and 
a majority of them are statistically significant.  One unexpected result is the positive and 
statistically significant correlations between the value of urban land and the level changes 
in cultivated land.  However, this correlation becomes negative or statistically 
insignificant in the regressions of percentage changes in cultivated land.  Thus, it is the 
best to interpret the correlation between the value of urban land and changes in cultivated 
land as ambiguous.   
Another peculiar result is that in the regressions of percentage change in cultivated 
land with the whole China sample, nearly all of the coefficient estimates become 
statistically insignificant, even though they are significant in the corresponding 
regressions of level changes.  Because the results from the whole China regressions may 
not be robust, the implications in the discussion are mainly drawn from the results from 
the East and West and Central samples.     
To sum, the annual changes in cultivated land, in both level and percentage terms are 
positively correlated with the value of cultivated land, and negatively correlated with 
local budgetary revenue and expenditure per unit of land.  Likewise, the annual changes 
in urban land, in both level and percentage terms, are positively correlated with the value 
of urban land, local budgetary revenue per unit of land, and local budgetary expenditure 
per unit of land.  These relationships are consistent with the findings in Lichtenberg and 
Ding (2009), using the same data and similar estimation procedures.  Moreover, very 
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few results show any relationships between changes in urban land area and the value of 
cultivated land.  In the models with policy interaction terms, the test for the effects of 
cultivated land value on changes in urban land area under the DBP concludes that there 
are no such effects, consistent with the theoretical prediction.   
These results reveal that local officials facing a higher value of cultivate land, and 
thus, a higher cost of land conversion, will slow down the rate of cultivated land 
conversion.  Local officials facing a higher value of urban land will increase the rate of 
cultivated land conversion.  Also, in areas where the average local government 
expenditure is expected to rise, more cultivated land will be converted to urban land to 
finance the anticipated expenditure.  As a result, urban land expansion accelerates if the 
average local government revenue and/or expenditure increase.   
The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients in the models of level changes in land 
areas are fairly small.  On average, an increase of US$1 per hectare in the cultivated 
land value will reduce the annual loss of cultivated land by about one hectare.  The 
absolute effects of a US$1 per hectare change in the urban land value, and the average 
local budgetary revenue and expenditure on changes in cultivated land and urban land 
areas are even smaller, ranging from 0.001 to 0.1 hectares.   
Argued by Lichtenberg and Ding (2009), the strength of the economic incentives for 
land use changes may be best gauged by the coefficients from the log-log models, 
because they indicate the elasticity of the ratio of land area in t+1 over land area in t with 
respect to each influencing factor.  Overall, the elasticities of the ratios of land area in 
t+1 over land area in t with respect to each economic factor are mostly comparable in 
East China and in West and Central China, with some higher in East China, indicating 
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that changes in land areas in this region have been more responsive to the economic 
incentives than they are in other parts of the country.   
On average, the elasticity of the ratios of cultivated land area in t+1 over cultivated 
land area in t with respect to agricultural land value is about 0.11 in East China, 0.02 in 
West and Central China, zero in China as a whole.  The elasticity of the ratios of urban 
land area in t+1 over urban land area in t with respect to urban land value is about 
0.11-0.13 in all three regions.  These elasticities indicate that the average effect of a 1% 
increase in cultivated land value or urban land value is smaller than the direct effect of 
the DBP on the percentage land use changes.  However, in reality, China is experiencing 
some 10% or higher increases in land values, especially in the urban areas.  For this 
reason, the strength of the economic incentives for cultivated land conversion still 
outweighs that of the policy disincentives.  This in part explains why the overall effect 
of the policy interacted with economic incentives appears so small.      
Using equation (8.5) and the average annual percent changes in land areas in Table 
7.2, the elasticities of the ratios of land area in t+1 over land area in t can be converted to 
the percentage point changes in land areas for a 1% increase in economic factors.  After 
the conversion, the results indicate that on average, the annual percentage change in 
urban land area in East China increases by 0.11 percentage points with a 1% increase in 
the value of urban land.  This result is in the range of those found by Lichtenberg and 
Ding (2009) using the sample of prefecture-level cities in East China.  They found that a 
1% increase in urban land value was associated with a 0.12-0.13 percentage point 
increase in urban land area.        
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In addition to the estimation of the economic incentives for changes in cultivated land 
and urban land areas, the third equation in the estimation model is the change in unused 
land as a function of the same economic incentives.  Empirical results indicate that the 
conversion of unused land to cultivated land is not driven by economic factors in East 
China.  In West and Central China and in China as a whole, changes in unused land are 
found to be negatively correlated with the value of cultivated land.  One possible 
explanation for this correlation is that in areas where the value of cultivated land is higher, 
more unused land is converted to cultivated land, regardless of the DBP.     
Nevertheless, when the DBP is in effect, the conversion of unused land to cultivated 
land in China is maybe a sequential action of cultivated land conversion.  The next 
section discusses the relationship between the change in cultivated land or urban land 
area and the change in unused land area. 
9.4 Impacts of Cultivated Land Conversion on Unused Land 
As mentioned before, the examination of the relationship between the change in 
cultivated land or urban land area and the change in unused land area would be of policy 
interest as the conversion of unused land to cultivated land in China may be merely a 
sequential action of cultivated land conversion.  This section discusses the impacts of 
cultivated land conversion on unused land based on the 2SLS or IV estimation results 
summarized in Table 9.5 and 9.6. 
Overall, there is a lack of evidence for any relationships between the change in 
unused land and the change in cultivated land or urban land.  The initial amount of 
unused land in a prefecture remains as the dominating force for the changes in unused 
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land area.  Results consistently show that areas with more unused land in the initial time 
period experience a faster loss of unused land.  
9.5 Policy Recommendations  
Empirical evidence suggests that the DBP has had no effects of reducing China‘s 
cultivated land loss.  Economic incentives, such as the values of urban and cultivated 
land, emerge as the most influential factors for China‘s land use changes.  The 
government‘s heavy weighting of the tax revenues from the urban sector may also lead to 
faster cultivated land conversion, but this incentive is sometimes weakened by the 
expanding expenditure for providing basic urban infrastructures.  These economic 
incentives jointly may also weaken or completely override the effects of the DBP, if any.       
Based on the results of this thesis, policies aiming to slow down cultivated land 
conversion could be made more effective through shrinking the profit margin of land 
conversion and conveyance, specifically through raising the costs and/or reducing the 
revenues of land conversion.  The following measures are considered.  
First, polices could be enacted so that the government faces the true opportunity cost 
of land acquisition.  Local governments in China currently pay the cost of cultivated 
land conversion determined by the agricultural output value of land.  However, many 
western countries determine the value of rural land at the urban fringes based on not only 
the physical characteristics of the land to be sold, such as the size of the tract and the 
proportion of cultivated land, and the value of the land in its existing use, but also its 
location with respect to urban areas, natural amenities, and access to economic and 
recreational activities.  The determination of the shadow price of the land is facilitated 
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by the hedonic price model, which can evaluate both the physical and accessibility and 
environmental characteristics of rural land in an urbanizing area (Shonkwiler and 
Reynolds 1986).  China may consider abandoning the idea of using a fixed formula to 
determine the compensation for farmers.  The compensation should be calculated based 
on the market conditions at the time of the conversion.  The calculation of the 
compensation may adopt the hedonic price model, so that farmers can benefit from the 
value increment during the land conversion from a low-value use to a high-value use.  
By doing so, local governments will retain a smaller portion of the value increment in 
land conversion and sales, and will lose some of the economic incentives for cultivated 
land conversion.  At the same time, farmers will be pleased and the tension between 
farmers and government caused by government land acquisition can be eased.   
Second, land acquisition cost could be raised through increased transparency and 
accountability during the land acquisition process.  Anecdotal evidence suggests 
resettlement subsidies are normally set by negotiations between village leaders and land 
acquisition agencies.  Village leaders may not adequately represent the interests of their 
fellow villagers and may be enticed to sell the land at a low price, resulting in low 
resettlement subsidies paid to the farmers (Henderson 2009).  By involving more 
farmers in the land acquisition procedures, the cost of land conversion faced by local land 
bureaus will likely increase.  More importantly, this is a practical way to acknowledge 
farmers‘ property rights over their land.   
Third, land acquisition cost can be raised through elevating the cost of reclaiming 
new cultivated land.  As discussed in this study, many local governments and private 
land developers simply consider the land reclamation fees as a fixed cost and a necessary 
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expense for their industrial and residential development priorities.  The land reclamation 
fees can be raised substantially to abate the incentives for land conversion. 
Fourth, land acquisition cost can also be raised through elevating the expected costs 
facing local officials of getting caught out of compliance of the laws.  The central 
government needs to seek methods of overseeing local land activities in a more timely 
and effective manner and increasing the probability of uncovering unapproved and illegal 
land development projects.  Instead of the prevailing periodic inspections conducted by 
the central government, oversight agencies outside the government may be a better 
instrument to increase the control over local land activities and help the central 
government gain control over land activities at local levels. 
Fifth, on the revenue side, land acquisition revenues can be reduced through taxation.  
Local government officials currently act like private developers in profit-seeking land 
transactions.  However, they currently do not pay any taxes on the value appreciation of 
the land during the conversion process.  On-going taxation reforms in China may design 
a measure to impose taxes on land revenues and redistribute such tax revenues to 
deserving farmers through social protection programs.  Such a measure can downplay 
the economic incentives of local officials for land conversion and, at the same time, 
promote social equity and harmony.  Also, if land is taxed, it will be less likely left idle.  
Taxation will intensify the land use efficiency.   
Sixth, policies can also be made to give incentives to local officials for promoting 
agricultural production and cultivated land protection.  As revealed by this thesis, the 
current cadre evaluation system promotes urban growth fueled by land conversion.  The 
central government should include cultivated land protection in their cadre evaluation 
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system, in addition to the traditional evaluation criteria based on GDP, investment, and 
local fiscal balance. 
The above recommended measures will reduce the economic incentives for land 
conversion and lead to more efficient land use.  Facing higher conversion costs, local 
governments will be discouraged from converting cultivated land before they have a 
definite source of investment, therefore, they will be less likely to leave the land idle and 
more likely to ensure the land goes to the highest-value and best use.  As discussed 
earlier, the current practice in the sales of land use rights is negotiations or listing that 
often grant land use rights to favored developers at lower prices (see Chapter 3).  If local 
land bureaus incur a much higher cost in acquiring the land, they will be motivated to 
adopt English auctions to find the highest bidders.  Moreover, a higher cost of cultivated 
land conversion may also encourage redevelopment of existing urban land under other 
policies that facilitate urban redevelopment. 
9.6 Limitations of the Empirical Results 
Despite meticulous attention paid to the empirical methodology, the empirical results 
discussed above are not without their limitations.  One obvious limitation is that the land 
use data does not capture the quality of cultivated land.  The DBP requires each 
province to designate 80% of their farmland as basic farmland, and keep it at a fixed level.  
However, data on cultivated land area is not differentiated by quality of the land.  As 
discussed in Chapter 4, local officials have the incentives to report low-quality cultivated 
land as good-quality cultivated land in order to meet the dynamic balance requirement.  
Admitted the noises in the data, this thesis has, at best, answered the questions how the 
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policy affects the annual changes in cultivated land and urban land areas and whether the 
policy can curb the loss of cultivated land.  Given the data limitation, this thesis cannot 
answer the question whether the policy has achieved its intended effect of maintaining 
China‘s high-quality and good-quality cultivated land.  
Another limitation is the potential biases in the estimated effects of the DBP on the 
change in cultivated land.  The coefficient of the DBP is likely biased downwards by 
any omitted variables related to the Grain for Green (GfG) program.  As discussed 
earlier, even if the DBP has had any effects on the average change in cultivated land area, 
the effects may have been washed out by the counter effects of the GfG policy. 
If the correlation between the GfG policy and the DBP exists, this thesis may have 
underestimated the effects of the DBP on cultivated land areas.  The underestimation 
may not be severe in East China because the loss of cultivated land due to the GfG policy 
is relatively small compared with the loss of cultivated land to urban uses in this region.  
However, the underestimation could be the reason for the lack of evidence for the effect 
of the DBP on cultivated land in West and Central China.  This thesis could not isolate 
the effects of the DBP from the effects of the GfG.  Therefore, findings here should be 
used with caution to conclude whether the DBP has had the effect of reducing cultivated 
land loss in West and Central China or in China as a whole.   
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Table 9.1  Two-Way FE Estimation Results of Level Changes in Land Area without Policy Interaction Terms  
A. Whole China 
 Without Corrections for Heteroskedasticity or AR(1) With Corrections for Heteroskedasticity and/or AR(1)
§
 




Level Change in 
Urban Land 
Area 
Level Change in 
Unused Land 
Area 




in Urban Land 
Area 
Level Change in 
Unused Land 
Area 
Real GDP from Primary Industry per Unit of 
Cultivated Land in Year t (US$/Ha) 
1.403*** -0.0678** 0.174 1.403*** -0.0842 0.174 
 (0.262) (0.0304) (0.980) (0.170) (0.154) (0.158) 
       
Real GDP from Secondary and Tertiary 
Industries per Unit of Urban Land in Year t 
(US$/Ha) 
0.00309 0.00117*** 0.00102 0.00309** 0.00122** 0.00102 
 (0.00244) (0.000284) (0.00913) (0.00125) (0.000475) (0.00150) 
       
Real Budgetary Revenue per Unit of Urban 
Land in Year t (US$/Ha) 
-0.0415 0.0258*** 0.00633 -0.0415 0.0271*** 0.00633 
 (0.0307) (0.00357) (0.115) (0.0282) (0.00538) (0.0259) 
       
Real Budgetary Expenditure per Unit of 
Urban Land in Year t (US$/Ha) 
-0.0406*** 0.00137 0.00358 -0.0406*** 0.00147* 0.00358 
 (0.0153) (0.00178) (0.0574) (0.00759) (0.000761) (0.00587) 
       
Dynamic Balance Policy in Effect 460.5 -56.51 1356.4 460.5 -68.20 1356.4** 
 (745.3) (86.62) (2788.9) (455.1) (55.38) (637.1) 
       
N 2475 2475 2475 2475 2475 2475 
R
2
 0.110 0.092 0.005 0.407 0.323 0.112 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
§
All results are corrected for heteroskedasticity with clusters. Results in bold are also corrected for AR(1) based on the Wooldridge test results in Table 8.2. 
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B. East China 
 Without Corrections for Heteroskedasticity or AR(1) With Corrections for Heteroskedasticity and/or AR(1)
§
 




Level Change in 
Urban Land 
Area 









in Urban Land 
Area 




Real GDP from Primary Industry per Unit of 
Cultivated Land in Year t (US$/Ha) 
1.270*** -0.0568 -0.166 1.342*** -0.0594 -0.166* 
 (0.238) (0.0539) (0.166) (0.296) (0.0941) (0.0960) 
       
Real GDP from Secondary and Tertiary 
Industries per Unit of Urban Land in Year t 
(US$/Ha) 
0.00477 0.00328*** 0.000676 0.00405 0.00333** 0.000676 
 (0.00404) (0.000916) (0.00282) (0.00373) (0.00134) (0.00310) 
       
Real Budgetary Revenue per Unit of Urban 
Land in Year t (US$/Ha) 
-0.0733** 0.0193** -0.0265 -0.0752 0.0193 -0.0265 
 (0.0340) (0.00771) (0.0237) (0.0511) (0.0166) (0.0280) 
       
Real Budgetary Expenditure per Unit of 
Urban Land in Year t (US$/Ha) 
-0.00562 0.000113 -0.00735 -0.00271 0.000122 -0.00735** 
 (0.0170) (0.00386) (0.0119) (0.00899) (0.00187) (0.00375) 
       
Dynamic Balance Policy in Effect -73.99 -19.05 780.6 -154.4 -22.99 780.6 
 (969.6) (219.9) (677.2) (1139.2) (205.8) (560.5) 
       
N 808 808 808 808 808 808 
R
2
 0.102 0.110 0.019 0.357 0.293 0.290 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
§
All results are corrected for heteroskedasticity with clusters. Results in bold are also corrected for AR(1) based on the Wooldridge test results in Table 8.2. 
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C. West and Central China 
 Without Corrections for Heteroskedasticity or AR(1) With Corrections for Heteroskedasticity and/or AR(1)
§
 




Level Change in 
Urban Land 
Area 








Level Change in 
Urban Land 
Area 




Real GDP from Primary Industry per Unit of 
Cultivated Land in Year t (US$/Ha) 
1.168** -0.0416 0.129 1.168*** -0.0416** 0.129 
 (0.545) (0.0408) (2.258) (0.354) (0.0171) (0.271) 
       
Real GDP from Secondary and Tertiary 
Industries per Unit of Urban Land in Year t 
(US$/Ha) 
0.00407 0.000672*** -0.0000931 0.00407*** 0.000672*** -0.0000931 
 (0.00310) (0.000232) (0.0128) (0.00104) (0.000227) (0.00131) 
       
Real Budgetary Revenue per Unit of Urban 
Land in Year t (US$/Ha) 
-0.167*** 0.0252*** -0.0769 -0.167*** 0.0252*** -0.0769* 
 (0.0634) (0.00475) (0.262) (0.0343) (0.00699) (0.0405) 
       
Real Budgetary Expenditure per Unit of 
Urban Land in Year t (US$/Ha) 
-0.0424* 0.00215 0.0561 -0.0424*** 0.00215*** 0.0561*** 
 (0.0245) (0.00184) (0.102) (0.0121) (0.000780) (0.0123) 
       
Dynamic Balance Policy in Effect 290.8 -38.23 1435.5 290.8 -38.23 1435.5 
 (1003.3) (75.15) (4154.9) (680.0) (34.97) (943.0) 
       
N 1667 1667 1667 1667 1667 1667 
R
2
 0.132 0.085 0.007 0.421 0.421 0.113 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
§
All results are corrected for heteroskedasticity with clusters. Results in bold are also corrected for AR(1) based on the Wooldridge test results in Table 8.2. 
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Table 9.2  Two-Way FE Estimation Results of Percent Changes in Land Area without Policy Interaction Terms  
A. Whole China 








in Urban Land 
Area 
Percent Change 










in Unused Land 
Area 
Log (Real GDP from Primary Industry per 
Unit of Cultivated Land in Year t) 
0.0361*** -0.0318** -0.0156 0.0361 -0.0366 -0.0156* 
 (0.00558) (0.0133) (0.0132) (0.0275) (0.0299) (0.00806) 
       
Log (Real GDP from Secondary and Tertiary 
Industries per Unit of Urban Land in Year t) 
-0.0116** 0.121*** -0.00555 -0.0116 0.129*** -0.00555 
 (0.00518) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0150) (0.0308) (0.00577) 
       
Log (Real Budgetary Revenue per Unit of 
Urban Land in Year t) 
-0.000391 0.0349*** 0.0125 -0.000391 0.0320 0.0125 
 (0.00442) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.00364) (0.0202) (0.00955) 
       
Log (Real Budgetary Expenditure per Unit of 
Urban Land in Year t) 
-0.0101* 0.107*** -0.0229* -0.0101 0.110*** -0.0229*** 
 (0.00577) (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.00862) (0.0272) (0.00601) 
       
Dynamic Balance Policy in Effect 0.00506 -0.0110 0.00263 0.00506 -0.0106 0.00263 
 (0.00319) (0.00763) (0.00756) (0.00511) (0.00649) (0.0121) 
       
N 2475 2475 2475 2475 2475 2475 
R
2
 0.078 0.203 0.008 0.245 0.308 0.144 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
§
All results are corrected for heteroskedasticity with clusters. Results in bold are also corrected for AR(1) based on the Wooldridge test results in Table 8.2. 
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B. East China 








in Urban Land 
Area 
Percent Change 











in Unused Land 
Area 
Log (Real GDP from Primary Industry per 
Unit of Cultivated Land in Year t) 
0.0952*** -0.0496** -0.0366 0.114*** -0.0527 -0.0366 
 (0.0143) (0.0232) (0.0373) (0.0380) (0.0360) (0.0259) 
       
Log (Real GDP from Secondary and Tertiary 
Industries per Unit of Urban Land in Year t) 
-0.00508 0.108*** -0.0135 -0.0125 0.112*** -0.0135 
 (0.0150) (0.0242) (0.0390) (0.0248) (0.0421) (0.0318) 
       
Log (Real Budgetary Revenue per Unit of 
Urban Land in Year t) 
-0.00165 0.0870*** -0.0188 -0.00519 0.0873*** -0.0188 
 (0.0126) (0.0204) (0.0328) (0.0164) (0.0235) (0.0132) 
       
Log (Real Budgetary Expenditure per Unit of 
Urban Land in Year t) 
-0.0330** 0.0626*** -0.0183 -0.0298** 0.0626*** -0.0183 
 (0.0144) (0.0232) (0.0374) (0.0128) (0.0233) (0.0209) 
       
Dynamic Balance Policy in Effect -0.00251 -0.00381 0.00253 -0.00345 -0.00378 0.00253 
 (0.00693) (0.0112) (0.0180) (0.00668) (0.00914) (0.0197) 
       
N 808 808 808 808 808 808 
R
2
 0.111 0.208 0.013 0.250 0.345 0.149 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
§
All results are corrected for heteroskedasticity with clusters. Results in bold are also corrected for AR(1) based on the Wooldridge test results in Table 8.2. 
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C. West and Central China 








in Urban Land 
Area 
Percent Change 










in Unused Land 
Area 
Log (Real GDP from Primary Industry per 
Unit of Cultivated Land in Year t) 
0.0191*** -0.0297* -0.0107 0.0191 -0.0323* -0.0107** 
 (0.00550) (0.0166) (0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0196) (0.00522) 
       
Log (Real GDP from Secondary and Tertiary 
Industries per Unit of Urban Land in Year t) 
-0.00872* 0.121*** -0.00749 -0.00872* 0.130*** -0.00749 
 (0.00499) (0.0150) (0.0110) (0.00480) (0.0222) (0.00590) 
       
Log (Real Budgetary Revenue per Unit of 
Urban Land in Year t) 
-0.00749 0.0160 0.0145 -0.00749 0.0115 0.0145* 
 (0.00478) (0.0144) (0.0105) (0.00785) (0.0111) (0.00815) 
       
Log (Real Budgetary Expenditure per Unit of 
Urban Land in Year t) 
0.00325 0.125*** -0.0154 0.00325 0.129*** -0.0154** 
 (0.00605) (0.0182) (0.0133) (0.00717) (0.0367) (0.00707) 
       
Dynamic Balance Policy in Effect 0.00638* -0.0151 0.00486 0.00638 -0.0142** 0.00486 
 (0.00333) (0.0100) (0.00732) (0.00771) (0.00612) (0.00367) 
       
N 1667 1667 1667 1667 1667 1667 
R
2
 0.113 0.207 0.013 0.276 0.296 0.147 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
§
All results are corrected for heteroskedasticity with clusters. Results in bold are also corrected for AR(1) based on the Wooldridge test results in Table 8.2. 
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Table 9.3  Two-Way FE Estimation Results of Level Changes in Land Area with Policy Interaction Terms  
A. Whole China 
 Without Corrections for Heteroskedasticity or AR(1) With Corrections for Heteroskedasticity and/or AR(1)
§
 




Level Change in 
Urban Land 
Area 















Real GDP from Primary Industry per Unit of 
Cultivated Land in Year t (US$/Ha) 
1.189*** -0.102*** -0.383 1.189*** -0.111 -0.336** 
 (0.336) (0.0391) (1.097) (0.229) (0.164) (0.160) 
       
Real GDP from Secondary and Tertiary 
Industries per Unit of Urban Land in Year t 
(US$/Ha) 
0.000948 0.00124*** 0.00259 0.000948 0.00127*** 0.00295 
 (0.00266) (0.000309) (0.00868) (0.00101) (0.000397) (0.00267) 
       
Real Budgetary Revenue per Unit of Urban 
Land in Year t (US$/Ha) 
-0.0345 0.0239*** -0.0602 -0.0345** 0.0263*** -0.0873 
 (0.0427) (0.00497) (0.139) (0.0167) (0.00357) (0.0848) 
       
Real Budgetary Expenditure per Unit of 
Urban Land in Year t (US$/Ha) 
-0.0239 0.00323 -0.00549 -0.0239* 0.00311*** -0.00127 
 (0.0194) (0.00225) (0.0632) (0.0144) (0.000863) (0.0114) 
       
Dynamic Balance Policy in Effect -3.031 -42.57 298.3 -3.031 -36.08 1134.1 
 (1003.9) (116.8) (3281.0) (1100.7) (103.5) (1969.8) 
       
Area of Unused Land in Year t (Ha) 0.00119 -0.000366 -0.345*** 0.00119 -0.000344 -0.427*** 
 (0.00407) (0.000474) (0.0133) (0.00214) (0.000224) (0.0276) 
       
Policy Interaction with Real GDP from 
Primary Industry per Unit of Cultivated Land 
0.158 0.0196 0.228 0.158*** 0.0166 0.186** 
 (0.122) (0.0142) (0.399) (0.0308) (0.0151) (0.0799) 
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Table 9.3A (Continued) 
 Without Corrections for Heteroskedasticity or AR(1) With Corrections for Heteroskedasticity and/or AR(1)
§
 




Level Change in 
Urban Land 
Area 















Policy Interaction with Real GDP from 
Secondary and Tertiary Industries per Unit of 
Urban Land 
0.00480** -0.000138 0.00266 0.00480*** -0.000114 0.000641 
 (0.00227) (0.000264) (0.00742) (0.000546) (0.000379) (0.00192) 
       
Policy Interaction with Real Budgetary 
Revenue per Unit of Urban Land 
-0.0514 0.00249 -0.0320 -0.0514** 0.00152 -0.00981 
 (0.0370) (0.00430) (0.121) (0.0227) (0.00490) (0.0642) 
       
Policy Interaction with Real Budgetary 
Expenditure per Unit of Urban Land 
-0.00805 -0.00202 -0.00166 -0.00805 -0.00188*** -0.00993 
 (0.0142) (0.00165) (0.0463) (0.0127) (0.000553) (0.0113) 
       
Policy Interaction with Area of Unused Land -0.000140 0.0000113 -0.000252 -0.000140* 0.0000107 -0.000222* 
 (0.000115) (0.0000134) (0.000377) (0.0000786) (0.0000184) (0.000125) 
       
F Test for Joint Significance of Policy 
Estimators 
0.89 1.09 0.13 0.00 1.44 3.44 
P-Value 0.4458 0.3514 0.9423 0.9978 0.4876 0.1792 
T Test for Effects of Cultivated Land Value 
on Changes in Land Areas under the Policy 
23.50*** 6.45** 0.03 39.13*** 0.37 1.41 
P-Value 0.0000 0.0112 0.8649 0.0000 0.5421 0.2352 
N 2475 2475 2475 2475 2475 2475 
R
2
 0.115 0.094 0.245 0.410 0.325 0.300 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
§




B. East China 
 Without Corrections for Heteroskedasticity or AR(1) With Corrections for Heteroskedasticity and/or AR(1)
§
 




Level Change in 
Urban Land 
Area 















Real GDP from Primary Industry per Unit of 
Cultivated Land in Year t (US$/Ha) 
1.328*** -0.173** -0.0743 1.346*** -0.179 -0.0800 
 (0.293) (0.0739) (0.227) (0.375) (0.122) (0.100) 
       
Real GDP from Secondary and Tertiary 
Industries per Unit of Urban Land in Year t 
(US$/Ha) 
0.00335 0.00345*** 0.000205 0.00329 0.00365*** 0.000140 
 (0.00412) (0.00104) (0.00318) (0.00394) (0.00132) (0.00243) 
       
Real Budgetary Revenue per Unit of Urban 
Land in Year t (US$/Ha) 
-0.0923* 0.0351*** -0.0226 -0.0920 0.0362* -0.0249 
 (0.0480) (0.0121) (0.0371) (0.0576) (0.0202) (0.0320) 
       
Real Budgetary Expenditure per Unit of 
Urban Land in Year t (US$/Ha) 
0.00399 0.000308 -0.00566 0.00412 0.000276 -0.00546* 
 (0.0155) (0.00391) (0.0120) (0.00683) (0.00200) (0.00299) 
       
Dynamic Balance Policy in Effect 3214.7** 197.1 969.9 3197.7*** 212.7 1044.4 
 (1290.9) (325.0) (996.4) (1068.6) (243.1) (663.2) 
       
Area of Unused Land in Year t (Ha) 0.217*** 0.00701 -0.111*** 0.215 0.00712 -0.134 
 (0.0391) (0.00985) (0.0302) (0.167) (0.00727) (0.161) 
       
Policy Interaction with Real GDP from 
Primary Industry per Unit of Cultivated Land 
-0.171 0.0709** -0.0481 -0.173 0.0705 -0.0507 




Table 9.3B (Continued) 
 Without Corrections for Heteroskedasticity or AR(1) With Corrections for Heteroskedasticity and/or AR(1)
§
 




Level Change in 
Urban Land 
Area 















Policy Interaction with Real GDP from 
Secondary and Tertiary Industries per Unit of 
Urban Land 
-0.00111 -0.000508 0.00226 -0.00112 -0.000526 0.00225* 
 (0.00221) (0.000556) (0.00170) (0.00274) (0.000797) (0.00127) 
       
Policy Interaction with Real Budgetary 
Revenue per Unit of Urban Land 
-0.00259 0.00462 -0.0268 -0.00252 0.00384 -0.0254 
 (0.0485) (0.0122) (0.0374) (0.0442) (0.0148) (0.0318) 
       
Policy Interaction with Real Budgetary 
Expenditure per Unit of Urban Land 
0.00178 -0.0121 0.00280 0.00157 -0.0119* 0.00219 
 (0.0324) (0.00815) (0.0250) (0.0265) (0.00650) (0.0162) 
       
Policy Interaction with Area of Unused Land -0.0187*** 0.000664 -0.00381* -0.0186** 0.000656* -0.00473 
 (0.00269) (0.000676) (0.00207) (0.00932) (0.000365) (0.00632) 
       
F Test for Joint Significance of Policy 
Estimators 
2.97** 2.67** 0.60 9.87** 4.28 2.67 
P-Value 0.0313 0.0465 0.6130 0.0197 0.2324 0.4457 
T Test for Effects of Cultivated Land Value 
on Changes in Land Areas under the Policy 
24.18 2.99* 0.45 12.78** 1.36 2.66 
P-Value 0.0000 0.0840 0.5009 0.0003 0.2440 0.1026 
N 808 808 808 808 808 808 
R
2
 0.281 0.121 0.040 0.501 0.297 0.281 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
§
All results are corrected for heteroskedasticity with clusters. Results in bold are also corrected for AR(1) based on the Wooldridge test results in Table 8.2. 
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C. West and Central China 
 Without Corrections for Heteroskedasticity or AR(1) With Corrections for Heteroskedasticity and/or AR(1)
§
 




Level Change in 
Urban Land 
Area 















Real GDP from Primary Industry per Unit of 
Cultivated Land in Year t (US$/Ha) 
0.637 -0.0232 -0.602 0.637*** -0.0232 -0.366 
 (0.617) (0.0462) (2.233) (0.239) (0.0225) (0.522) 
       
Real GDP from Secondary and Tertiary 
Industries per Unit of Urban Land in Year t 
(US$/Ha) 
0.00220 0.000788*** 0.00607 0.00220*** 0.000788*** 0.00569 
 (0.00338) (0.000253) (0.0122) (0.000849) (0.000229) (0.00354) 
       
Real Budgetary Revenue per Unit of Urban 
Land in Year t (US$/Ha) 
-0.147** 0.0183*** -0.211 -0.147*** 0.0183*** -0.248 
 (0.0735) (0.00551) (0.266) (0.0416) (0.00497) (0.157) 
       
Real Budgetary Expenditure per Unit of 
Urban Land in Year t (US$/Ha) 
-0.0349 0.00690** 0.00228 -0.0349 0.00690*** 0.00818 
 (0.0396) (0.00297) (0.143) (0.0341) (0.00129) (0.0363) 
       
Dynamic Balance Policy in Effect -1373.7 78.38 388.6 -1373.7 78.38** 2426.5 
 (1474.4) (110.5) (5334.9) (1655.7) (37.32) (2949.7) 
       
Area of Unused Land in Year t (Ha) -0.000851 -0.000408 -0.347*** -0.000851 -0.000408* -0.434*** 
 (0.00451) (0.000338) (0.0163) (0.00297) (0.000210) (0.0280) 
       
Policy Interaction with Real GDP from 
Primary Industry per Unit of Cultivated Land 
0.930*** -0.0428 0.927 0.930*** -0.0428** 0.616 




Table 9.3C (Continued) 
 Without Corrections for Heteroskedasticity or AR(1) With Corrections for Heteroskedasticity and/or AR(1)
§
 




Level Change in 
Urban Land 
Area 















Policy Interaction with Real GDP from 
Secondary and Tertiary Industries per Unit of 
Urban Land 
0.00662* -0.000306 -0.00190 0.00662*** -0.000306 -0.00409 
 (0.00402) (0.000301) (0.0145) (0.000897) (0.000278) (0.00486) 
       
Policy Interaction with Real Budgetary 
Revenue per Unit of Urban Land 
-0.107 0.0108** -0.0513 -0.107*** 0.0108** -0.0539 
 (0.0656) (0.00491) (0.237) (0.0213) (0.00477) (0.0630) 
       
Policy Interaction with Real Budgetary 
Expenditure per Unit of Urban Land 
0.00527 -0.00390** 0.00615 0.00527 -0.00390*** -0.00225 
 (0.0215) (0.00161) (0.0779) (0.0187) (0.000940) (0.0182) 
       
Policy Interaction with Area of Unused Land -0.000129 0.0000133 -0.000298 -0.000129 0.0000133 -0.000273** 
 (0.000131) (0.00000980) (0.000473) (0.000103) (0.0000203) (0.000134) 
       
F Test for Joint Significance of Policy 
Estimators 
3.36** 3.22** 0.24 51.54*** 59.91*** 12.91*** 
P-Value 0.0183 0.0220 0.8665 0.0000 0.0000 0.0016 
T Test for Effects of Cultivated Land Value 
on Changes in Land Areas under the Policy 
7.90*** 2.50 0.03 15.02*** 5.21** 1.73 
P-Value 0.0050 0.1140 0.8718 0.0001 0.0225 0.1883 
N 1667 1667 1667 1667 1667 1667 
R
2
 0.140 0.093 0.249 0.426 0.426 0.304 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
§
All results are corrected for heteroskedasticity with clusters. Results in bold are also corrected for AR(1) based on the Wooldridge test results in Table 8.2. 
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Table 9.4  Two-Way FE Estimation Results of Percent Changes in Land Area with Policy Interaction Terms  
A. Whole China 








in Urban Land 
Area 
Percent Change 













Log (Real GDP from Primary Industry per 
Unit of Cultivated Land in Year t) 
0.0376*** -0.0362*** -0.00776 0.0376 -0.0388 -0.00714 
 (0.00577) (0.0138) (0.0129) (0.0263) (0.0249) (0.0106) 
       
Log (Real GDP from Secondary and Tertiary 
Industries per Unit of Urban Land in Year t) 
-0.0150*** 0.133*** 0.0127 -0.0150 0.138*** 0.0139 
 (0.00539) (0.0129) (0.0121) (0.0142) (0.0270) (0.0109) 
       
Log (Real Budgetary Revenue per Unit of 
Urban Land in Year t) 
0.00314 0.00516 -0.000759 0.00314* 0.00537 -0.00533 
 (0.00520) (0.0124) (0.0116) (0.00174) (0.0197) (0.0127) 
       
Log (Real Budgetary Expenditure per Unit of 
Urban Land in Year t) 
-0.00878 0.128*** -0.00885 -0.00878 0.129*** -0.00528 
 (0.00630) (0.0151) (0.0141) (0.0119) (0.0277) (0.00889) 
       
Dynamic Balance Policy in Effect 0.0946** -0.274*** -0.0280 0.0946 -0.263*** -0.0266 
 (0.0408) (0.0976) (0.0913) (0.0725) (0.0954) (0.0940) 
       
Log (Area of Unused Land in Year t) 0.0196*** -0.0123 -0.268*** 0.0196** -0.00859 -0.325** 
 (0.00710) (0.0170) (0.0159) (0.0100) (0.0170) (0.144) 
       
Policy Interaction with Log (Real GDP from 
Primary Industry per Unit of Cultivated Land) 
0.00111 0.00613 -0.00871* 0.00111 0.00604 -0.00872 
 (0.00203) (0.00486) (0.00454) (0.00515) (0.00992) (0.00548) 
165 
 
Table 9.4A (Continued)  








in Urban Land 
Area 
Percent Change 













Policy Interaction with Log (Real GDP from 
Secondary and Tertiary Industries per Unit of 
Urban Land) 
0.00497 -0.00415 0.0151 0.00497 -0.00316 0.0145 
 (0.00463) (0.0111) (0.0104) (0.00447) (0.0106) (0.0134) 
       
Policy Interaction with Log (Real Budgetary 
Revenue per Unit of Urban Land) 
-0.00783 0.0319** -0.0157 -0.00783 0.0311** -0.0147 
 (0.00531) (0.0127) (0.0119) (0.00481) (0.0137) (0.0130) 
       
Policy Interaction with Log (Real Budgetary 
Expenditure per Unit of Urban Land) 
-0.00629 -0.00647 0.00883 -0.00629 -0.00809 0.00848*** 
 (0.00385) (0.00922) (0.00863) (0.00399) (0.0187) (0.00217) 
       
Policy Interaction with Log (Area of Unused 
Land) 
-0.00147 0.00193 -0.00244 -0.00147 0.00212 -0.00232 
 (0.000951) (0.00227) (0.00213) (0.00131) (0.00180) (0.00186) 
F Test for Joint Significance of Policy 
Estimators 
4.20*** 4.47*** 1.14 5520.89*** 5536.61*** 3503.51*** 
P-Value 0.0003 0.0002 0.3391 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
T Test for Effects of Cultivated Land Value 
on Changes in Land Areas under the Policy 
46.47*** 4.90** 1.68 1.74 1.21 3.25* 
P-Value 0.0000 0.0270 0.1950 0.1868 0.2707 0.0712 
N 2475 2475 2475 2475 2475 2475 
R
2
 0.091 0.212 0.126 0.255 0.320 0.246 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
§
All results are corrected for heteroskedasticity with clusters. Results in bold are also corrected for AR(1) based on the Wooldridge test results in Table 8.2. 
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B. East China 








in Urban Land 
Area 
Percent Change 














Log (Real GDP from Primary Industry per 
Unit of Cultivated Land in Year t) 
0.103*** -0.0545** 0.00212 0.115*** -0.0573 -0.00292 
 (0.0153) (0.0249) (0.0387) (0.0352) (0.0353) (0.0296) 
       
Log (Real GDP from Secondary and Tertiary 
Industries per Unit of Urban Land in Year t) 
-0.0159 0.115*** 0.00457 -0.0205 0.119*** 0.00626 
 (0.0155) (0.0252) (0.0393) (0.0243) (0.0398) (0.0261) 
       
Log (Real Budgetary Revenue per Unit of 
Urban Land in Year t) 
0.00920 0.0668*** -0.00722 0.00541 0.0679** -0.0199 
 (0.0144) (0.0234) (0.0365) (0.0186) (0.0281) (0.0212) 
       
Log (Real Budgetary Expenditure per Unit of 
Urban Land in Year t) 
-0.0359** 0.0724*** -0.0387 -0.0322** 0.0716*** -0.0342* 
 (0.0152) (0.0246) (0.0384) (0.0164) (0.0239) (0.0203) 
       
Dynamic Balance Policy in Effect 0.181* -0.193 -0.175 0.186* -0.194 -0.211 
 (0.0976) (0.158) (0.247) (0.101) (0.130) (0.135) 
       
Log (Area of Unused Land in Year t) 0.0167 0.00994 -0.193*** 0.0162 0.0114 -0.288* 
 (0.0123) (0.0200) (0.0311) (0.0176) (0.0360) (0.152) 
       
Policy Interaction with Log (Real GDP from 
Primary Industry per Unit of Cultivated Land) 
-0.00511 0.00576 -0.0490*** -0.00444 0.00565 -0.0522*** 




Table 9.4B (Continued) 








in Urban Land 
Area 
Percent Change 














Policy Interaction with Log (Real GDP from 
Secondary and Tertiary Industries per Unit of 
Urban Land) 
0.00781 0.000551 0.0710*** 0.00775 0.000476 0.0724*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0166) (0.0258) (0.0105) (0.0193) (0.0227) 
       
Policy Interaction with Log (Real Budgetary 
Revenue per Unit of Urban Land) 
-0.00610 0.0193 -0.0770** -0.00468 0.0186 -0.0769*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0202) (0.0314) (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0206) 
       
Policy Interaction with Log (Real Budgetary 
Expenditure per Unit of Urban Land) 
-0.0156 -0.00797 0.0574* -0.0179 -0.00709 0.0634*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0193) (0.0301) (0.0126) (0.0183) (0.0216) 
       
Policy Interaction with Log (Area of Unused 
Land) 
-0.00169 0.00227 -0.0151*** -0.00170 0.00235 -0.0164*** 
 (0.00227) (0.00369) (0.00575) (0.00240) (0.00225) (0.00588) 
F Test for Joint Significance of Policy 
Estimators 
1.85* 0.96 3.57*** 24.23*** 5.52 29.14*** 
P-Value 0.0872 0.4530 0.0017 0.0005 0.4786 0.0001 
T Test for Effects of Cultivated Land Value 
on Changes in Land Areas under the Policy 
43.73*** 4.14** 1.58 8.68*** 2.03 4.04** 
P-Value 0.0000 0.0424 0.2093 0.0032 0.1545 0.0444 
N 808 808 808 808 808 808 
R
2
 0.127 0.215 0.082 0.265 0.350 0.207 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
§
All results are corrected for heteroskedasticity with clusters. Results in bold are also corrected for AR(1) based on the Wooldridge test results in Table 8.2. 
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C. West and Central China 








in Urban Land 
Area 
Percent Change 













Log (Real GDP from Primary Industry per 
Unit of Cultivated Land in Year t) 
0.0202*** -0.0311* -0.00438 0.0202* -0.0317* -0.00247 
 (0.00566) (0.0171) (0.0108) (0.0118) (0.0177) (0.00518) 
       
Log (Real GDP from Secondary and Tertiary 
Industries per Unit of Urban Land in Year t) 
-0.0112** 0.134*** 0.0164* -0.0112** 0.137*** 0.0161*** 
 (0.00521) (0.0157) (0.00994) (0.00538) (0.0212) (0.00569) 
       
Log (Real Budgetary Revenue per Unit of 
Urban Land in Year t) 
-0.00366 -0.0133 -0.0183* -0.00366 -0.0127 -0.0190*** 
 (0.00539) (0.0163) (0.0103) (0.00891) (0.0188) (0.00688) 
       
Log (Real Budgetary Expenditure per Unit of 
Urban Land in Year t) 
0.00416 0.148*** 0.00832 0.00416 0.149*** 0.0114** 
 (0.00660) (0.0199) (0.0126) (0.00883) (0.0415) (0.00487) 
       
Dynamic Balance Policy in Effect 0.0285 -0.302** 0.0462 0.0285 -0.285** 0.0554 
 (0.0425) (0.128) (0.0811) (0.0647) (0.118) (0.0520) 
       
Log (Area of Unused Land in Year t) 0.0315*** -0.0307 -0.383*** 0.0315** -0.0301 -0.458*** 
 (0.00894) (0.0270) (0.0171) (0.0123) (0.0188) (0.0456) 
       
Policy Interaction with Log (Real GDP from 
Primary Industry per Unit of Cultivated Land) 
0.00243 0.00686 -0.00157 0.00243 0.00679 -0.00183 




Table 9.4C (Continued) 








in Urban Land 
Area 
Percent Change 













Policy Interaction with Log (Real GDP from 
Secondary and Tertiary Industries per Unit of 
Urban Land) 
0.00599 -0.00820 -0.0100 0.00599 -0.00532 -0.00874** 
 (0.00498) (0.0150) (0.00951) (0.00449) (0.0163) (0.00370) 
       
Policy Interaction with Log (Real Budgetary 
Revenue per Unit of Urban Land) 
-0.00462 0.0425** 0.00871 -0.00462 0.0398 0.00655 
 (0.00562) (0.0170) (0.0107) (0.00375) (0.0244) (0.00430) 
       
Policy Interaction with Log (Real Budgetary 
Expenditure per Unit of Urban Land) 
-0.00534 -0.00960 -0.00176 -0.00534* -0.0123 -0.00250 
 (0.00371) (0.0112) (0.00709) (0.00303) (0.0212) (0.00342) 
       
Policy Interaction with Log (Area of Unused 
Land) 
-0.00107 0.00203 0.00231 -0.00107 0.00241 0.00283* 
 (0.000986) (0.00298) (0.00188) (0.00192) (0.00161) (0.00145) 
F Test for Joint Significance of Policy 
Estimators 
2.97*** 3.30*** 0.90 566.92*** 737.84*** 289.51*** 
P-Value 0.0069 0.0031 0.4923 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
T Test for Effects of Cultivated Land Value 
on Changes in Land Areas under the Policy 
15.91*** 2.00 0.30 3.75* 1.56 0.77 
P-Value 0.0001 0.1579 0.5838 0.0527 0.2111 0.3789 
N 1667 1667 1667 1667 1667 1667 
R
2
 0.129 0.218 0.273 0.289 0.316 0.365 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
§




Table 9.5  Second-Stage Two-Way FE Estimation Results of Level Changes in 
Unused Land Area  
 
A. Whole China 










 Stage Dependent Variable Level Change 




in Unused Land 
Area 
Level Change 




in Unused Land 
Area 
Level Change in Cultivated Land 
Area  
0.2002  0.2989  
 (0.1220)  (0.1370)  
     
Level Change in Urban Land Area   -1.0223  -0.9370 
  (1.0484)  (0.9975) 
     
Dynamic Balance Policy in Effect 797.7** 840.6** 912.6** 1020.8** 
 (389.4) (411.6) (412.2) (419.6) 
     
Area of Unused Land in Year t -0.345*** -0.345*** -0.345*** -0.345*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0168) (0.0143) (0.0168) 
     
Policy Interaction with Area of 
Unused Land 
  -0.0002** -0.0003*** 
   (0.00009) (0.00007) 
     
Over-identification Test  
(Hansen J statistic) 
4.937 4.728 10.771 13.985 
P-Value 0.1765 0.1928 0.1489 0.0514 
Under-identification Test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
16.997 23.443 21.749 37.929 
P-Value 0.0019 0.0001 0.0054 0.0000 
Weak Identification Test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
10.615 44.115 6.358 23.090 
N 2475 2475 2475 2475 
R
2
 0.2422 0.2441 0.2394 0.2444 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Stock-Yogo Critical Values 
5% maximal IV relative bias 
10% maximal IV relative bias 
20% maximal IV relative bias 
30% maximal IV relative bias 
10% maximal IV size 
15% maximal IV size  
20% maximal IV size  
























B. East China 










 Stage Dependent Variable Level Change 




in Unused Land 
Area 
Level Change 




in Unused Land 
Area 
Level Change in Cultivated Land 
Area  
0.0220  0.0989  
 (0.0892)  (0.1019)  
     
Level Change in Urban Land Area   -0.5059  -0.5588 
  (0.3821)  (0.3501) 
     
Dynamic Balance Policy in Effect 658.0* 674.9* 735.1** 929.0** 
 (363.5) (377.9) (363.2) (458.1) 
     
Area of Unused Land in Year t -0.0855 -0.0745 -0.1199** -0.0947 
 (0.0566) (0.0471) (0.0597) (0.0592) 
     
Policy Interaction with Area of 
Unused Land 
  -0.0008 -0.0026 
   (0.0019) (0.0017) 
     
Over-identification Test  
(Hansen J statistic) 
3.774 4.276 5.955 5.852 
P-Value 0.2869 0.2332 0.5450 0.5571 
Under-identification Test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
7.626 15.734 12.571 18.082 
P-Value 0.1063 0.0034 0.1275 0.0206 
Weak Identification Test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
9.419 16.385 5.358 9.328 
N 808 808 808 808 
R
2
 0.0295 0.0190 0.0361 0.0176 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Stock-Yogo Critical Values 
5% maximal IV relative bias 
10% maximal IV relative bias 
20% maximal IV relative bias 
30% maximal IV relative bias 
10% maximal IV size 
15% maximal IV size  
20% maximal IV size  
























C. West and Central China 










 Stage Dependent Variable Level Change 




in Unused Land 
Area 
Level Change 




in Unused Land 
Area 
Level Change in Cultivated Land 
Area  
0.6997  0.6741*  
 (0.4896)  (0.3497)  
     
Level Change in Urban Land Area   -3.7722  -4.2454 
  (3.5327)  (3.0890) 
     
Dynamic Balance Policy in Effect 616.7 559.3 780.1 711.2 
 (844. 5) (636.4) (834.0) (654.1) 
     
Area of Unused Land in Year t -0.3460*** -0.3482*** -0.3460*** -0.3484*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0159) (0.0114) (0.0156) 
     
Policy Interaction with Area of 
Unused Land 
  -0.0002 -0.0002** 
   (0.00013) (0.00008) 
     
Over-identification Test  
(Hansen J statistic) 
1.682 2.496 7.293 9.952 
P-Value 0.6410 0.4761 0.3990 0.1913 
Under-identification Test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
12.774 16.470 16.798 29.002 
P-Value 0.0124 0.0024 0.0323 0.0003 
Weak Identification Test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
5.286 22.084 4.519 12.050 
N 1667 1667 1667 1667 
R
2
 0.2206 0.2472 0.2227 0.2464 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Stock-Yogo Critical Values 
5% maximal IV relative bias 
10% maximal IV relative bias 
20% maximal IV relative bias 
30% maximal IV relative bias 
10% maximal IV size 
15% maximal IV size  
20% maximal IV size  

























Table 9.6  Second-Stage Two-Way FE Estimation Results of Percent Changes in 
Unused Land Area  
 
A. Whole China 










 Stage Dependent Variable Percent Change 




in Unused Land 
Area 
Percent Change 




in Unused Land 
Area 
Percent Change in Cultivated 
Land Area  
-0.2841  -0.2654  
 (0.3313)  (0.2967)  
     
Percent Change in Urban Land 
Area  
 0.02058  0.0143 
  (0.0486)  (0.0482) 
     
Dynamic Balance Policy in Effect 0.0064 0.0054 0.0206 0.0139 
 (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0390) (0.0388) 
     
Log (Area of Unused Land) -0.2594*** -0.2646*** -0.2589*** -0.2640*** 
 (0.0454) (0.0486) (0.0455) (0.0493) 
     
Policy Interaction with Log (Area 
of Unused Land) 
  -0.0012 -0.0007 
   (0.0030) (0.0030) 
     
Over-identification Test  
(Hansen J statistic) 
1.761 1.646 8.177 8.791 
P-Value 0.6235 0.6490 0.3172 0.2680 
Under-identification Test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
13.609 20.890 22.501 27.551 
P-Value 0.0087 0.0003 0.0041 0.0006 
Weak Identification Test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
14.081 117.013 9.252 62.143 
N 2475 2475 2475 2475 
R
2
 0.1150 0.1191 0.1166 0.1204 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Stock-Yogo Critical Values 
5% maximal IV relative bias 
10% maximal IV relative bias 
20% maximal IV relative bias 
30% maximal IV relative bias 
10% maximal IV size 
15% maximal IV size  
20% maximal IV size  

























B. East China 










 Stage Dependent Variable Percent Change 




in Unused Land 
Area 
Percent Change 




in Unused Land 
Area 
Percent Change in Cultivated 
Land Area  
-0.1838  -0.0247  
 (0.3977)  (0.3730)  
     
Percent Change in Urban Land 
Area  
 -0.0515  -0.0983 
  (0.1795)  (0.1742) 
     
Dynamic Balance Policy in Effect 0.0039 0.0037 0.0582 0.0620 
 (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0871) (0.0886) 
     
Log (Area of Unused Land) -0.1659*** -0.1641*** -0.1664*** -0.1612*** 
 (0.0374) (0.0433) (0.0377) (0.0452) 
     
Policy Interaction with Log (Area 
of Unused Land) 
  -0.0051 -0.0055 
   (0.0071) (0.0072) 
     
Over-identification Test  
(Hansen J statistic) 
0.906 0.857 10.077 8.538 
P-Value 0.8241 0.8359 0.1842 0.2875 
Under-identification Test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
14.432 21.827 17.221 32.055 
P-Value 0.0060 0.0002 0.0279 0.0001 
Weak Identification Test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
15.047 38.387 8.880 19.699 
N 808 808 808 808 
R
2
 0.0421 0.0627 0.0515 0.0731 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Stock-Yogo Critical Values 
5% maximal IV relative bias 
10% maximal IV relative bias 
20% maximal IV relative bias 
30% maximal IV relative bias 
10% maximal IV size 
15% maximal IV size  
20% maximal IV size  























West and Central China 










 Stage Dependent Variable Percent Change 




in Unused Land 
Area 
Percent Change 




in Unused Land 
Area 
Percent Change in Cultivated 
Land Area  
-0.0890  -0.1526  
 (0.4819)  (0.2804)  
     
Percent Change in Urban Land 
Area  
 0.0370  0.0263 
  (0.0240)  (0.0190) 
     
Dynamic Balance Policy in Effect 0.0052 0.0054* -0.0307 -0.0334 
 (0.0045) (0.0030) (0.0190) (0.0209) 
     
Log (Area of Unused Land) -0.3684*** -0.3716*** -0.3697*** -0.3750*** 
 (0.0535) (0.0674) (0.0566) (0.0677) 
     
Policy Interaction with Log (Area 
of Unused Land) 
  0.0030** 0.0032* 
   (0.0015) (0.0017) 
     
Over-identification Test  
(Hansen J statistic) 
5.378 2.200 9.371 9.176 
P-Value 0.1461 0.5320 0.2271 0.2403 
Under-identification Test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
13.026 17.370 19.775 17.966 
P-Value 0.0111 0.0016 0.0112 0.0215 
Weak Identification Test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
4.403 77.795 3.267 41.086 
N 1667 1667 1667 1667 
R
2
 0.2716 0.2636 0.2746 0.2672 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Stock-Yogo Critical Values 
5% maximal IV relative bias 
10% maximal IV relative bias 
20% maximal IV relative bias 
30% maximal IV relative bias 
10% maximal IV size 
15% maximal IV size  
20% maximal IV size  
























Table 9.7  Overall Effects of the Dynamic Balance Policy and Wald Test 
 
A. Linear Models 
 
East China 
West and Central 
China 
Whole China 
Average Overall Effects on the 
Annual Absolute Change in Cultivated 
Land (Ha) 
-270.56 429.43 531.46 
Wald Test Statistics 0.06 0.50 1.62 
P-Value 0.8009 0.4778 0.2033 
Average Overall Effects on the 
Annual Absolute Change in Urban 
Land Area (Ha) 
-91.84 -69.02 -81.91 
Wald Test Statistics 0.13 2.20 2.31 
P-Value 0.7160 0.1376 0.1287 
Average Overall Effects on the 
Annual Absolute Change in Unused 
Land Area (Ha) 
726.71 815.35 1,018.00 
Wald Test Statistics 1.72 0.15 0.47 
P-Value 0.1897 0.7015 0.4928 
 
B. Log-Log Models 
 
East China 
West and Central 
China 
Whole China 
Average Overall Effects on the Ratio 
of Cultivated Land Area in t+1 over Its 
Area in t (%) 
-0.0088 0.0063 0.0041 
Wald Test Statistics 1.13 0.73 0.69 
P-Value 0.2888 0.3934 0.4049 
Average Overall Effects on the Ratio 
of Urban Land Area in t+1 over Its 
Area in t (%) 
0.00059 -0.0103 -0.0061 
Wald Test Statistics 0.00 0.50 0.26 
P-Value 0.9493 0.4798 0.6110 
Average Overall Effects on the Ratio 
of Unused Land Area in t+1 over Its 
Area in t (%) 
0.0180 0.0044*** 0.0090 
Wald Test Statistics 0.81 10.23 0.43 





10 Concluding Remarks  
Motivated by the prevailing problems in China‘s rural land acquisition and 
conveyance, this dissertation was conducted for the purpose of examining the economic 
incentives for land acquisition and conveyance and the impacts of the Dynamic Balance 
Policy, a policy designed to protect cultivated land.  From the formulation of the policy 
questions to the methodology of answering such questions, this is the first in-depth 
analysis of its kind on this topic.  The contribution of this dissertation is twofold.  First, 
it rationalizes the incentive structure as well as the policy intervention in China‘s land 
conversion in an economic model.  Second, with a solid theoretical foundation, the 
empirical findings provide sound policy recommendations for the decision makers in 
China.    
This thesis finds that the DBP has had no effects of reducing cultivated land loss, 
although empirical evidence found by this thesis may have underestimated the effects of 
the DBP.  Nevertheless, results do show that even if the DBP has had a direct impact on 
land use changes, the effects would be overriden by strong economic incentives for 
cultivated land conversion.  These economic incentives are the main driving forces for 
cultivated land conversion, and are likely to grow with China‘s rapid economic growth.  
Consequently, any effects that the DBP may have are not likely to be sustainable.   
Moreover, the DBP has its deficiencies in designing, which could plague its 
effectiveness.  Specifically, the DBP is essentially a quota constraint on the scale of 
cultivated land conversion, and does not address the fundamental problems in land 
conversion, namely undefined property rights of rural land before 2007, the government 
taking of rural land at below the market price, the inappropriate compensation scheme, 
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and the inefficient land use planning.  China has made the successful transition from a 
planned economy to a market economy, yet it is no surprise that such 
―command-and-control‖—a term dubbed by Henderson (2009)—government 
management would fail since such powerful economic incentives for cultivated land 
conversion counteract it.  
This thesis suggests that the following schemes of restraining the economic 
incentives for land conversion may be more effective in curbing cultivated land loss: (1) 
making local governments pay the cost of cultivated land conversion determined by the 
characteristics of the land, such as the size and value of existing use, as well as its 
location with respect to urban areas, natural amenities, and access to economic and 
recreational activities; (2) raising the cost of land conversion by increasing the 
participation of farmers in the land acquisition process; (3) raising the cost of land 
conversion by increasing the land reclamation fees; (4) raising the cost of land conversion 
by increasing the expected costs of getting caught out of compliance of laws; (5) reducing 
the revenue of land conversion by imposing taxes on it; and (6) increasing the incentive 
for promoting agricultural production and cultivated land protection.   
In addition to measures underlining the incentive structure of land conversion as 
proposed by this study, several regulative measures in the debate deserve mentioning.  
First, this thesis has found that even when the Dynamic Balance Policy is followed in 
some land conversion projects, the quality of the reclaimed land is much lower compared 
with the land lost.  The government could adopt the Global Position System (GPS) to 
better monitor the exchange of new cultivated land for converted land.  With the GPS 
technologies, each parcel of land can be identified and recorded.  Then, full information 
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on its agricultural productivity, measured by indicators such as soil acidity and alkalinity, 
climate data, access to irrigation facilities, and average annual agricultural output values, 
should be attached to each parcel of land.  Any conversion of such land has to be 
compensated by land of the same quality or having the potential to have the same quality.   
Second, the ongoing tax reform in China provides a platform for developing 
alternative revenue sources for local governments, which will lessen local government‘s 
reliance on land revenues and ultimately restrain local government from inefficient urban 
land expansion.  Property taxes have been advocated as an alternative source of local 
revenue.  Not only can property taxes generate revenues for local government, they can 
also safeguard the property rights of tax payers and discourage the abuse of power by 
public servants (Cao, Feng, and Tao 2008).   
Third, to help China mitigate the incidence of land disputes, policies should be made 
to clearly define ―public interests‖ serving the rationale for land acquisition, tighten the 
de facto protection of farmers‘ land use rights, improve farmers‘ participation in land 
acquisition process, design adequate compensation packages for farmers, and ensure 
compensation is paid to the deserving farmers.  The 2011 Urban Taking Law has made 
important improvement in these respects.  Some of the measures in the Urban Taking 
Law may be applied to rural land acquisition (Li 2011).   
Fourth, it is also important for China to have a well-organized land dispute 
arbitration system.  Land disputes exist even in well-functioning market systems.  It is 
China‘s lack of dispute resolution institutions that intensify such problems (Clarke, 
Murrell, and Whiting 2008).  If a well-organized land dispute arbitration system existed 
in China, local officials and land developers would have to calculate the potential of 
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being brought to court for land disputes as their development costs, both time and money 
wise.    
Fifth, a drastic reform in China‘s land market is arguably to liberalize the land sales 
between farmers and urban private land users with the adoption of strict zoning 
regulations, a call by both western and Chinese scholars (for example, Ding 2003; Cao, 
Feng, and Tao 2008; Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting 2008; Lichtenberg and Ding 2008).      
As a final remark, this thesis conducts a conceptual and empirical investigation of the 
influence of economic incentives and the impacts of the cultivated land protection policy 
on China‘s cultivated land loss and urban land expansion.  Its findings suggest that 
under the strong influence of economic incentives for land conversion, the effect of the 
existing policy for cultivated land protection may not sustain in the long term.  This 
dissertation emphasizes that policies made to lessen the economic incentives for land 






Wooldridge Test for Serial Correlation in Panel Data 
Wooldridge (2002) derives a simple test for first-order autocorrelation (AR(1)) in 
panel-data models.  The general form of panel-data regression equations is 
                         
where y is the dependent variable, Xit represents a vector of time-varying covariates, Zi 
represents a vector of time-invariant covariates.  The error term is consisted of the 
individual-specific unobserved effects (  ), the time-specific unobserved effects (  ), and 
idiosyncratic errors (   ). 
Wooldridge test for AR(1) uses the residuals from first-differenced regressions  
                                          , 
or equally 
                       . 
Denote the estimated residuals as      .  Given Wooldridge‘s observation that, if 
error terms are not serially correlated, then                       , the test regresses 
the residuals       on their lags and tests whether the coefficient on the lagged residuals 
is equal to -0.5.  Interested audience can refer to pages 282-283 of Wooldridge (2002) 
for details and examples. 
The syntax of Wooldridge test in Stata is  
xtserial depvar [varlist] [if exp] [in range] [, output]. 
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You must tsset your data before using xtserial.  The test statistics follow F distribution.  
Rejection of the null hypothesis of no AR(1) leads to the conclusion of the presence of 
AR(1) in the model.   
Because the Wooldridge test is based on fewer assumptions, it is less powerful than 
tests that make specific assumptions about the nature of the individual effects or test for 
the individual-level effects jointly, such as the Baltagi–Wu test (Drukker 2003).  
However, it should be more robust.  While the robustness of the test makes it attractive, 
it is important to verify that it has good size and power properties under these weaker 
assumptions.  Drukker (2003) provides simulation results showing that the test has good 
size and power properties in reasonably sized samples.  Drukker‘s simulations are 
conducted for both fixed and random effects models, with and without conditional 
homoskedasticity in the idiosyncratic error terms, with balanced data and unbalanced data 
with and without gaps in the individual series.  The power simulations include both 
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